Narrative:

Area C; we started with 11 controllers before 2 sick calls brought the number to 9. Nothing was done. A third controller left from the shift early; bringing us to 8. Nothing was done. A fourth controller left sick later. From what I understand; the flm [front line manager] had requested overtime; but the omic [operations manager in charge] declined. Thanks for the help.I was performing ojti [on the job training instruction] duties at sectors 34 and 47; combined. We did not have a d-side at first; but a d-rated developmental was assigned later. The supervisor had asked whether or not I wanted to have the sectors split; and I had replied that I did not because it was beneficial (at the time) for training to leave them combined. Things were manageable. Things changed.traffic levels increased beyond what was prudent for leaving the sectors combined or for conducting training; but the sectors were not split - it seems by then that we no longer had staffing available to split the sectors. We were trying to make the best of the situation as far as training went; but the situation was becoming overwhelming. We had been on position for 1+30 to 1+40 and the sector had been red for a large portion of that time. I hesitated to take the situation from the developmental because it felt like they were only just a little behind the curve and could sufficiently work through it; given the chance.the developmental ended up accepting a handoff on aircraft Y; overflying pvd westbound on his route to teb; after issuing a 'descend via' clearance to aircraft X; who was overflying provi eastbound - which overlies pvd - on their way to bos. The developmental did not discern these aircraft to be a conflict at the time they accepted the handoff; and I subsequently identified the conflict to the developmental and our d-side. The d-side had apparently asked my developmental if they wanted anything to be done with aircraft Y; but the developmental declined. I hadn't heard this. We were busy enough; actually; that I didn't immediately notice the developmental had taken the handoff on aircraft Y. As soon as I did; I pointed it out. The 'right (only)' move was to go left with aircraft Y; but the developmental turned the aircraft right heading 360. This ended up only being a 20 or 30 degree turn - and it was into aircraft X's path rather than away. I immediately said that the developmental should have gone left; and then experienced an apparent large lapse in judgement and elected to try to help the developmental force their plan to work. It was a bad plan; but I didn't immediately recognize how bad. I directed the developmental to have aircraft X expedite his descent; which they (the trainee) did. I directed them to climb aircraft Y from 160 to FL200; which they did. However; the pilot of aircraft Y did not climb. I took over the radio at that point and turned aircraft X left to 030. I'd waited too long; it was not enough to maintain 3-mile radar separation. Aircraft Y came back to us a little after and wanted to clarify he was to climb to FL200. We confirmed that he had been cleared to climb. I'm pretty sure he read the initial clearance back; though I can't say whether or not it would have saved separation. It would have been better; anyway.1) stop shorting us (staffing) to the point we can't open/split sectors we need to have open for safety! What's our priority?2) if we could not provide adequate staffing/sector configuration; the traffic should have been slowed to a more manageable level. Mileage-in-trail restrictions; minutes-in-trail; and other tmu initiatives should have been put in place; but were not.bad judgement happens. It happens more frequently when you're tired; stressed; and pressed. We were all of those things. We already know what happens - how many times do we have to 'relearn' it?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZBW Controller while instructing let the developmental turn an aircraft the wrong direction which led to a loss of separation.

Narrative: Area C; we started with 11 controllers before 2 sick calls brought the number to 9. Nothing was done. A third controller left from the shift early; bringing us to 8. Nothing was done. A fourth controller left sick later. From what I understand; the FLM [Front Line Manager] had requested overtime; but the OMIC [Operations Manager In Charge] declined. Thanks for the help.I was performing OJTI [On The Job Training Instruction] duties at sectors 34 and 47; combined. We did not have a D-side at first; but a D-rated developmental was assigned later. The supervisor had asked whether or not I wanted to have the sectors split; and I had replied that I did not because it was beneficial (at the time) for training to leave them combined. Things were manageable. Things changed.Traffic levels increased beyond what was prudent for leaving the sectors combined or for conducting training; but the sectors were not split - it seems by then that we no longer had staffing available to split the sectors. We were trying to make the best of the situation as far as training went; but the situation was becoming overwhelming. We had been on position for 1+30 to 1+40 and the sector had been red for a large portion of that time. I hesitated to take the situation from the developmental because it felt like they were only just a little behind the curve and could sufficiently work through it; given the chance.The developmental ended up accepting a handoff on Aircraft Y; overflying PVD westbound on his route to TEB; after issuing a 'descend via' clearance to Aircraft X; who was overflying PROVI eastbound - which overlies PVD - on their way to BOS. The developmental did not discern these aircraft to be a conflict at the time they accepted the handoff; and I subsequently identified the conflict to the developmental and our D-side. The D-side had apparently asked my developmental if they wanted anything to be done with Aircraft Y; but the developmental declined. I hadn't heard this. We were busy enough; actually; that I didn't immediately notice the developmental had taken the handoff on Aircraft Y. As soon as I did; I pointed it out. The 'right (only)' move was to go left with Aircraft Y; but the developmental turned the aircraft right heading 360. This ended up only being a 20 or 30 degree turn - and it was into Aircraft X's path rather than away. I immediately said that the developmental should have gone left; and then experienced an apparent large lapse in judgement and elected to try to help the developmental force their plan to work. It was a bad plan; but I didn't immediately recognize how bad. I directed the developmental to have Aircraft X expedite his descent; which they (the trainee) did. I directed them to climb Aircraft Y from 160 to FL200; which they did. However; the pilot of Aircraft Y did not climb. I took over the radio at that point and turned Aircraft X left to 030. I'd waited too long; it was not enough to maintain 3-mile radar separation. Aircraft Y came back to us a little after and wanted to clarify he was to climb to FL200. We confirmed that he had been cleared to climb. I'm pretty sure he read the initial clearance back; though I can't say whether or not it would have saved separation. It would have been better; anyway.1) Stop shorting us (staffing) to the point we can't open/split sectors we NEED to have open for safety! What's our priority?2) If we could not provide adequate staffing/sector configuration; the traffic should have been slowed to a more manageable level. Mileage-in-trail restrictions; minutes-in-trail; and other TMU initiatives should have been put in place; but were not.Bad judgement happens. It happens more frequently when you're tired; stressed; and pressed. We were all of those things. We already know what happens - how many times do we have to 'relearn' it?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.