37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1381815 |
Time | |
Date | 201608 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | UAO.Airport |
State Reference | OR |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Flight Plan | None |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Pitts Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Person 1 | |
Function | Single Pilot |
Qualification | Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Private Flight Crew Multiengine |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 33 Flight Crew Total 3500 Flight Crew Type 3300 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Conflict Ground Conflict Critical Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Ground Incursion Taxiway |
Miss Distance | Horizontal 20 Vertical 0 |
Narrative:
There are several issues involved in this incident. First is my failure to contact aurora ground control for a clearance to taxi; and when I realized I had not done so my aircraft had partially entered an active taxiway. Second; the aurora ground controller issued an inappropriate taxi clearance following my radio call without first checking the area to which my aircraft had been cleared to taxi; there being another aircraft heading toward my aircraft on the same taxiway. Third is the failure of the pitts pilot to taxi at a safe and prudent pace; and to maintain adequate forward visibility to be able to see and avoid obstacles in the path of his aircraft. [After engine start] I neglected to stop at the end of our hangar row and contact aurora ground control for a taxi clearance. Instead I continued to the ramp; then partially entered taxiway alpha at the north exit from the ramp. At this point I realized I had not contacted ground control and stopped. I then contacted ground control; explained that I had forgotten to call for a taxi clearance; and reported my position. The aurora ground controller immediately issued a clearance to me to taxi on alpha to runway 35. I repeated the clearance. Before I set the aircraft in motion I looked south down taxiway alpha; the direction in which I had been cleared to taxi. Some fifty (50) [yards]away; and getting closer quickly at a faster-than-a-walk pace; was a dark [colored] pitts biplane making very shallow 'south' turns; apparently oblivious to my aircraft's position. I was about to say something into my microphone when the ground controller commanded the pitts to stop immediately; which he did approximately twenty (20) feet from my aircraft. The controller then told me to hold my position; which I had been doing without his instruction. At this point the pitts pilot became very vocal when he realized he had not seen my aircraft at all and had been totally dependent on the ground controller to advise him of any obstacles in the path of his aircraft. He even admitted that he could not see forward in his aircraft. The controller asked the pitts pilot if he could 'make it past the cherokee'. The pitts pilot replied sarcastically that he would move completely out of the way; which he did by performing a 180 degree turn and moving onto taxiway alpha 2. The ground controller used the phrase 'possible pilot deviation' at some point during this time frame.after the pitts moved onto taxiway alpha 2 the ground controller cleared me to taxi to runway 35 via alpha. Soon the controller told me to call aurora tower and provided the phone number. I taxied south on alpha; then moved off to an open ramp area in front of a hangar under construction; informing ground control of my intention. I then shut down the engine and called aurora tower at the phone number provided. The ground controller answered; asked for my name and phone number; and then told me to expect a call shortly. [After a conversation with tower personnel] I then started my aircraft; called ground control; received a taxi clearance to runway 35; where a run-up was performed [and I departed]. I have flown from the aurora state airport; until recently an uncontrolled field; for over thirty (30) years. Only within the past ten (10) months has there been an operating control tower at this airport. I have less than six months of experience with this tower. My flight was to take place on a beautiful summer day; to an aviation destination. My wife and I did what we had always done - arrived at our hangar in plenty of time to obtain fuel; check the tire pressure; and perform a thorough pre-flight inspection. Following the fuel truck's departure I noticed that we had plenty of time before we needed to begin our flight; but my wife and I agreed to get on our way early. This was perhaps the first link in the chain of events. When it came time to start the aircraft's engine it seemed to be another summer day with a flight at an uncontrolled field I had known for many; many years. This was perhaps the second link. My wife was busy programming a GPS unit and doing other tasks. We usually act as a team; but this time she did not notice that I had not called aurora ground control at the end of our hangar row to obtain a taxi clearance. This was the third link in our chain of events. I do not know what made me realize I was no longer operating from an uncontrolled field and that I had not called aurora ground control. I know that beginning to move onto taxiway alpha is when I realized my error. I stopped immediately; but with the nose of the aircraft; and perhaps the nose gear; impinging on the taxiway surface area; but certainly not very far. My actions to this point had been inappropriate for my level of experience.ground controllers actions:when I contacted aurora ground control at the north exit of the ramp the controller seemed 'new' and inexperienced. He did not have the polished; self-confident speech of an experienced controller. Link four? His immediate issuance of an ill-advised taxi clearance to me appeared to me to show a lack situational awareness; since I assume he had cleared the pitts to taxi north on taxiway alpha. He did recognize his error fairly quickly; which was fortunate since the pitts pilot showed no signs of stopping on his own. Links five and six? As the pitts pilot became more vocal; expressing disbelief that the controller had not kept him informed about the possible obstacle in his way; that this was the very reason he depended on controllers since he was unable to see forward in his plane; his voice indignant; the controller uttered the phrase 'possible pilot deviation.' the controller seemed to recover his composure quickly; continuing with his activities in communicating with both pilots in a civil manner.pitts pilot's actions:from our vantage point both my wife and I considered the pitts' taxi speed to be excessive. We were taught to taxi no faster than a person can walk. Also; the 'south' turns made by the pitts were very shallow; seemingly only token movements; solely to keep the plane aligned with the center of the taxiway. More pronounced (and at a slower pace) 'south' turns would have allowed the pilot to look out the side of his cockpit to actually see what was in front of his aircraft; not simply the edge of the taxiway. By the pilot's tone of voice and his choice of aircraft he appeared to be a 'type a' personality; perhaps with an ego. The color of the pitts was dark. It was not instantly visible on the taxiway. If this situation had presented itself with a light color aircraft; I would have noticed it simply by peripheral vision. Being dark it was not as noticeable. I believe the pitts pilot's very vocal; indignant; and sarcastic comments contributed to the escalation of this incident to a 'possible pilot deviation.' he has lessons to learn from this scenario; as does the controller; I; and my wife.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: PA28 pilot reported a ground conflict with a tailwheel aircraft after the reporter failed to call Ground Control for clearance.
Narrative: There are several issues involved in this incident. First is my failure to contact Aurora Ground Control for a clearance to taxi; and when I realized I had not done so my aircraft had partially entered an active taxiway. Second; the Aurora Ground Controller issued an inappropriate taxi clearance following my radio call without first checking the area to which my aircraft had been cleared to taxi; there being another aircraft heading toward my aircraft on the same taxiway. Third is the failure of the Pitts pilot to taxi at a safe and prudent pace; and to maintain adequate forward visibility to be able to see and avoid obstacles in the path of his aircraft. [After engine start] I neglected to stop at the end of our hangar row and contact Aurora Ground Control for a taxi clearance. Instead I continued to the ramp; then partially entered taxiway Alpha at the north exit from the ramp. At this point I realized I had not contacted Ground Control and stopped. I then contacted Ground Control; explained that I had forgotten to call for a taxi clearance; and reported my position. The Aurora Ground Controller immediately issued a clearance to me to taxi on Alpha to Runway 35. I repeated the clearance. Before I set the aircraft in motion I looked south down taxiway Alpha; the direction in which I had been cleared to taxi. Some fifty (50) [yards]away; and getting closer quickly at a faster-than-a-walk pace; was a dark [colored] Pitts biplane making very shallow 'S' turns; apparently oblivious to my aircraft's position. I was about to say something into my microphone when the Ground Controller commanded the Pitts to stop immediately; which he did approximately twenty (20) feet from my aircraft. The controller then told me to hold my position; which I had been doing without his instruction. At this point the Pitts pilot became very vocal when he realized he had not seen my aircraft at all and had been totally dependent on the Ground Controller to advise him of any obstacles in the path of his aircraft. He even admitted that he could not see forward in his aircraft. The controller asked the Pitts pilot if he could 'make it past the Cherokee'. The Pitts pilot replied sarcastically that he would move completely out of the way; which he did by performing a 180 degree turn and moving onto taxiway Alpha 2. The Ground Controller used the phrase 'possible pilot deviation' at some point during this time frame.After the Pitts moved onto taxiway Alpha 2 the Ground Controller cleared me to taxi to Runway 35 via Alpha. Soon the controller told me to call Aurora Tower and provided the phone number. I taxied south on Alpha; then moved off to an open ramp area in front of a hangar under construction; informing Ground Control of my intention. I then shut down the engine and called Aurora Tower at the phone number provided. The Ground Controller answered; asked for my name and phone number; and then told me to expect a call shortly. [After a conversation with Tower personnel] I then started my aircraft; called Ground Control; received a taxi clearance to Runway 35; where a run-up was performed [and I departed]. I have flown from the Aurora State Airport; until recently an uncontrolled field; for over thirty (30) years. Only within the past ten (10) months has there been an operating control tower at this airport. I have less than six months of experience with this tower. My flight was to take place on a beautiful summer day; to an aviation destination. My wife and I did what we had always done - arrived at our hangar in plenty of time to obtain fuel; check the tire pressure; and perform a thorough pre-flight inspection. Following the fuel truck's departure I noticed that we had plenty of time before we needed to begin our flight; but my wife and I agreed to get on our way early. This was perhaps the first link in the chain of events. When it came time to start the aircraft's engine it seemed to be another summer day with a flight at an uncontrolled field I had known for many; many years. This was perhaps the second link. My wife was busy programming a GPS unit and doing other tasks. We usually act as a team; but this time she did not notice that I had not called Aurora Ground Control at the end of our hangar row to obtain a taxi clearance. This was the third link in our chain of events. I do not know what made me realize I was no longer operating from an uncontrolled field and that I had not called Aurora Ground Control. I know that beginning to move onto taxiway Alpha is when I realized my error. I stopped immediately; but with the nose of the aircraft; and perhaps the nose gear; impinging on the taxiway surface area; but certainly not very far. My actions to this point had been inappropriate for my level of experience.Ground Controllers actions:When I contacted Aurora Ground Control at the north exit of the ramp the controller seemed 'new' and inexperienced. He did not have the polished; self-confident speech of an experienced controller. Link four? His immediate issuance of an ill-advised taxi clearance to me appeared to me to show a lack situational awareness; since I assume he had cleared the Pitts to taxi north on taxiway Alpha. He did recognize his error fairly quickly; which was fortunate since the Pitts pilot showed no signs of stopping on his own. Links five and six? As the Pitts pilot became more vocal; expressing disbelief that the controller had not kept him informed about the possible obstacle in his way; that this was the very reason he depended on controllers since he was unable to see forward in his plane; his voice indignant; the controller uttered the phrase 'possible pilot deviation.' The controller seemed to recover his composure quickly; continuing with his activities in communicating with both pilots in a civil manner.Pitts pilot's actions:From our vantage point both my wife and I considered the Pitts' taxi speed to be excessive. We were taught to taxi no faster than a person can walk. Also; the 'S' turns made by the Pitts were very shallow; seemingly only token movements; solely to keep the plane aligned with the center of the taxiway. More pronounced (and at a slower pace) 'S' turns would have allowed the pilot to look out the side of his cockpit to actually see what was in front of his aircraft; not simply the edge of the taxiway. By the pilot's tone of voice and his choice of aircraft he appeared to be a 'Type A' personality; perhaps with an ego. The color of the Pitts was dark. It was not instantly visible on the taxiway. If this situation had presented itself with a light color aircraft; I would have noticed it simply by peripheral vision. Being dark it was not as noticeable. I believe the Pitts pilot's very vocal; indignant; and sarcastic comments contributed to the escalation of this incident to a 'possible pilot deviation.' He has lessons to learn from this scenario; as does the controller; I; and my wife.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.