Narrative:

At very end of takeoff roll / unstick / initial climb-out; experienced some vibration--it was noticeable; but not what I would call heavy. It seemed to both of us that the vibration had perhaps come from the nose gear. Also got 'antiskid inop' light at the same time (although I did not initially see that light as it was out of my field of view while focused outside during the takeoff / initial climb). All other systems were normal. As a precautionary measure; requested dispatch call tower to ask for a runway check to determine if we had left any rubber on the runway (28R). It took a while to get an answer; but dispatch advised that the runway check came back as negative. Then requested dispatch call with [maintenance] on line to discuss the issue and inquire with [maintenance] if there were any airborne trouble-shooting options for the anti-skid system (I had a failure of that same system about two months ago on initial climb-out but the light later extinguished at cruise). [Maintenance] advised there was not any procedure he could add beside the QRH which we had already run. Advised dispatch that when we got to [destination] we would utilize runway 34L to take advantage of the length and minimize required braking. Completed abnormal performance computations; then had a minor passenger disturbance issue enroute which consumed some time. Shortly before top of descent started to get flickering of a system eng-1 low pressure light. System went to zero quantity; but pressure was holding at 3;000 psi. Advised ATC we would require runway 34L. Ran the hydraulic pump low pressure QRH. We then reviewed the loss of system a QRH so we would be familiar with it if needed. Flaps extended normally in pattern. Upon lowering gear; did not get a green light on the forward panel for the right main; but we did have a green light on the overhead panel. Was aware of the fact that this was a valid down and locked indication; however I preferred to consult the QRH given the fact that we now strongly believed we sustained tire damage on takeoff and I did not want to act on system memory and possibly miss something which may have pertained to our situation. Additionally; the a system pressure subsequently started to decrease. Elected to discontinue the approach and make left traffic so as to have time to now run the loss of system a QRH; rather than rush the checklist on short final. Also; during the low approach (I would not call it a go-around since it was initiated at 7;000 feet) tower was able to confirm that there was in fact a damaged tire. Completed loss of a system QRH; during the left hand traffic pattern; except did not utilize the manual gear extension procedure since it called for placing the gear handle in 'off'. Since the gear was extended before the a system pressure went to zero; there was no yaw; and the overhead lights were green; I saw no safety benefit; and perhaps a possible detriment to taking the gear handle out of 'down' at this point. Made flaps-40 landing using only reverse for braking until at a slow taxi speed. The roll-out was bumpy but control was never in doubt. Alternate nose-gear steering functioned normally. Shut down engines (had APU running) and fire department advised that except for our bad tire and leaking hydraulics; we appeared to be in a safe condition. Air stairs were brought out and passengers de-planed into busses. Consulted with maintenance and made appropriate log entries.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 Captain reported loss of anti-skid system and A Hydraulic system with subsequent successful landing at destination.

Narrative: At very end of takeoff roll / unstick / initial climb-out; experienced some vibration--it was noticeable; but not what I would call heavy. It seemed to both of us that the vibration had perhaps come from the nose gear. Also got 'Antiskid Inop' light at the same time (although I did not initially see that light as it was out of my field of view while focused outside during the takeoff / initial climb). All other systems were normal. As a precautionary measure; requested Dispatch call tower to ask for a runway check to determine if we had left any rubber on the runway (28R). It took a while to get an answer; but Dispatch advised that the runway check came back as negative. Then requested Dispatch call with [maintenance] on line to discuss the issue and inquire with [maintenance] if there were any airborne trouble-shooting options for the anti-skid system (I had a failure of that same system about two months ago on initial climb-out but the light later extinguished at cruise). [Maintenance] advised there was not any procedure he could add beside the QRH which we had already run. Advised Dispatch that when we got to [destination] we would utilize runway 34L to take advantage of the length and minimize required braking. Completed abnormal performance computations; then had a minor passenger disturbance issue enroute which consumed some time. Shortly before top of descent started to get flickering of A system Eng-1 Low Pressure light. System went to zero quantity; but pressure was holding at 3;000 psi. Advised ATC we would require runway 34L. Ran the Hydraulic Pump Low Pressure QRH. We then reviewed the Loss of System A QRH so we would be familiar with it if needed. Flaps extended normally in pattern. Upon lowering gear; did not get a green light on the forward panel for the right main; but we did have a green light on the overhead panel. Was aware of the fact that this was a valid down and locked indication; however I preferred to consult the QRH given the fact that we now strongly believed we sustained tire damage on takeoff and I did not want to act on system memory and possibly miss something which may have pertained to our situation. Additionally; the A system pressure subsequently started to decrease. Elected to discontinue the approach and make left traffic so as to have time to now run the Loss of System A QRH; rather than rush the checklist on short final. Also; during the low approach (I would not call it a go-around since it was initiated at 7;000 feet) tower was able to confirm that there was in fact a damaged tire. Completed Loss of A System QRH; during the left hand traffic pattern; except did not utilize the manual gear extension procedure since it called for placing the gear handle in 'Off'. Since the gear was extended before the A system pressure went to zero; there was no yaw; and the overhead lights were green; I saw no safety benefit; and perhaps a possible detriment to taking the gear handle out of 'down' at this point. Made flaps-40 landing using only reverse for braking until at a slow taxi speed. The roll-out was bumpy but control was never in doubt. Alternate nose-gear steering functioned normally. Shut down engines (had APU running) and fire department advised that except for our bad tire and leaking hydraulics; we appeared to be in a safe condition. Air stairs were brought out and passengers de-planed into busses. Consulted with maintenance and made appropriate log entries.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.