Narrative:

Aircraft X appeared to be loaded normally by ground personnel. The aircraft had arrived slightly late (we ended up pushing a few minutes late). Captain noticed that the cargo load report had been incorrectly completed. It indicated 21 'standard checked' in R2 and 6 'gate claim/planeside' in R1. As we do not have a second aft baggage compartment on the crj-200; captain transferred the 21 to the R1 column. I do not know if he conferred with ground personnel.the flight proceeded normally until our arrival. As I was completing the post flight inspection; I was surprised to see ground personnel unloading ballast from our cargo compartment. I remembered there had been no ballast indicated on the cargo load report when I entered the weight and balance numbers into the ACARS. I watched them unload for a few minutes and counted at least 16 bricks stacked on the belt loader.I returned to the aircraft and told the captain what I had seen. He left the aircraft to confer with the ground personnel. A ramp agent came to the flight deck shortly thereafter and told us that there had actually been 20 ballast bricks in the cargo compartment upon our arrival.the captain then told me that the control pressure at takeoff rotation had seemed unusually light. The aircraft had seemed to want to rotate by itself at vr. We decided this was a serious safety concern; and decided to [report] the event. Upon our return a few hours later; the jet bridge had malfunctioned and was unable to detach from our aircraft. A ground supervisor came to the flight deck to explain what was happening. While he was there; the captain mentioned our previous issue with the unreported ballast and allowed the supervisor to photograph the copy of the original cargo load report.after discussing the situation at length with the captain we decided that poor communication between ground personnel is the greatest factor leading to this problem today. Although I am not exactly sure how ramp crews work together to load the aircraft; it seems that they do not share equal accountability for the safe execution of this task. For example; one person loads bags onto the belt loader. A second person scans these bags as they ascend to the cargo compartment. A third person stacks and organizes luggage within the cargo compartment. And finally; whoever maintains the bag count (the person with the scanner?) gives this information to the gate agent; who transfers it to the cargo load report. If the person inside the bag compartment fail to tell the scanner or gate agent that there was already ballast loaded into the cargo compartment; that information is obviously never disseminated to the flight crew. Anyone involved in any part of the loading process should have a box to sign or initial on the cargo load report after reviewing it and ensuring that all information is correct.secondly; the scanners used by ramp personnel seem to be very useful for maintaining an accurate bag count. However; there is no way to scan a brick of ballast as it ascends the belt loader. Ramp crew must rely on their fingers and toes to keep an accurate count. Perhaps a generic bar code could be added to each ballast brick so that it may be scanned and counted electronically before being transferred to the cargo load report. Finally; better training for ground personnel in the areas of aircraft weight & balance and performance would give them a deeper understanding of the issues that can arise with improper procedures. Although loading aircraft seems to be a rather mundane and monotonous task; the importance of completing it safely cannot be overemphasized. If ground personnel were more aware of the danger posed by an improperly loaded aircraft; perhaps they would take more care in following the correct procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 First Officer reported departing with an inaccurate weight and balance load sheet when ground personnel failed to account for ballast in a cargo pit.

Narrative: Aircraft X appeared to be loaded normally by ground personnel. The aircraft had arrived slightly late (we ended up pushing a few minutes late). Captain noticed that the Cargo Load Report had been incorrectly completed. It indicated 21 'Standard Checked' in R2 and 6 'Gate Claim/Planeside' in R1. As we do not have a second aft baggage compartment on the CRJ-200; Captain transferred the 21 to the R1 column. I do not know if he conferred with ground personnel.The flight proceeded normally until our arrival. As I was completing the post flight inspection; I was surprised to see ground personnel unloading ballast from our cargo compartment. I remembered there had been no ballast indicated on the Cargo Load Report when I entered the weight and balance numbers into the ACARS. I watched them unload for a few minutes and counted at least 16 bricks stacked on the belt loader.I returned to the aircraft and told the Captain what I had seen. He left the aircraft to confer with the ground personnel. A ramp agent came to the flight deck shortly thereafter and told us that there had actually been 20 ballast bricks in the cargo compartment upon our arrival.The Captain then told me that the control pressure at takeoff rotation had seemed unusually light. The aircraft had seemed to want to rotate by itself at Vr. We decided this was a serious safety concern; and decided to [report] the event. Upon our return a few hours later; the jet bridge had malfunctioned and was unable to detach from our aircraft. A ground supervisor came to the flight deck to explain what was happening. While he was there; the Captain mentioned our previous issue with the unreported ballast and allowed the supervisor to photograph the copy of the original Cargo Load Report.After discussing the situation at length with the Captain we decided that poor communication between ground personnel is the greatest factor leading to this problem today. Although I am not exactly sure how ramp crews work together to load the aircraft; it seems that they do not share equal accountability for the safe execution of this task. For example; one person loads bags onto the belt loader. A second person scans these bags as they ascend to the cargo compartment. A third person stacks and organizes luggage within the cargo compartment. And finally; whoever maintains the bag count (the person with the scanner?) gives this information to the gate agent; who transfers it to the Cargo Load Report. If the person inside the bag compartment fail to tell the scanner or gate agent that there was already ballast loaded into the cargo compartment; that information is obviously never disseminated to the flight crew. Anyone involved in ANY part of the loading process should have a box to sign or initial on the Cargo Load Report AFTER reviewing it and ensuring that ALL information is correct.Secondly; the scanners used by ramp personnel seem to be very useful for maintaining an accurate bag count. However; there is no way to scan a brick of ballast as it ascends the belt loader. Ramp crew must rely on their fingers and toes to keep an accurate count. Perhaps a generic bar code could be added to each ballast brick so that it may be scanned and counted electronically before being transferred to the Cargo Load Report. Finally; better training for ground personnel in the areas of aircraft weight & balance and performance would give them a deeper understanding of the issues that can arise with improper procedures. Although loading aircraft seems to be a rather mundane and monotonous task; the importance of completing it safely cannot be overemphasized. If ground personnel were more aware of the danger posed by an improperly loaded aircraft; perhaps they would take more care in following the correct procedures.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.