Narrative:

On the bdega 2 RNAV into sfo; we were given holding instructions to hold at bgglo as published; we were at FL360; the next controller gave us a descent to FL330. As we approached the holding fix; I; as pm; went off frequency to inform the flight attendant's; passenger and operations of our requirement to hold. I returned just as we were entering the hold. The FMS commanded a 200 knot holding speed. The PF was monitoring the speed and had mentioned to me (earlier as we discussed the procedure to enter the hold) that he thought 200 kts was far too low for the altitude of FL330. As I was returning from coordinating and informing; the airplane was slowing and turning to the holding heading. The PF observed the airspeed at 200 kts; the eyebrows appear (as the aircraft banked) and the low speed tape rise. He interpreted this as an impending stall and kicked off the autopilot. I entered from my coordination's at this point; saw him kick off the auto pilot and commence a descent. I came on the controls to arrest the descent (loss of 300-350 feet); got slightly aggressive about it and the stick shaker activated momentarily (1-2 seconds). We recovered the lost altitude and continued the holding pattern. I don't recall the airspeed ever getting below 200 kts. There was no query from oakland center and the rest of the flight was uneventful.I believe the FMS holding speeds are too low for such a high altitude. I don't believe we would have stalled at 200 kts; however. So; my level of confidence was higher than the PF. Even though he expressed his concern; I failed to discern his level of concern. Also; being 'absent' (communicating) at the critical point of entering the hold; removed input that could have mitigated the threat indications; i.e. Simply overriding the at to increase the airspeed during the turn and manually setting a higher hold speed (210-215 kts).consider increasing canned FMS holding speeds.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ERJ-175 Captain reported the FMS was programmed for an unrealistically low airspeed for high altitude holds.

Narrative: On the BDEGA 2 RNAV into SFO; we were given holding instructions to hold at BGGLO as published; we were at FL360; the next controller gave us a descent to FL330. As we approached the holding fix; I; as PM; went off frequency to inform the FA's; PAX and operations of our requirement to hold. I returned just as we were entering the hold. The FMS commanded a 200 knot holding speed. The PF was monitoring the speed and had mentioned to me (earlier as we discussed the procedure to enter the hold) that he thought 200 kts was far too low for the altitude of FL330. As I was returning from coordinating and informing; the airplane was slowing and turning to the holding heading. The PF observed the airspeed at 200 kts; the eyebrows appear (as the aircraft banked) and the low speed tape rise. He interpreted this as an impending stall and kicked off the autopilot. I entered from my coordination's at this point; saw him kick off the auto pilot and commence a descent. I came on the controls to arrest the descent (loss of 300-350 feet); got slightly aggressive about it and the stick shaker activated momentarily (1-2 seconds). We recovered the lost altitude and continued the holding pattern. I don't recall the airspeed ever getting below 200 kts. There was no query from Oakland Center and the rest of the flight was uneventful.I believe the FMS holding speeds are too low for such a high altitude. I don't believe we would have stalled at 200 kts; however. So; my level of confidence was higher than the PF. Even though he expressed his concern; I failed to discern his LEVEL of concern. Also; being 'absent' (communicating) at the critical point of entering the hold; removed input that could have mitigated the threat indications; i.e. simply overriding the AT to increase the airspeed during the turn and manually setting a higher hold speed (210-215 kts).Consider increasing canned FMS holding speeds.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.