Narrative:

At cruise altitude of FL370 the #2 left inner tank pump faulted. We turned it off and began to search for an associated circuit breaker on the circuit breaker panel on the aft wall of the cockpit. We found two that I believe were associated and neither was popped. Within a moment or two we smelled what I describe an electrical wire burning smell. I offered I felt the risk was too high to continue for the distance to our destination and first officer agreed. I already had closest airports up on the FMC which displayed ZZZ virtually below us and I recollect ZZZ1 was second closest. I made the decision to divert to ZZZ and first officer began the conversation with ATC. Almost simultaneous the entire row of inner pumps faulted and the ECAM said the auto fuel feed had faulted. To better understand or seek the 'big picture' what might be occurring I focused on the overhead panel for a moment and at that time the fuel system was displaying the entire inner pump row faulted and fuel feed coming from the outer tanks to the engines. Not normal for nominal cruise flight with an hour to go but okay to keep the engines running. We had just over 6000 lbs in each outer so that was plenty to descend and land at ZZZ. It may be worth mentioning the auto system re-engaged during the descent and began utilizing fuel from the center tank (all the inner tanks were off per the ECAM guidance). I recall giving first officer the plane and me quickly getting out of my seat and checking the avionics compartment through the hatch in the floor to accurately investigate with my flashlight the presence of any visible smoke and there was none; but the odor seemed stronger in the avionic compartment itself. We discussed oxygen masks and decided to defer donning for now.we turned back to ZZZ and ATC expeditiously vectored us back to a normal landing and we cleared and stopped at a taxiway and high speed intersection per the request of tower ( I assume so there would be plenty of pavement around us should it be necessary for the emergency equipment surrounding to move in after we stopped). I deferred blowing the slide to egress to further assess the issues. We had conversation with the crash crew and asked for external visible indications-there were none. After discussion on the radio they managed to open the forward avionics compartment from the outside; came inside the compartment and scanned inside around the compartment with some type of hand held sensing device. During this evaluation we went from two engines to one engine then down to just the APU and de-powering most of the equipment. While I still had no knowledge of what the source of the smell was I felt the threat to the jet and our safety was lowered and emergency egress was not necessary though of course always available should circumstances change. While not nauseous we sought to get out of the jet with the smell still evident. After maintenance arrived we left the APU running and exited the aircraft via a fire crew ladder out of L1. Other notes: one's nose adapts to scent and smell with time but after we landed and heard the avionics ground cooling fans come on; the burning scent came on strong yet again. The situation in real time never seemed to let up. Conversely; I would like to add I considered I did not feel we needed to rush to land as in exceed 250 below 10;000; but just expeditiously get the jet on the ground. If there would have been associated smoke then masks; higher speeds and likely a blown escape slide and the evacuation checklist would have been utilized. These options were always on the ready if conditions were to change.I now know at this writing that there were electrical components that went south and caused the smell/fumes that we smelled. The event with hindsight was not that serious. However; if something similar happens again I wouldn't conduct myself any different. The unknowns; my control of same; make the risk too high to continue to destination unless I was already within gliding distance. The event inmy opinion came on sequentially in a relatively short period of time which strongly suggested that the issue was growing and coming on with worse issues possibly to come; helping me make a timely divert decision. I had a somewhat similar event 8-9 years ago except it was right after takeoff in cat ii weather. I recall in that event it was also fumes but a different scent. We had deiced/anti-iced for takeoff but had no indications of equipment losses; other system abnormalities or imminent threats present.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Airbus flight crew reported the ECAM first alerted a LEFT INNER FUEL PUMP FAULT followed by an acrid burning electrical odor. The crew decided to divert and the ECAM alerted AUTO FUEL FEED FAULT and all inner fuel pumps faulted. The flight landed uneventfully.

Narrative: At cruise altitude of FL370 the #2 left inner tank pump faulted. We turned it off and began to search for an associated circuit breaker on the CB panel on the aft wall of the cockpit. We found two that I believe were associated and neither was popped. Within a moment or two we smelled what I describe an electrical wire burning smell. I offered I felt the risk was too high to continue for the distance to our destination and FO agreed. I already had closest airports up on the FMC which displayed ZZZ virtually below us and I recollect ZZZ1 was second closest. I made the decision to divert to ZZZ and FO began the conversation with ATC. Almost simultaneous the entire row of inner pumps faulted and the ECAM said the Auto Fuel Feed had faulted. To better understand or seek the 'big picture' what might be occurring I focused on the overhead panel for a moment and at that time the fuel system was displaying the entire inner pump row faulted and fuel feed coming from the outer tanks to the engines. Not normal for nominal cruise flight with an hour to go but okay to keep the engines running. We had just over 6000 lbs in each outer so that was plenty to descend and land at ZZZ. It may be worth mentioning the auto system re-engaged during the descent and began utilizing fuel from the center tank (all the inner tanks were off per the ECAM guidance). I recall giving FO the plane and me quickly getting out of my seat and checking the avionics compartment through the hatch in the floor to accurately investigate with my flashlight the presence of any visible smoke and there was none; but the odor seemed stronger in the avionic compartment itself. We discussed oxygen masks and decided to defer donning for now.We turned back to ZZZ and ATC expeditiously vectored us back to a normal landing and we cleared and stopped at a taxiway and high speed intersection per the request of tower ( I assume so there would be plenty of pavement around us should it be necessary for the emergency equipment surrounding to move in after we stopped). I deferred blowing the slide to egress to further assess the issues. We had conversation with the crash crew and asked for external visible indications-there were none. After discussion on the radio they managed to open the forward avionics compartment from the outside; came inside the compartment and scanned inside around the compartment with some type of hand held sensing device. During this evaluation we went from two engines to one engine then down to just the APU and de-powering most of the equipment. While I still had no knowledge of what the source of the smell was I felt the threat to the jet and our safety was lowered and emergency egress was not necessary though of course always available should circumstances change. While not nauseous we sought to get out of the jet with the smell still evident. After maintenance arrived we left the APU running and exited the aircraft via a fire crew ladder out of L1. Other notes: One's nose adapts to scent and smell with time but after we landed and heard the avionics ground cooling fans come on; the burning scent came on strong yet again. The situation in real time never seemed to let up. Conversely; I would like to add I considered I did not feel we needed to rush to land as in exceed 250 below 10;000; but just expeditiously get the jet on the ground. If there would have been associated smoke then masks; higher speeds and likely a blown escape slide and the evacuation checklist would have been utilized. These options were always on the ready if conditions were to change.I now know at this writing that there were electrical components that went south and caused the smell/fumes that we smelled. The event with hindsight was not that serious. However; if something similar happens again I wouldn't conduct myself any different. The unknowns; my control of same; make the risk too high to continue to destination unless I was already within gliding distance. The event inmy opinion came on sequentially in a relatively short period of time which strongly suggested that the issue was growing and coming on with worse issues possibly to come; helping me make a timely divert decision. I had a somewhat similar event 8-9 years ago except it was right after takeoff in Cat II weather. I recall in that event it was also fumes but a different scent. We had deiced/anti-iced for takeoff but had no indications of equipment losses; other system abnormalities or imminent threats present.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.