Narrative:

On climb out (passing approximately 6000 ft); we noticed the number 1 engine low oil quantity indication in reverse video indicating approximately 14 percent. All other engine instruments looked normal. As the pilot flying; I slowly closed the number 1 thrust lever. We initially discussed the possibility of oil gulping; but the throttles had been reduced from takeoff setting for a couple minutes and we were slowly climbing because of overhead traffic. Oil quantity at engine start had been 72 percent. Oil pressure throughout event was approximately 23 percent.as the pilot monitoring; I pulled out the QRH to look for a low oil quantity checklist; I called operations and asked them to call dispatch; and ask them to come up our frequency. When the agent replied they didn't know how to do that; I thanked them and switched to operations. (I was going to use the ACARS to contact dispatch; but this particular -700 (like the -800s) did not allow programming from both cdus simultaneously; and the first officer was using it.) dispatch eventually contacted us on operations frequency without any prompting from us. When I refocused on the first officer; he said he couldn't find a low oil procedure. A brief discussion followed; cut short by the number 1 oil temperature turning amber and reading 143 degrees. We had asked for and received a lower level off altitude and informed departure that we were having problems with our number 1 engine and wanted to divert. We quickly ran through the high oil temperature checklist; brought the full engine parameters up on the lower [display] to verify the oil temperature was not at the red line; and decided to keep the engine running for the landing. Dispatch contacted us and changed our destination. During the flight; I spoke with the flight attendants twice and the passengers once.enroute; (which had an undesired consequence of the controllers and us rushing things). It was probably the right thing to do; it just seemed like things happened faster than I wanted and I did not take action to slow it down; i.e. Extend downwind and have them create another gap in the arrivals. The first officer was busy trying to program the FMC and not having luck doing it. I told him to forget it. The controllers asked us to keep our speed up and plan for the ILS to 25L. Weather was 700 ft overcast. We were then changed to 24R. We hit the high points of the approach; did not rerun numbers for 24R but agreed that we would not have a problem stopping on 24R with flaps set at 15 degrees. We intercepted the localizer high; needed to go to flaps 25 to get down to glideslope; but we were stabilized at 1000 ft with the flaps at 15. The landing was uneventful.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The Flight Crew of a B737-700 reported #1 engine oil quantity diminishing and oil temperature rising during climb.

Narrative: On climb out (passing approximately 6000 ft); we noticed the number 1 engine Low Oil Quantity indication in reverse video indicating approximately 14 percent. All other engine instruments looked normal. As the Pilot Flying; I slowly closed the number 1 thrust lever. We initially discussed the possibility of oil gulping; but the throttles had been reduced from takeoff setting for a couple minutes and we were slowly climbing because of overhead traffic. Oil quantity at engine start had been 72 percent. Oil pressure throughout event was approximately 23 percent.As the Pilot Monitoring; I pulled out the QRH to look for a Low Oil Quantity Checklist; I called Operations and asked them to call Dispatch; and ask them to come up our frequency. When the Agent replied they didn't know how to do that; I thanked them and switched to Operations. (I was going to use the ACARS to contact Dispatch; but this particular -700 (like the -800s) did not allow programming from both CDUs simultaneously; and the First Officer was using it.) Dispatch eventually contacted us on Operations frequency without any prompting from us. When I refocused on the First Officer; he said he couldn't find a Low Oil Procedure. A brief discussion followed; cut short by the number 1 oil temperature turning amber and reading 143 degrees. We had asked for and received a lower level off altitude and informed Departure that we were having problems with our number 1 engine and wanted to divert. We quickly ran through the High Oil Temperature Checklist; brought the full engine parameters up on the lower [display] to verify the oil temperature was not at the red line; and decided to keep the engine running for the landing. Dispatch contacted us and changed our destination. During the flight; I spoke with the Flight Attendants twice and the Passengers once.Enroute; (which had an undesired consequence of the Controllers and us rushing things). It was probably the right thing to do; it just seemed like things happened faster than I wanted and I did not take action to slow it down; i.e. extend downwind and have them create another gap in the arrivals. The First Officer was busy trying to program the FMC and not having luck doing it. I told him to forget it. The Controllers asked us to keep our speed up and plan for the ILS to 25L. Weather was 700 ft overcast. We were then changed to 24R. We hit the high points of the approach; did not rerun numbers for 24R but agreed that we would not have a problem stopping on 24R with flaps set at 15 degrees. We intercepted the Localizer high; needed to go to flaps 25 to get down to glideslope; but we were stabilized at 1000 ft with the flaps at 15. The landing was uneventful.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.