Narrative:

I was the first officer and pilot monitoring on this flight. The event started at approximately xb:40.this particular aircraft had a service check the night prior to our flight where each engine was serviced with 2 quarts of oil according to the aircraft flight discrepancy log (afdl) entry. Both the captain and I had reviewed this prior to the flight. All preflight checks were normal; including my walk-around of the airplane where nothing was out of the ordinary (specifically there were no indications of oil leaks or puddles around the airplane). The engine start; taxi out; and takeoff were all normal.during the climb out; prior to reaching 8;000 feet MSL; with climb thrust set and 250 KIAS; about 5 minutes after takeoff; the captain (pilot flying) noticed that the oil pressure was decreasing and the oil temperature was increasing into the amber range on the left engine. The captain directed me to start QRH procedures while he covered the radios and continued to fly the airplane. We requested an early level off at 10;000 feet from ATC while we addressed a problem. During the course of this event; the oil temperature got as high as 180 degrees C (with a red indication); and the oil pressure dropped to as low as 35 psi (with an amber indication).we had no warning or caution messages on the EICAS; so I ran the abnormal procedure for 'high oil temperature' on the QRH. The oil temperature could not be reduced below the red range; so the checklist referred us to 'abnormal single engine procedures; in-flight engine shutdown'. This checklist led to an intentional shutdown of the left engine; which then results in a landing 'at the nearest suitable airport' and the 'abnormal single engine approach and landing procedure.'while I was running the checklists; the captain coordinated the return to [departure airport] with ATC and our dispatcher. The captain [advised ATC of the situation] and we were given vectors back toward [our departure airport]. We were still within 30-40 miles of [our departure airport] during this entire event; and the ATIS reported: calm 9SM clear 23/23 30.03 with visual approaches to [the] runway. So [our departure airport] was certainly our best choice of airports. When the workload had slowed down; the captain also notified the flight attendant and passengers of our situation.due to the quick return back we were going to be landing overweight. We were operating under emergency authority of the captain; and it was made very clear in my training that landing 'at the nearest suitable airport' means you should land overweight (if needed) and not take the time to burn off excess fuel. So we decided that the overweight landing was the best course of action. Our actual landing weight was calculated to be 47;504 pounds with a descent rate of less than 500 feet per minute.I called [airport] operations and let them know we were returning on a single engine and our plan was to return to the gate as long as events did not get worse and require an evacuation. We got vectors to the visual approach to the runway; and the captain made an excellent landing. Fire trucks were ready along the taxiways; however all indications were normal (given the situation); so their assistance was not needed. We taxied to the gate where the passengers were deplaned normally.the captain and I both went outside to check the airplane afterward; and the left engine in particular. There were no indications of oil leaks or spills on/around the engine; and none in the aft equipment bay.the captain wrote up the oil temperature/oil pressure problem; the subsequent engine shutdown; and the overweight landing in the afdl.passengers were rebooked on other flights.other info: duty-in was xa:45; and duty-out was xm:32.threats: abnormal oil temperature and oil pressure indications which were consistent with a loss of oil in the left engine.errors: I truthfully can't identify any errors we made. I had just gone through [training recently]; and the captain is one of the sharpest and most professional I have gotten to fly with. I thought we worked very well as a team; followed the appropriate checklists; and ultimately landed safely while single-engine. The crew coordination was very good.undesired aircraft state: in this case; flying single-engine was actually desired and in-line with established procedures; so I would not classify anything as an undesired aircraft state.after reviewing this event with my captain as well as on my own; I feel that we handled the situation the correct way. We ran checklists that were certainly consistent with the engine indications presented; made timely decisions to return to [departure airport]; and coordinated with all the parties necessary (ATC; dispatcher; flight attendant; passengers; and [airport] operations). The overweight landing was also the correct decision based on our discussions in [training] earlier.it was great to see that our training carried over very well to the real-world scenario. So I'd like to give credit to the company and training department in that regard.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 First Officer reported high oil temperature/low oil pressure on the left engine during climb out which resulted in an inflight shutdown of the engine with a return to the departure airport for an overweight landing.

Narrative: I was the First Officer and pilot monitoring on this flight. The event started at approximately XB:40.This particular aircraft had a service check the night prior to our flight where each engine was serviced with 2 quarts of oil according to the Aircraft Flight Discrepancy Log (AFDL) entry. Both the Captain and I had reviewed this prior to the flight. All preflight checks were normal; including my walk-around of the airplane where nothing was out of the ordinary (specifically there were no indications of oil leaks or puddles around the airplane). The engine start; taxi out; and takeoff were all normal.During the climb out; prior to reaching 8;000 feet MSL; with climb thrust set and 250 KIAS; about 5 minutes after takeoff; the Captain (pilot flying) noticed that the oil pressure was decreasing and the oil temperature was increasing into the amber range on the left engine. The Captain directed me to start QRH procedures while he covered the radios and continued to fly the airplane. We requested an early level off at 10;000 feet from ATC while we addressed a problem. During the course of this event; the oil temperature got as high as 180 degrees C (with a red indication); and the oil pressure dropped to as low as 35 PSI (with an amber indication).We had no warning or caution messages on the EICAS; so I ran the abnormal procedure for 'high oil temperature' on the QRH. The oil temperature could not be reduced below the red range; so the checklist referred us to 'abnormal single engine procedures; in-flight engine shutdown'. This checklist led to an intentional shutdown of the left engine; which then results in a landing 'at the nearest suitable airport' and the 'abnormal single engine approach and landing procedure.'While I was running the checklists; the Captain coordinated the return to [departure airport] with ATC and our dispatcher. The Captain [advised ATC of the situation] and we were given vectors back toward [our departure airport]. We were still within 30-40 miles of [our departure airport] during this entire event; and the ATIS reported: Calm 9SM CLR 23/23 30.03 with visual approaches to [the] runway. So [our departure airport] was certainly our best choice of airports. When the workload had slowed down; the Captain also notified the flight attendant and passengers of our situation.Due to the quick return back we were going to be landing overweight. We were operating under emergency authority of the Captain; and it was made very clear in my training that landing 'at the nearest suitable airport' means you should land overweight (if needed) and not take the time to burn off excess fuel. So we decided that the overweight landing was the best course of action. Our actual landing weight was calculated to be 47;504 pounds with a descent rate of less than 500 feet per minute.I called [airport] operations and let them know we were returning on a single engine and our plan was to return to the gate as long as events did not get worse and require an evacuation. We got vectors to the visual approach to the runway; and the Captain made an excellent landing. Fire trucks were ready along the taxiways; however all indications were normal (given the situation); so their assistance was not needed. We taxied to the gate where the passengers were deplaned normally.The Captain and I both went outside to check the airplane afterward; and the left engine in particular. There were no indications of oil leaks or spills on/around the engine; and none in the aft equipment bay.The Captain wrote up the oil temperature/oil pressure problem; the subsequent engine shutdown; and the overweight landing in the AFDL.Passengers were rebooked on other flights.Other info: duty-in was XA:45; and duty-out was XM:32.Threats: abnormal oil temperature and oil pressure indications which were consistent with a loss of oil in the left engine.Errors: I truthfully can't identify any errors we made. I had just gone through [training recently]; and the Captain is one of the sharpest and most professional I have gotten to fly with. I thought we worked very well as a team; followed the appropriate checklists; and ultimately landed safely while single-engine. The crew coordination was very good.Undesired Aircraft State: in this case; flying single-engine was actually desired and in-line with established procedures; so I would not classify anything as an undesired aircraft state.After reviewing this event with my Captain as well as on my own; I feel that we handled the situation the correct way. We ran checklists that were certainly consistent with the engine indications presented; made timely decisions to return to [departure airport]; and coordinated with all the parties necessary (ATC; dispatcher; flight attendant; passengers; and [airport] operations). The overweight landing was also the correct decision based on our discussions in [training] earlier.It was great to see that our training carried over very well to the real-world scenario. So I'd like to give credit to the company and training department in that regard.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.