Narrative:

I was acting as pilot in command and pilot flying of a flight to new orleans; la (msy). During this flight we abandoned our approach due to weather and declared minimum fuel. The first officer set up the FMS as normal while I reviewed the release. I then reviewed the FMS double checked that everything was correct. I [reviewed] the ATIS in new orleans and noted that at the time; we would expect a visual approach to runway 2; and I loaded the ILS for that runway. We then received our clearance and reviewed the FMS again to ensure everything was correct. Our clearance was correctly loaded in the FMS. I then preformed the brief with the first officer and ran the before start checklist. We confirmed our fuel on board was 8;600 pounds which matched the release. We then set the weight and balance and handed out the paperwork.after push back; we started the number 2 engine and ran the taxi checklist before calling ramp for taxi. We did not experience any delays on our taxi and as we made the turn from runway xx onto taxiway echo; I called for the delay before start checklist as we were number 3 in line for departure. The first officer started the number 1 engine and I updated our fuel on board; which was around 8;450 pounds; on the perf page of the FMS. That is when I first noticed that the FMS said that our landing fuel was 2;400 pounds. The reserve fuel for this flight was about 2;350 pounds. At this point; we turned onto E2 and held short of runway xy. I called dispatch to discuss the fuel load with the dispatcher and we both agreed to return for more fuel. The first officer called ops to request a fuel truck meet us in the west hard stand; while I called ground to request a taxi. Once there; we ran the shutdown checklist and I then informed the flight attendants and made a PA announcement. When the truck arrived; I asked for 9;000 pounds total fuel on board which the FMS computed would give about 3;200 pounds on landing. Once done with fueling; we ran the before start checklist; started both engines since there were no other planes waiting for takeoff; ran the taxi checklist and taxied out for takeoff with no delays.out of 10;000 feet; we accelerated to 280 knots as per the departure; and then 290 knots as per the profile when normal speed was given. During our climb; I again reviewed our fuel as well as the winds aloft. Based on the winds aloft in the release and the ACARS econ page; the first officer and I discussed and decided to request a climb from FL360; our filed altitude; to FL380. Once at FL380; I checked the fuel again and determined that increasing our speed to M.82 would give us a landing fuel of 3;100 pounds and allow us to make up several minutes since we were only about 15 minutes late at that point. Somewhere close to atl; we were cleared direct to the sji VOR and we noticed some build ups in the distance. Using the radar; we could see they were about 150 NM out and we discussed which way to go around them. We only needed 10 degrees right and once passed we turned back towards sji. About 40 minutes from new orleans; I briefed the approach; with the ATIS still reporting a visual approach to runway 2.houston center held us up high for a while; not giving us a descent until west of mobile and we made an idle descent from FL380 to 11;000 feet. As we made our descent; the approach controller stated that the airport and turned around and to expect a visual to runway 20. We then set up for the RNAV approach and I briefed it. Because we had been held high for so long; I asked for a delay vector to lose some more altitude and we were vectored to the north before turning back just outside of rayop on the RNAV 20 approach. We were given a 180 heading to join the approach between rayop and jaspo and to contact the tower. We checked in with the tower and were cleared to land runway 20; and advised that there was a microburst alert for runway 11 with a loss of 25 knots. The controller called the winds as 210 at 15 gusting to25. At this time; I looked at our fuel again and we had about 3;200 pounds on board. We continued on the approach for a few seconds longer as I analyzed the situation. We were in VMC and I had the airport in sight at about 1;800 feet just inside of jaspo. I could also see a rain shaft with what appeared to be heavy rain just to the west of the field. I knew we did not have an alternate; nor did we have any missed approach fuel or holding fuel and any delays in a decision could lead to a fuel emergency. I decided to execute a missed approach with a turn to the east. We asked how fast and what direction the cell was moving. The controller said was not moving very much and that it was sitting pretty much on top of the field. I looked the station bulletin and determined that baton rouge was the closest airport at 56 NM and decided to divert there and declared minimum fuel. The first officer entered direct baton rouge and loaded an approach while we were given a vector over lake pontchartrain towards baton rouge and a climb to 10;000 feet. I confirmed the change in the FMS and then looked at the fuel; which said we would land with 1;400 pounds of fuel. I realized that heading to baton rouge would not work; and stopped the climb at 5;000 feet. I asked again what the weather was in new orleans. The controller said the winds were 190 at 7 gusting to 15 and that there was another arrival that said there was no loss or gain in speed. I decided to turn back to new orleans to land. We then reloaded the RNAV runway 20 and flew the visual approach. I added 5 knots to the reference speed and called for the continuous ignition. We did not experience any gain or loss of speed on the approach and landed with about 2;700 pounds of fuel on board.the taf for our scheduled time of arrival was 140/7knots P6SM SCT035. There was no inclement weather forecasted in new orleans for the entire day. When we sent for the ATIS; they were not reporting any adverse weather and we did not expect any. The cell popped up just prior to our arrival.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Regional Jet flight crew reported declaring minimum fuel after abandoning an approach to MSY due to a microburst alert and successfully landed on the second attempt.

Narrative: I was acting as Pilot In Command and Pilot Flying of a flight to New Orleans; LA (MSY). During this flight we abandoned our approach due to weather and declared minimum fuel. The First Officer set up the FMS as normal while I reviewed the release. I then reviewed the FMS double checked that everything was correct. I [reviewed] the ATIS in New Orleans and noted that at the time; we would expect a visual approach to runway 2; and I loaded the ILS for that runway. We then received our clearance and reviewed the FMS again to ensure everything was correct. Our clearance was correctly loaded in the FMS. I then preformed the brief with the First Officer and ran the Before Start Checklist. We confirmed our fuel on board was 8;600 LBS which matched the release. We then set the weight and balance and handed out the paperwork.After push back; we started the number 2 engine and ran the taxi checklist before calling ramp for taxi. We did not experience any delays on our taxi and as we made the turn from runway XX onto taxiway Echo; I called for the Delay Before Start Checklist as we were number 3 in line for departure. The First Officer started the number 1 engine and I updated our fuel on board; which was around 8;450 LBS; on the PERF page of the FMS. That is when I first noticed that the FMS said that our landing fuel was 2;400 LBS. The reserve fuel for this flight was about 2;350 LBS. At this point; we turned onto E2 and held short of runway XY. I called dispatch to discuss the fuel load with the dispatcher and we both agreed to return for more fuel. The First Officer called ops to request a fuel truck meet us in the west hard stand; while I called ground to request a taxi. Once there; we ran the shutdown checklist and I then informed the Flight Attendants and made a PA announcement. When the truck arrived; I asked for 9;000 LBS total fuel on board which the FMS computed would give about 3;200 LBS on landing. Once done with fueling; we ran the before start checklist; started both engines since there were no other planes waiting for takeoff; ran the taxi checklist and taxied out for takeoff with no delays.Out of 10;000 feet; we accelerated to 280 knots as per the departure; and then 290 knots as per the profile when normal speed was given. During our climb; I again reviewed our fuel as well as the winds aloft. Based on the winds aloft in the release and the ACARS ECON page; the First Officer and I discussed and decided to request a climb from FL360; our filed altitude; to FL380. Once at FL380; I checked the fuel again and determined that increasing our speed to M.82 would give us a landing fuel of 3;100 LBS and allow us to make up several minutes since we were only about 15 minutes late at that point. Somewhere close to ATL; we were cleared direct to the SJI VOR and we noticed some build ups in the distance. Using the radar; we could see they were about 150 NM out and we discussed which way to go around them. We only needed 10 degrees right and once passed we turned back towards SJI. About 40 minutes from New Orleans; I briefed the approach; with the ATIS still reporting a visual approach to runway 2.Houston Center held us up high for a while; not giving us a descent until west of Mobile and we made an idle descent from FL380 to 11;000 feet. As we made our descent; the approach controller stated that the airport and turned around and to expect a visual to runway 20. We then set up for the RNAV approach and I briefed it. Because we had been held high for so long; I asked for a delay vector to lose some more altitude and we were vectored to the north before turning back just outside of RAYOP on the RNAV 20 approach. We were given a 180 heading to join the approach between RAYOP and JASPO and to contact the tower. We checked in with the tower and were cleared to land runway 20; and advised that there was a Microburst Alert for runway 11 with a loss of 25 knots. The controller called the winds as 210 at 15 gusting to25. At this time; I looked at our fuel again and we had about 3;200 LBS on board. We continued on the approach for a few seconds longer as I analyzed the situation. We were in VMC and I had the airport in sight at about 1;800 feet just inside of JASPO. I could also see a rain shaft with what appeared to be heavy rain just to the west of the field. I knew we did not have an Alternate; nor did we have any missed approach fuel or holding fuel and any delays in a decision could lead to a fuel emergency. I decided to execute a missed approach with a turn to the east. We asked how fast and what direction the cell was moving. The controller said was not moving very much and that it was sitting pretty much on top of the field. I looked the station bulletin and determined that Baton Rouge was the closest airport at 56 NM and decided to divert there and declared Minimum Fuel. The First Officer entered direct Baton Rouge and loaded an approach while we were given a vector over Lake Pontchartrain towards Baton Rouge and a climb to 10;000 feet. I confirmed the change in the FMS and then looked at the fuel; which said we would land with 1;400 LBS of fuel. I realized that heading to Baton Rouge would not work; and stopped the climb at 5;000 feet. I asked again what the weather was in New Orleans. The controller said the winds were 190 at 7 gusting to 15 and that there was another arrival that said there was no loss or gain in speed. I decided to turn back to New Orleans to land. We then reloaded the RNAV runway 20 and flew the visual approach. I added 5 knots to the REF speed and called for the continuous ignition. We did not experience any gain or loss of speed on the approach and landed with about 2;700 LBS of fuel on board.The TAF for our scheduled time of arrival was 140/7knots P6SM SCT035. There was no inclement weather forecasted in New Orleans for the entire day. When we sent for the ATIS; they were not reporting any adverse weather and we did not expect any. The cell popped up just prior to our arrival.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.