Embraer 120 first officer reported that on a post flight inspection; discovered that the #2 nacelle ...

Narrative:

I am a first officer on the emb 120 aircraft. As part of my training I was informed that my responsibilities include a preflight inspection of the aircraft; and that this inspection consisted of a general inspection typical of other aircraft I had been trained in. The only type-specific inspection training related to a few items such items as number of vortex generators on the tail; the position of a bolt in the wheel brakes; the propeller; etc. Very little detailed inspection criteria was provided for the airframe; and no criteria was provided for checking the hydraulic access panels on the underside of the engine nacelles.prior to first flight of the day I completed a full preflight inspection/walk-around of the aircraft. All doors; panels and hatches were inspected and verified for security and proper position; in addition to other normal preflight items. On this occasion a FSDO FAA aviation safety inspector (asi) inspected the aircraft prior to flight; and he observed my preflight inspection of the aircraft. The FAA asi then reported to the captain his opinion that everything was good on the preflight inspection.after previous flights I had discovered the outboard latch on the #2 nacelle hydraulic access panel unlocked after landing. I reported the difficulty to numerous captains on previous occasions prior to this flight; and had become accustomed to inspecting this area carefully since it was prone to unlock before the end of a given flight.two weeks prior to today's flight a captain submitted a maintenance discrepancy describing the difficulty I reported. As result of that discrepancy report maintenance action was performed and repair was noted in the aircraft dispatch paperwork.after today's first flight I performed my normal post flight inspection for a quick turn per company procedure. At this time I discovered that the #2 nacelle hydraulic door was missing and that damage had been sustained to the right hand inboard wing flap and areas of the nacelle in proximity to the missing hydraulic access door.at a post flight meeting with company maintenance personnel and safety inspectors I was informed that company maintenance personnel were aware that previous incidents have occurred with this aircraft type; where the hydraulic access panel has been known to separate from the aircraft and cause damage to the wing flaps. In addition; more senior employees told me after today's event that this particular panel latch has been found unlocked after previous flights.from the damage evidence I cannot determine whether the damage to the flap was caused by the hydraulic access panel latch unlocking; lack of proper maintenance; from outside force such as a bird strike; or if some internal pressure damaged the flap and caused the panel to open and separate from the aircraft.I believe that this damage might have been avoided with the following suggestions:1) more precise training in preflight inspection criteria; and awareness of the problem history of the hydraulic access panel latches;2) more stringent maintenance procedures;3) an improvement to the design of the hydraulic access panel4) a change to operational procedure that would require preflight inspection to be designated required inspection item with inspection by two individuals; to include the pilot in command.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Embraer 120 First Officer reported that on a post flight inspection; discovered that the #2 nacelle hydraulic door was missing and that damage had been sustained to the right hand inboard wing flap and areas of the nacelle in proximity to the missing hydraulic access door.

Narrative: I am a First Officer on the EMB 120 aircraft. As part of my training I was informed that my responsibilities include a preflight inspection of the aircraft; and that this inspection consisted of a general inspection typical of other aircraft I had been trained in. The only type-specific inspection training related to a few items such items as number of vortex generators on the tail; the position of a bolt in the wheel brakes; the propeller; etc. Very little detailed inspection criteria was provided for the airframe; and no criteria was provided for checking the hydraulic access panels on the underside of the engine nacelles.Prior to first flight of the day I completed a full preflight inspection/walk-around of the aircraft. All doors; panels and hatches were inspected and verified for security and proper position; in addition to other normal preflight items. On this occasion a FSDO FAA Aviation Safety Inspector (ASI) inspected the aircraft prior to flight; and he observed my preflight inspection of the aircraft. The FAA ASI then reported to the Captain his opinion that everything was good on the preflight inspection.After previous flights I had discovered the outboard latch on the #2 nacelle hydraulic access panel unlocked after landing. I reported the difficulty to numerous captains on previous occasions prior to this flight; and had become accustomed to inspecting this area carefully since it was prone to unlock before the end of a given flight.Two weeks prior to today's flight a Captain submitted a maintenance discrepancy describing the difficulty I reported. As result of that discrepancy report maintenance action was performed and repair was noted in the aircraft dispatch paperwork.After today's first flight I performed my normal post flight inspection for a quick turn per company procedure. At this time I discovered that the #2 nacelle hydraulic door was missing and that damage had been sustained to the right hand inboard wing flap and areas of the nacelle in proximity to the missing hydraulic access door.At a post flight meeting with company maintenance personnel and safety inspectors I was informed that company maintenance personnel were aware that previous incidents have occurred with this aircraft type; where the hydraulic access panel has been known to separate from the aircraft and cause damage to the wing flaps. In addition; more senior employees told me after today's event that this particular panel latch has been found unlocked after previous flights.From the damage evidence I cannot determine whether the damage to the flap was caused by the hydraulic access panel latch unlocking; lack of proper maintenance; from outside force such as a bird strike; or if some internal pressure damaged the flap and caused the panel to open and separate from the aircraft.I believe that this damage might have been avoided with the following suggestions:1) More precise training in preflight inspection criteria; and awareness of the problem history of the hydraulic access panel latches;2) More stringent maintenance procedures;3) An improvement to the design of the hydraulic access panel4) A change to operational procedure that would require preflight inspection to be designated required inspection item with inspection by two individuals; to include the pilot in command.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	1384184
Time
Date	201608
Local Time Of Day	0601-1200
Place
Locale Reference	ZZZ.Airport
State Reference	US
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	Brasilia EMB-120 All Series
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 135
Flight Phase	Parked
Component
Aircraft Component	Pylon Fasteners & Latches
Person 1
Function	First Officer
Qualification	Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Commercial Flight Crew Instrument
Events
Anomaly	Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Other / Unknown

Embraer 120 first officer reported that on a post flight inspection; discovered that the #2 nacelle hydraulic door was missing and that damage had been sustained to the right hand inboard wing flap and areas of the nacelle in proximity to the missing hydraulic access door.