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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1373370 |
Time | |
Date | 201607 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80 Flight Crew Total 17000 Flight Crew Type 11000 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Total 13000 Flight Crew Type 2200 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Maintenance Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor Ground Incursion Taxiway |
Narrative:
Prior to event the first officer (first officer) and I discussed a write up for the incident airplane from the previous day where a fire had been noted in the number 1 engine by another aircraft as the crew taxied for takeoff. Also; on his exterior preflight; first officer observed that some fresh oil had pooled below the #1 engine. The mechanic who responded to our request for maintenance said that he personally serviced the engine overnight and that he had 'over-serviced' or overfilled the engine with oil. Given this recent history we were both sensitive to any issues with that engine.we were given a clearance to line up on runway xxl. Just before I was to begin the 90 turn onto the centerline another flight called on tower frequency that there was a fire in our left engine. I immediately shutdown the engine and without asking for clearance; I opted to continue straight ahead off the runway and onto the parallel taxiway. Meanwhile; the first officer requested emergency equipment. We ran both the QRH 'engine fire' and 'evacuation' checklists. We started the APU and I shutdown the number 2 engine. I opened the window to examine the engine as best as I could and noted some smoke but no fire. Because we had no fire indications from the flight deck and because the checklist doesn't specifically call for the use of a fire bottle without such indications; we discussed whether it would be helpful to do so. We opted not to do so unless the smoke continued or strengthened. I should also mention that once we finished all applicable items on the 'evacuation' checklist we maintained a continuous dialog with passengers and crew. Fire trucks arrived within 5-10 minutes and fire crew confirmed that the fire appeared extinguished and thermal imaging equipment indicated that the engine was cooling. They also reported that a significant amount of fluid (presumably oil) was leaking from the engine. I discussed with first officer the wisdom of starting the number 2 engine but decided that the few minutes saved over getting a tug wasn't worth the potential safety issues that come with adding an ignition source to whatever might be leaking from the left engine. Tug crew brought us to a gate and passengers and crew were deplaned.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737 flight crew reported an aircraft behind them spotted an indication of fire on their #1 engine as they were lining up on the runway. The aircraft was taxied off and ARFF was contacted. They were towed back to the gate.
Narrative: Prior to event the First Officer (FO) and I discussed a write up for the incident airplane from the previous day where a fire had been noted in the Number 1 engine by another aircraft as the crew taxied for takeoff. Also; on his exterior preflight; First Officer observed that some fresh oil had pooled below the #1 engine. The mechanic who responded to our request for maintenance said that he personally serviced the engine overnight and that he had 'over-serviced' or overfilled the engine with oil. Given this recent history we were both sensitive to any issues with that engine.We were given a clearance to line up on runway XXL. Just before I was to begin the 90 turn onto the centerline another flight called on tower frequency that there was a fire in our left engine. I immediately shutdown the engine and without asking for clearance; I opted to continue straight ahead off the runway and onto the parallel taxiway. Meanwhile; the FO requested emergency equipment. We ran both the QRH 'Engine Fire' and 'Evacuation' checklists. We started the APU and I shutdown the Number 2 engine. I opened the window to examine the engine as best as I could and noted some smoke but no fire. Because we had no fire indications from the flight deck and because the checklist doesn't specifically call for the use of a fire bottle without such indications; we discussed whether it would be helpful to do so. We opted not to do so unless the smoke continued or strengthened. I should also mention that once we finished all applicable items on the 'Evacuation' checklist we maintained a continuous dialog with passengers and crew. Fire trucks arrived within 5-10 minutes and fire crew confirmed that the fire appeared extinguished and thermal imaging equipment indicated that the engine was cooling. They also reported that a significant amount of fluid (presumably oil) was leaking from the engine. I discussed with FO the wisdom of starting the Number 2 engine but decided that the few minutes saved over getting a tug wasn't worth the potential safety issues that come with adding an ignition source to whatever might be leaking from the left engine. Tug crew brought us to a gate and passengers and crew were deplaned.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.