Narrative:

After departure climbing through roughly 500 ft AGL we received a bleed 1 overpress caution EICAS message. The climbout was continued and the aircraft configuration cleaned up; then a positive transfer of radios was initiated to give the first officer the controls and radios. As the PIC I ran the QRH for the bleed 1 overpress EICAS message. At the time I felt that I followed the QRH procedures word for word which led for the throttle on engine number 1 be brought to idle and the single engine approach and landing procedures to be accomplished. We asked for vectors to be close to [the] airport. The first officer continued to fly and handle the radios while I conducted the single engine approach and landing checklist; followed by the overweight landing checklist and all other appropriate checklists. The flight attendants and passengers were briefed on the situation as well as all QRH items being accomplished before preceding for a safe landing. After the successful landing; taxi in and deplaning I contacted the chief pilot on call to discuss the situation. While discussing the QRH there was doubt raised that I might have inadvertently 'pushed out' the pack 1 button instead of bleed 1 as the QRH called for. I cannot put any assurance into the fact that I did or did not press the pack 1 instead of bleed 1. By the time this doubt was raised maintenance was already on board and the landing configuration of the overhead panel had been changed. The maintenance personnel onboard the aircraft ran a test on the mfd and found there was a fault detected in the bleed system of the number 1 engine. I feel that in the QRH procedures that lead to degraded aircraft performance there should be a 'confirm' item listed in the procedure when dealing with turning off critical items this QRH procedure does not call for any confirmation of any kind even when it asks to reduce the thrust to idle on an engine.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB175 flight crew experienced a Bleed 1 overpressure shortly after takeoff with the First Officer flying. The Captain performed the QRH procedure which lead to idling the number 1 engine and a return to the departure airport. After landing the Chief Pilot suggested that the Pack 1 switch may have been turned off instead of the Bleed 1 switch as the QRH calls for.

Narrative: After departure climbing through roughly 500 ft AGL we received a Bleed 1 overpress Caution EICAS message. The climbout was continued and the aircraft configuration cleaned up; then a positive transfer of radios was initiated to give the FO the controls and radios. As the PIC I ran the QRH for the Bleed 1 overpress EICAS message. At the time I felt that I followed the QRH procedures word for word which led for the throttle on engine number 1 be brought to idle and the single engine approach and landing procedures to be accomplished. We asked for vectors to be close to [the] airport. The first officer continued to fly and handle the radios while I conducted the single engine approach and landing checklist; followed by the overweight landing checklist and all other appropriate checklists. The flight attendants and passengers were briefed on the situation as well as all QRH items being accomplished before preceding for a safe landing. After the successful landing; taxi in and deplaning I contacted the chief pilot on call to discuss the situation. While discussing the QRH there was doubt raised that I might have inadvertently 'pushed out' the Pack 1 button instead of Bleed 1 as the QRH called for. I cannot put any assurance into the fact that I did or did not press the Pack 1 instead of Bleed 1. By the time this doubt was raised maintenance was already on board and the landing configuration of the overhead panel had been changed. The maintenance personnel onboard the aircraft ran a test on the MFD and found there was a fault detected in the bleed system of the number 1 engine. I feel that in the QRH procedures that lead to degraded aircraft performance there should be a 'confirm' item listed in the procedure when dealing with turning off critical items This QRH procedure does not call for any confirmation of any kind even when it asks to reduce the thrust to idle on an engine.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.