Narrative:

I was pm (pilot monitoring) and sic (second in command). We were at FL360 and deviating around some storms in the area. The PF (pilot flying) and I noticed at the same time a strong burning odor that smelled like burning plastic. At the time were no EICAS messages or any indication out of the ordinary. We checked with the flight attendant's (flight attendants) to see if there was anything going in the cabin that could be causing the smell. The flight attendant said that the odor was apparent in the forward part of the cabin; and was beginning to cause concern amongst the passengers. The flight attendant checked the cabin; including the lavs; for anything that could be causing the odor and found nothing. Our thoughts turned to the checked bags down below; and the fact that passengers admitted to having laptops; ipads; phones; etc. Packed in them. However there were no cargo smoke indications.during the time that the flight attendant was checking the cabin; the odor continued; and we began the smoke; fire; fumes QRH procedure. We then briefed the fas on our plan of action. We [advised ATC]; contacted dispatch; and began formulating a diversion plan with them. We decided that since there was no smoke; only an odor; that there wasn't enough of a threat to make donning oxygen masks necessary; and that donning them would only distract us and increase the already high workload. The QRH directed us to turn off the recirc fan; which did stop the odor. The QRH steps after that were use smoke evac procedure as necessary (which wasn't); land as soon as possible; and brief the fas using 'test' which we did. That was the end of the QRH.pretty much as soon as we noticed the odor we discussed ZZZ as an appropriate diversion airport. It was directly in front of us; had good weather; appropriate crash fire rescue equipment (crash fire rescue) and facilities; and good long runways. By the time we made the call to begin descending; we were about 80 miles from the field. ATC gave us some vectors to allow us to descend for a visual approach to runway 22 in ZZZ. There was some momentary confusion; due to ATC vectors and descriptions that seemed misleading to us as to the correct runway and/or airport; especially since [another airport] is literally a mile north and a very similar runway.since there was another airport extremely close to ZZZ; it was important to ensure we were landing at the correct airport where we had crash; fire rescue standing by. Due to the confusion; we asked ATC to give us vectors to line us up on the ILS 22; which had been set up; tuned and briefed. Also; at some point during the descent/approach a blue remote circuit breaker trip message posted on EICAS; but since we were so close to landing we decided to address that after landing safely. We made a normal; stable approach and landing to runway 22 in ZZZ; exited the runway; shutdown the engines and had airport fire inspect the aircraft for heat signatures and look in the fwd cargo compartment; the only one with bags. After getting the all clear from them that there was no apparent or imminent danger; we started the engines and taxied to the gate. At the gate; we deplaned the pax; and the captain had paramedics come check on the few that complained of feeling nauseous. Also; tsa came out and inspected the checked bags; finding no signs of anything burning.maintenance came out and addressed the tripped remote circuit breaker; which was for the water compressor. He reset it; and it popped again; thus identifying this as the probable cause of the burning odor. After locking the circuit breaker out; performing an engine run up; meling the water compressor; and doing all the appropriate paperwork and communications with everyone involved; we loaded up the passengers and continued without further incident. The burning odor and apparent electric short to the water compressor was a mechanical problem; which we know happens occasionally. I think the actions taken by the flight crew were the most appropriate and timely actions we could have done. One suggestion I would make to flightcrews that encounter an abrupt and unexpected diversion of this nature; is to receive from ATC; if available; at least vectors to join whatever instrument approach; if available; there is to the intended runway. Being a clear and a million day; ATC was giving us a purely visual approach. Due to the high workload in the situation; it would have expedited the landing more if we had just been given vectors to the ILS; which we had loaded up and tuned; than to be doing a purely visual approach. It would have been helpful if ATC had been more on the ball on their end; however as pilots we should also have the situational awareness to see that instead of a visual approach; getting lined up for an instrument approach would be more beneficial and get us on the ground quicker and easier during an emergency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-175 copilot reported a burning odor from a failed water compressor that caused the crew to divert.

Narrative: I was PM (Pilot Monitoring) and SIC (Second in Command). We were at FL360 and deviating around some storms in the area. The PF (Pilot Flying) and I noticed at the same time a strong burning odor that smelled like burning plastic. At the time were no EICAS messages or any indication out of the ordinary. We checked with the FA's (Flight Attendants) to see if there was anything going in the cabin that could be causing the smell. The FA said that the odor was apparent in the forward part of the cabin; and was beginning to cause concern amongst the passengers. The FA checked the cabin; including the lavs; for anything that could be causing the odor and found nothing. Our thoughts turned to the checked bags down below; and the fact that passengers admitted to having laptops; iPads; phones; etc. packed in them. However there were no cargo smoke indications.During the time that the FA was checking the cabin; the odor continued; and we began the smoke; fire; fumes QRH procedure. We then briefed the FAs on our plan of action. We [advised ATC]; contacted dispatch; and began formulating a diversion plan with them. We decided that since there was no smoke; only an odor; that there wasn't enough of a threat to make donning oxygen masks necessary; and that donning them would only distract us and increase the already high workload. The QRH directed us to turn off the recirc fan; which did stop the odor. The QRH steps after that were use smoke evac procedure as necessary (which wasn't); land ASAP; and brief the FAs using 'TEST' which we did. That was the end of the QRH.Pretty much as soon as we noticed the odor we discussed ZZZ as an appropriate diversion airport. It was directly in front of us; had good weather; appropriate CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) and facilities; and good long runways. By the time we made the call to begin descending; we were about 80 miles from the field. ATC gave us some vectors to allow us to descend for a visual approach to runway 22 in ZZZ. There was some momentary confusion; due to ATC vectors and descriptions that seemed misleading to us as to the correct runway and/or airport; especially since [another airport] is literally a mile north and a very similar runway.Since there was another airport extremely close to ZZZ; it was important to ensure we were landing at the correct airport where we had crash; fire rescue standing by. Due to the confusion; we asked ATC to give us vectors to line us up on the ILS 22; which had been set up; tuned and briefed. Also; at some point during the descent/approach a blue REMOTE CB TRIP message posted on EICAS; but since we were so close to landing we decided to address that after landing safely. We made a normal; stable approach and landing to RWY 22 in ZZZ; exited the runway; shutdown the engines and had airport fire inspect the aircraft for heat signatures and look in the fwd cargo compartment; the only one with bags. After getting the all clear from them that there was no apparent or imminent danger; we started the engines and taxied to the gate. At the gate; we deplaned the pax; and the captain had paramedics come check on the few that complained of feeling nauseous. Also; TSA came out and inspected the checked bags; finding no signs of anything burning.Maintenance came out and addressed the tripped remote CB; which was for the water compressor. He reset it; and it popped again; thus identifying this as the probable cause of the burning odor. After locking the CB out; performing an engine run up; MELing the water compressor; and doing all the appropriate paperwork and communications with everyone involved; we loaded up the passengers and continued without further incident. The burning odor and apparent electric short to the water compressor was a mechanical problem; which we know happens occasionally. I think the actions taken by the flight crew were the most appropriate and timely actions we could have done. One suggestion I would make to flightcrews that encounter an abrupt and unexpected diversion of this nature; is to receive from ATC; if available; at least vectors to join whatever instrument approach; if available; there is to the intended runway. Being a clear and a million day; ATC was giving us a purely visual approach. Due to the high workload in the situation; it would have expedited the landing more if we had just been given vectors to the ILS; which we had loaded up and tuned; than to be doing a purely visual approach. It would have been helpful if ATC had been more on the ball on their end; however as pilots we should also have the situational awareness to see that instead of a visual approach; getting lined up for an instrument approach would be more beneficial and get us on the ground quicker and easier during an emergency.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.