Narrative:

This flight included 2 check airman applicants; myself included; and the FAA in the jumpseat conducting a line check. There were many small factors that might have contributed to the initial error; in that the environment had a higher than normal stress level. With any FAA check ride; there is always a higher level of stress. We were also behind due to a bird strike and were undergoing a maintenance inspection. ZZZ itself is also a high workload airport with the surrounding airspace; terrain and general aviation traffic. However; these threats were ultimately managed effectively as they were simply small contributing factors to the large factor that facilitated the initial error. The main factor was unfamiliarity with the new epic load 27.1 next gen aircraft. This was our first time flying a ng aircraft. The information we normally see is now in a different place. The other check airman and myself reviewed the training bulletins twice before this flight and yet still found ourselves struggling to find the correct pages we needed for data entry. This led to the problem and the reason for this report. When the takeoff data was read to me; the flap position was omitted. This most likely due to the different format and location of the flap value. Because I was unfamiliar with the new ng epic load 27.1 I was out of sequence in entering the takeoff data. I found myself hunting for the correct menu where I could enter the data. The lsk 6R feature as mentioned in our training bulletins did seem to lead me to the correct page. My mistake was that I followed a different prompt on the 'take off init' page; leading me to a different menu item. There is not a lsk 6R prompt on page 1 of 2 on the 'take off init' page. Page 2 of that menu is where the takeoff flap position is selected. The result is that I did not set the flap setting and it was subsequently left at the default setting of flaps 2. This could have resulted in a very dangerous and undesired aircraft state as you will soon see. The takeoff performance was for flaps 4 given the short runway in ZZZ. The V speeds were set accordingly for flaps 4 performance per the ACARS data. On push back I always keep the ACARS takeoff performance page up so I can reference it. On the pushback the other check airman selected flaps 2. I immediately caught the mistake and told him it was flaps 4. However; that is when we realized that I hadn't selected flaps 4 in the FMS takeoff data. Although the error was immediately recognized and corrected; the FAA inspector felt it imperative I write a report to address this safety concern. I personally have witnessed most pilots push back without the ACARS takeoff data report up. Once it is set at the gate; the mcdu is on another page. If that were to be the case in our situation; it could have resulted in dire consequences. In our situation; we initially and momentarily had flaps 2 set as well as flaps 2 being set in the takeoff data of the FMS due to the default setting. However we had much slower V1 and vr speeds set for flaps 4. This at a very critical airport with short runways and rising terrain directly off the departure end. Even though the error was immediately identified and corrected; my concern; along with the FAA inspector; is that could it happen again and be overlooked. And the most frightening reality is this: if the error had not been discovered; we would have still gotten a 'take off config ok' on our before takeoff check list; even though the V speeds were set for a different flap setting.I believe unfamiliarity with the new epic load 27.1 could facilitate such an error reoccurring and quite possibly not being caught. I believe the difference between a flaps 4 and a flaps 2 vr speed is significant enough on such a critical runway that obstacle clearance could be an issue. Although the presence of the FAA conducting a line check along with the bird strike increased the stress level; the main contributing factor was unfamiliaritywith the new epic load 27.1. As a result I never 'came across' the page where flaps were set. Because it was omitted in the read back; I never had a page to prompt me to call for it.[suggest] a bulletin being sent out to the pilot group alerting them of the potential. I now only have 1 leg under my belt in the left seat with the new epic load 27.1. Upon an additional review of the training module again; I might find where I initially went wrong in overlooking the menu with the flap setting. Ultimately awareness is key. But if there could be a software change highlighting the V speeds in video given that they are set for flaps 4 and do not match the flap setting; that might help facilitate this issue being discovered. Obviously familiarity with the new epic load will help alleviate such issues... Because the take off config only checks for flap settings; the wrong V speeds can still be set. Especially in the case of a runway change. This same situation could very well be realized in a last minute runway change.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An ERJ-170 pilot reported the new Primus Epic 27.1 FMS software design permitted him to incorrectly enter a takeoff flap setting which resulted in incorrect takeoff speeds output. The error was caught before taxi; but could easily have been overlooked.

Narrative: This flight included 2 check airman applicants; myself included; and the FAA in the jumpseat conducting a line check. There were many small factors that might have contributed to the initial error; in that the environment had a higher than normal stress level. With any FAA check ride; there is always a higher level of stress. We were also behind due to a bird strike and were undergoing a maintenance inspection. ZZZ itself is also a high workload airport with the surrounding airspace; terrain and general aviation traffic. However; these threats were ultimately managed effectively as they were simply small contributing factors to the large factor that facilitated the initial error. The main factor was unfamiliarity with the new Epic Load 27.1 Next Gen aircraft. This was our first time flying a NG aircraft. The information we normally see is now in a different place. The other check airman and myself reviewed the training bulletins twice before this flight and yet still found ourselves struggling to find the correct pages we needed for data entry. This led to the problem and the reason for this report. When the takeoff data was read to me; the flap position was omitted. This most likely due to the different format and location of the flap value. Because I was unfamiliar with the new NG Epic Load 27.1 I was out of sequence in entering the takeoff data. I found myself hunting for the correct menu where I could enter the data. The LSK 6R feature as mentioned in our training bulletins did seem to lead me to the correct page. My mistake was that I followed a different prompt on the 'Take Off Init' page; leading me to a different menu item. There is not a LSK 6R prompt on page 1 of 2 on the 'Take Off Init' page. Page 2 of that menu is where the takeoff flap position is selected. The result is that I did not set the flap setting and it was subsequently left at the default setting of flaps 2. This could have resulted in a very dangerous and undesired aircraft state as you will soon see. The takeoff performance was for flaps 4 given the short runway in ZZZ. The V speeds were set accordingly for flaps 4 performance per the ACARS data. On push back I always keep the ACARS takeoff performance page up so I can reference it. On the pushback the other check airman selected flaps 2. I immediately caught the mistake and told him it was flaps 4. However; that is when we realized that I hadn't selected flaps 4 in the FMS takeoff data. Although the error was immediately recognized and corrected; the FAA inspector felt it imperative I write a report to address this safety concern. I personally have witnessed most pilots push back without the ACARS takeoff data report up. Once it is set at the gate; the MCDU is on another page. If that were to be the case in our situation; it could have resulted in dire consequences. In our situation; we initially and momentarily had flaps 2 set as well as flaps 2 being set in the takeoff data of the FMS due to the default setting. However we had much slower V1 and VR speeds set for flaps 4. This at a very critical airport with short runways and rising terrain directly off the departure end. Even though the error was immediately identified and corrected; my concern; along with the FAA inspector; is that could it happen again and be overlooked. And the most frightening reality is this: If the error had not been discovered; we would have still gotten a 'Take Off Config OK' on our before takeoff check list; even though the V speeds were set for a different flap setting.I believe unfamiliarity with the new Epic Load 27.1 could facilitate such an error reoccurring and quite possibly not being caught. I believe the difference between a flaps 4 and a flaps 2 VR speed is significant enough on such a critical runway that obstacle clearance could be an issue. Although the presence of the FAA conducting a line check along with the bird strike increased the stress level; the main contributing factor was unfamiliaritywith the new Epic Load 27.1. As a result I never 'came across' the page where flaps were set. Because it was omitted in the read back; I never had a page to prompt me to call for it.[Suggest] a bulletin being sent out to the pilot group alerting them of the potential. I now only have 1 leg under my belt in the left seat with the new Epic Load 27.1. Upon an additional review of the training module again; I might find where I initially went wrong in overlooking the menu with the flap setting. Ultimately awareness is key. But if there could be a software change highlighting the V speeds in video given that they are set for flaps 4 and do not match the flap setting; that might help facilitate this issue being discovered. Obviously familiarity with the new Epic Load will help alleviate such issues... because the Take Off Config only checks for flap settings; the wrong V speeds can still be set. Especially in the case of a runway change. This same situation could very well be realized in a last minute runway change.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.