Narrative:

After completion of appropriate checklists and pushback; we began to taxi to runway 23 for departure. As we were taxiing on taxiway C as we got closer to taxiway H; we had a right pack auto fail master caution message. Upon receiving the indication we had pulled over to the run up area to the left of taxi way C close to the departure end of 23. After parking brakes were applied; we followed QRH procedures; and both PF (pilot flying) and PNF (pilot not flying) were discussing what our next steps should be. We both agreed the captain call mx control. Mx deferred the right pack as per the MEL of the aircraft. After everything was signed off PF and PNF felt comfortable to continue with the flight. After a routine take off and climb out; we had soon entered our enroute phase of flight. As we were at our filed altitude of FL230; we entered some clouds causing some ice build-up. PF turned on the cowls and wing anti-ice to comply with the ice master caution. Soon after approx. 5-10 mins of anti-ice coming on; we then received a left bleed duct master warning. PNF proceeded to obtain the QRH and look for appropriate procedure to comply with. As this was happening; we began getting cabin pressure master caution; and our indications were showing that we were losing cabin pressure. PNF promptly began calling center to let them know we were unable to hold FL230 and we began to descend to 10;000 feet. We then went to the immediate action items checklists and donned our oxygen masks. First and second attempt on the radio was blocked by another aircraft; on third attempt we obtained a frequency change. PNF switched frequencies due to the radio congestion; upon the new frequency PNF on initial contact warned ATC that we were descending to 10;000 ft and unable to maintain FL230. During decent we received EICAS indications that passenger oxygen masks had been deployed and a F/a (flight attendant) had called the cockpit to let us know. PNF had told the F/a at that point that we were losing pressure and to take procedures. PNF then made an announcement over the PA notifying paxs to wear oxygen masks and that we will be diverting. During that time PF was doing all he can do bring the aircraft safely to 10;000 feet while PNF was then communicating with ATC; F/a; and airport ops. Soon after reaching 10;000 feet [the airport] was in view and ATC gave us vectors for approach in to runway 34. As the PF was flying the PNF at that point was now setting up the aircraft for a safe landing ie setting speeds; and FMS for approach and executing appropriate approach and landing checklists. Upon normal and safe landing; we were escorted to the gate. No one was injured and the passengers safely disembarked the aircraft. Our original threat was before takeoff with the right pack auto fail. I feel it was because of this failure that it had something to do with the cabin not holding its pressure. The following threat was the left bleed duct master warning; we had pulled the QRH; and as that process was taking place one after another message kept coming up on the EICAS ie cabin pressure; bleed duct master caution; etc.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-700 First Officer reported diverting to an alternate airport after loss of cabin pressure following the failure of their only remaining pack.

Narrative: After completion of appropriate checklists and pushback; we began to taxi to runway 23 for departure. As we were taxiing on taxiway C as we got closer to taxiway H; we had a Right Pack auto fail master caution message. Upon receiving the indication we had pulled over to the run up area to the left of taxi way C close to the departure end of 23. After parking brakes were applied; we followed QRH procedures; and both PF (Pilot Flying) and PNF (Pilot Not Flying) were discussing what our next steps should be. We both agreed the captain call MX control. MX deferred the right pack as per the MEL of the aircraft. After everything was signed off PF and PNF felt comfortable to continue with the flight. After a routine take off and climb out; we had soon entered our enroute phase of flight. As we were at our filed altitude of FL230; we entered some clouds causing some ice build-up. PF turned on the Cowls and wing anti-ice to comply with the ice master caution. Soon after approx. 5-10 mins of anti-ice coming on; we then received a Left Bleed Duct Master Warning. PNF proceeded to obtain the QRH and look for appropriate procedure to comply with. As this was happening; we began getting Cabin Pressure Master Caution; and our indications were showing that we were losing cabin pressure. PNF promptly began calling Center to let them know we were unable to hold FL230 and we began to descend to 10;000 feet. We then went to the immediate action items checklists and donned our oxygen masks. First and second attempt on the radio was blocked by another aircraft; on third attempt we obtained a frequency change. PNF switched frequencies due to the radio congestion; upon the new frequency PNF on initial contact warned ATC that we were descending to 10;000 ft and unable to maintain FL230. During decent we received EICAS indications that passenger oxygen masks had been deployed and a F/A (Flight Attendant) had called the cockpit to let us know. PNF had told the F/A at that point that we were losing pressure and to take procedures. PNF then made an announcement over the PA notifying PAXs to wear oxygen masks and that we will be diverting. During that time PF was doing all he can do bring the aircraft safely to 10;000 feet while PNF was then communicating with ATC; F/A; and airport ops. Soon after reaching 10;000 feet [the airport] was in view and ATC gave us vectors for approach in to RWY 34. As the PF was flying the PNF at that point was now setting up the aircraft for a safe landing ie setting speeds; and FMS for approach and executing appropriate approach and landing checklists. Upon normal and safe landing; we were escorted to the gate. No one was injured and the passengers safely disembarked the aircraft. Our original threat was before takeoff with the Right Pack Auto fail. I feel it was because of this failure that it had something to do with the cabin not holding its pressure. The following threat was the Left Bleed Duct Master Warning; we had pulled the QRH; and as that process was taking place one after another message kept coming up on the EICAS ie Cabin pressure; Bleed Duct Master Caution; etc.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.