Narrative:

After the captain (pilot flying) finished loading the mcdu I checked the information. I verified the flight plan route fix by fix and cross checked the total route distance in the mcdu and total flight planned distance on the release and verified that the difference was within approximately 10 NM. I don't believe that the estimated fuel on aircraft (efoa) number on the mcdu was amber at this point but if it was I somehow missed it.required fuel at takeoff was 24;017. Planned ramp fuel was 28;310. Actual fuel on board (fob) upon completion of refueling was 28;400. Actual takeoff fuel was 28;000. The passenger booked section of the release was blank but I thought it was for nothing more than informational purposes. The estimated zero fuel weight (ezfw) was 94.4 but this didn't raise a red flag for myself or the captain as we have both done multiple repo flights recently.our taxi route was a-t-U to rwy xy. Based on the fact that it's not a terribly long taxi as it is; there was taxiway closures and construction; and it was past sunset my workload during the taxi was relatively high. While on taxiway uniform I switched to the tower frequency and just as I was beginning the before takeoff checklist tower stated that there was an aircraft on base and we were cleared for takeoff. In hindsight I clearly should have declined the takeoff clearance and advised tower that we would need another minute or two. Instead I read back the takeoff clearance and allowed myself to get rushed. In doing so I inadvertently failed to reference the dispatch release estimated take off weight (etow) during the gross weight comparison.during the initial climb we noticed the efoa prediction on the mcdu was amber. We briefly discussed it and thought that perhaps there was an error in the flight plan or something. We noted that the fob was still well above our required take off fuel (tof) so we decided to delay our investigation until an appropriate time above 10;000 feet. After passing through 10;000 feet I checked the mcdu flight plan again against the dispatch release. All the fixes; distances; and times were correct but the fuel burn was off. I began recording the predicted time and [estimated] fuel remaining for each fix and continued to update throughout the flight with actual numbers at each fix. After noting that the difference between the planned vs mcdu predicted estimated fuel remaining (efrem) was increasing for each successive fix we determined that the actual fuel burn was significantly higher than the planned fuel burn.at this time we began investigating for possible mechanical issues (such as a control surface deflection; gear door/s open; landing lights extended... Anything) just in case. We immediately ruled out a fuel leak but still continued to monitor fuel burned vs fuel remaining on board. After finding no evidence of mechanical issues we determined that the sole issue must have been the dispatch release and flight planning. By this point we slowed to a cost index of 0 and went from showing an efoa of 1.0 to 1.8. We communicated this to dispatch via ACARS and said that we suspected that the computer may have messed something up on the release and asked if they could run the numbers again on a different computer. (We were told by dispatch to continue to [destination] and that they would keep an eye on it). It was then determined that the flight had been planned with zero passengers and bags. This accounted for a difference of approximately 36;000 pounds between planned tow and actual tow. We now knew the reason for the significant difference in fuel burn.after conferring with dispatch we agreed to divert to ZZZ for fuel. The ZZZ station did an excellent job quick turning us and we continued to our filed destination uneventfully. We blocked in 51 minutes past our scheduled arrival time in our filed destination. I've been with this carrier for about 8 month. For the last (approx) 6 years I've been flying smaller regional jets with shorter stage lengths. In that time I've never had a major problem with a discrepancy between planned and actual loading affecting the fuel burn so significantly. The airbus is a much larger aircraft with significantly larger loads and longer stage lengths. Unfortunately I was not able to effectively correlate the importance of some aspects of the gross weight comparison during my initial training. To be very honest this was an eye-opening experience for me. I now fully understand the importance of checking the planned weights with the actual weights during the gross weight comparison; how to catch such errors; as well as the repercussions if such errors are not caught. I believe that I have learned a lot from my mistakes during this event and will be adjusting my personal procedures/techniques accordingly so as to ensure that this never happens again.I also believe people learn best by example and pilots are certainly no exception. I think that sharing a brief narrative of this event along with a reminder of the preventive measures with the pilot group (either as a pilot read file or during recurrent training) would help to prevent future events such as this.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 flight crew reported departing on a transcontinental flight with insufficient fuel due to flight plan not including baggage or passengers.

Narrative: After the captain (Pilot Flying) finished loading the MCDU I checked the information. I verified the flight plan route fix by fix and cross checked the total route distance in the MCDU and total flight planned distance on the release and verified that the difference was within approximately 10 NM. I don't believe that the Estimated Fuel On Aircraft (EFOA) number on the MCDU was amber at this point but if it was I somehow missed it.Required fuel at takeoff was 24;017. Planned ramp fuel was 28;310. Actual Fuel On Board (FOB) upon completion of refueling was 28;400. Actual takeoff fuel was 28;000. The PAX BOOKED section of the release was blank but I thought it was for nothing more than informational purposes. The Estimated Zero Fuel Weight (EZFW) was 94.4 but this didn't raise a red flag for myself or the captain as we have both done multiple repo flights recently.Our taxi route was A-T-U to rwy XY. Based on the fact that it's not a terribly long taxi as it is; there was taxiway closures and construction; and it was past sunset my workload during the taxi was relatively high. While on taxiway Uniform I switched to the tower frequency and just as I was beginning the Before Takeoff checklist tower stated that there was an aircraft on base and we were cleared for takeoff. In hindsight I clearly should have declined the takeoff clearance and advised tower that we would need another minute or two. Instead I read back the takeoff clearance and allowed myself to get rushed. In doing so I inadvertently failed to reference the dispatch release Estimated Take Off Weight (ETOW) during the gross weight comparison.During the initial climb we noticed the EFOA prediction on the MCDU was amber. We briefly discussed it and thought that perhaps there was an error in the flight plan or something. We noted that the FOB was still well above our required Take Off Fuel (TOF) so we decided to delay our investigation until an appropriate time above 10;000 feet. After passing through 10;000 feet I checked the MCDU flight plan again against the dispatch release. All the fixes; distances; and times were correct but the fuel burn was off. I began recording the predicted time and [estimated] fuel remaining for each fix and continued to update throughout the flight with ACTUAL numbers at each fix. After noting that the difference between the planned vs MCDU predicted Estimated Fuel Remaining (EFREM) was increasing for each successive fix we determined that the actual fuel burn was significantly higher than the planned fuel burn.At this time we began investigating for possible mechanical issues (such as a control surface deflection; gear door/s open; landing lights extended... ANYTHING) just in case. We immediately ruled out a fuel leak but still continued to monitor fuel burned vs fuel remaining on board. After finding no evidence of mechanical issues we determined that the sole issue must have been the dispatch release and flight planning. By this point we slowed to a cost index of 0 and went from showing an EFOA of 1.0 to 1.8. We communicated this to dispatch via ACARS and said that we suspected that the computer may have messed something up on the release and asked if they could run the numbers again on a different computer. (We were told by dispatch to continue to [destination] and that they would keep an eye on it). It was then determined that the flight had been planned with zero passengers and bags. This accounted for a difference of approximately 36;000 LBS between planned TOW and actual TOW. We now knew the reason for the significant difference in fuel burn.After conferring with dispatch we agreed to divert to ZZZ for fuel. The ZZZ station did an excellent job quick turning us and we continued to our filed destination uneventfully. We blocked in 51 minutes past our scheduled arrival time in our filed destination. I've been with this Carrier for about 8 month. For the last (approx) 6 years I've been flying smaller regional jets with shorter stage lengths. In that time I've never had a major problem with a discrepancy between planned and actual loading affecting the fuel burn so significantly. The Airbus is a much larger aircraft with significantly larger loads and longer stage lengths. Unfortunately I was not able to effectively correlate the importance of some aspects of the gross weight comparison during my initial training. To be very honest this was an eye-opening experience for me. I now fully understand the importance of checking the planned weights with the actual weights during the gross weight comparison; how to catch such errors; as well as the repercussions if such errors are not caught. I believe that I have learned a lot from my mistakes during this event and will be adjusting my personal procedures/techniques accordingly so as to ensure that this never happens again.I also believe people learn best by example and pilots are certainly no exception. I think that sharing a brief narrative of this event along with a reminder of the preventive measures with the pilot group (either as a pilot read file or during recurrent training) would help to prevent future events such as this.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.