Narrative:

When the captain and I arrived at the airplane; the airplane was in maintenance. The airplane had 2 write-ups that were written by the previous crew. To the best of my knowledge; the first write-up was for the left engine had a slow N2 rotation and had no starter cut out. The second write-up was for the cockpit emergency escape hatch making a squealing noise on climb out. Maintenance personnel arrived at the airplane. I (first officer) observed maintenance personnel ask the captain if he could start the left engine for them. The captain agreed to start the left engine. After the maintenance personnel gave the okay to start the left engine; the captain initiated the start. At this point I (first officer) observed all indications were normal. At the appropriate starting limits; the captain advanced the trust levers from shut off to idle. The engine light off appeared to be slower than normal; approaching the starter limit N2 was approximately 55% or above; and it appeared the starter was not going to cut out. From my observations; the captain was going to select the stop button on the starter; and inadvertently selected the start for the number 2 engine. I (first officer) said to the captain no; you want to hit the starter stop button on the number 1 engine just as there was a loud noise coming from outside the airplane. This happened within seconds; and in my opinion I do not think the captain heard me because of the loud noise from outside the airplane. At that point; I observed the fire warning switch and warning bell going off. I (first officer) selected both starters to stop once I heard the fire warning switch and warning bell. The captain and I started running the immediate action checklist for engine fire or severe damage on ground and then we ran the appropriate QRH checklist.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 First Officer reported that the Captain was asked by Maintenance to start the left engine to assess a write up for slow N2 rotation and no starter cut out during start. When the Captain attempted to terminate the left start; he activated the right starter. The First Officer terminated both starters; but not before the left starter disintegrated causing a fire warning.

Narrative: When the captain and I arrived at the airplane; the airplane was in maintenance. The airplane had 2 write-ups that were written by the previous crew. To the best of my knowledge; the first write-up was for the left engine had a slow N2 rotation and had no starter cut out. The second write-up was for the cockpit emergency escape hatch making a squealing noise on climb out. Maintenance personnel arrived at the airplane. I (First Officer) observed maintenance personnel ask the captain if he could start the left engine for them. The captain agreed to start the left engine. After the maintenance personnel gave the okay to start the left engine; the captain initiated the start. At this point I (First Officer) observed all indications were normal. At the appropriate starting limits; the captain advanced the trust levers from shut off to idle. The engine light off appeared to be slower than normal; approaching the starter limit N2 was approximately 55% or above; and it appeared the starter was not going to cut out. From my observations; the captain was going to select the stop button on the starter; and inadvertently selected the start for the number 2 engine. I (First Officer) said to the captain no; you want to hit the starter stop button on the number 1 engine just as there was a loud noise coming from outside the airplane. This happened within seconds; and in my opinion I do not think the captain heard me because of the loud noise from outside the airplane. At that point; I observed the fire warning switch and warning bell going off. I (First Officer) selected both starters to stop once I heard the fire warning switch and warning bell. The captain and I started running the immediate action checklist for engine fire or severe damage on ground and then we ran the appropriate QRH checklist.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.