Narrative:

The logbook was not on the aircraft when I arrived at the aircraft. I was told that there was a problem with passenger life vests. There were several seats missing life vests security seals; covers and seals or life vests. Maintenance said they didn't have time to fix 37 seats that maintenance; security and the flight attendants had identified with discrepancies. The life vests were written up in the logbook for corrective action by maintenance. After consultation with the flight attendants; we were not comfortable with the departure and arrival over water with approximately 37 life vests in the cabinet adjacent to the first class galley. [The MEL] (that maintenance was using); states; 'remove and stow the affected life vest with the broken or missing cover in the spare life vest kit.' the MEL procedure was not complied with correctly. The vests were individually stacked in a cabinet; adjacent to the galley; on top of the spare life vest kits. Due to the large number of life vests in the cabinet; a departure and arrival over large bodies of water and consultation with the flight attendants; I decided that safety was being compromised and talked to a maintenance manager for another solution to have the life vests readily accessible to the passengers. The maintenance manager wanted to return the life vests to their under seat pouches and secure them with tape or stickers. I agreed that would be the safest course of action due to the high number of seats involved. The intent of the MEL; I believe; is not to put 1/3 of the aircraft's life vests in an overhead cabinet so they are not readily accessible by the passengers in the event of a water landing shortly after takeoff or before landing during overwater operations. The MEL is talking about a life vest. The MEL does not address multiple; or 1/3 of the life vests; being placed in the spare life vest kits; as this would be physically impossible. The MEL is poorly written because maintenance interprets it to mean they could put every life vest; loose; in the front cabinet. Clearly; this is not the intent of the MEL or the FAA. The MEL does not identify a maximum number of life vests allowed to be out of position.[airport] operations; mr. A; came down from operations to the aircraft cockpit to try and get us to accept the poorly written MEL. Mr. A was only concerned with the delay the maintenance discrepancy was causing and tried to get us to take the incorrect interpretation of the MEL and unsatisfactory/incorrect placement of the life vests. He said this is a legal MEL and we need the gate. Mr. A came back to the cockpit after I made the decision to have the placement of the life vests returned to the 37 seats; as the maintenance manager had described; in the interest of passenger safety; after consultation with my crew and maintenance; and said you have 3 choices here captain; 1) you can take the aircraft with the MEL (not complied with correctly); 2) have maintenance use the temporary securing procedure to put the life vests back under their seats which will take two hours to accomplish in a hangar (which I elected) or cancelling the flight. I chose option 2. The mechanics wanted to remove the aircraft off the gate; so the crew deplaned to the gate area. Mr. A was clearly upset with my decision; stating several aircraft had departed with the same problem; the same incorrect placement of loose vests in the cabinet and the same MEL. I told him that doesn't make the high number of inaccessible life vests; in a short notice situation; being crammed in a cabinet; correct or the safest course of action. Due to the high number of vests in the cabinet; it would be near impossible for the flight attendants to get those to passengers in a panicked cabin in the water. The placement of this many vests in a cabinet would hamper the safe evacuation of the aircraft on water. Once these passengers; without life vests; were in the water; even one mile offshore; their survival chances would be poor. I told mr. A my decision stands on the maintenance corrective action discussed with the maintenance manager.the gate agents were taking comments from the passengers when I asked would you like me to make a PA. I announced to the passengers that we had a life vest problem due to the departure and arrival over water; and in the interest of safety the mechanics were replacing the life vests under the seats. Most people accepted my explanation. As I was departing the gate area; [a passenger] accosted me; yelling you need to apologize to all these passengers. I told him in a calm voice that I said what I needed to say. He continued with his loud rant yelling this is ridiculous and you need to apologize. I asked him his name; as I decided in his rage and temper; was not fit to fly on the aircraft. He refused to give me his name and said what is your name as I walked away with the first officer. He chased me down the terminal; stepping in front of me; yelling what is your name. I returned to the gate; as I felt threatened when he impeded my movement in the terminal; as he chased me yelling like a mentally disturbed man; to call the police and have him removed from the flight. The police arrived at the gate and was briefed by the first officer and myself. We both identified ourselves as ffdos (federal flight deck officers) to the police officer; although the first officer was non-mission. The officer said the unstable; belligerent passenger was gone from our gate area and would be no further trouble. The passenger was subsequently rebooked on another flight; to my objection. I called operations and told them this passenger shouldn't be allowed on any flight due to his unstable; irritated; explosive behavior. I called the captain of the other flight and briefed him on the belligerent passenger and told him he had been removed from my flight due to his threatening behavior; and the company put him on his flight. We were given another aircraft by operations and departed with a delay of 3+51.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A321 Captain reported a long flight delay due to missing life vest security seals and disagreement over where the vests were to be stowed in compliance with the MEL.

Narrative: The logbook was not on the aircraft when I arrived at the aircraft. I was told that there was a problem with passenger life vests. There were several seats missing life vests security seals; covers and seals or life vests. Maintenance said they didn't have time to fix 37 seats that maintenance; security and the flight attendants had identified with discrepancies. The life vests were written up in the logbook for corrective action by maintenance. After consultation with the flight attendants; we were not comfortable with the departure and arrival over water with approximately 37 life vests in the cabinet adjacent to the first class galley. [The MEL] (that maintenance was using); states; 'remove and stow the affected life vest with the broken or missing cover in the spare life vest kit.' The MEL procedure was not complied with correctly. The vests were individually stacked in a cabinet; adjacent to the galley; on top of the spare life vest kits. Due to the large number of life vests in the cabinet; a departure and arrival over large bodies of water and consultation with the flight attendants; I decided that safety was being compromised and talked to a maintenance manager for another solution to have the life vests readily accessible to the passengers. The maintenance manager wanted to return the life vests to their under seat pouches and secure them with tape or stickers. I agreed that would be the safest course of action due to the high number of seats involved. The intent of the MEL; I believe; is not to put 1/3 of the aircraft's life vests in an overhead cabinet so they are not readily accessible by the passengers in the event of a water landing shortly after takeoff or before landing during overwater operations. The MEL is talking about a life vest. The MEL does not address multiple; or 1/3 of the life vests; being placed in the spare life vest kits; as this would be physically impossible. The MEL is poorly written because maintenance interprets it to mean they could put every life vest; loose; in the front cabinet. Clearly; this is not the intent of the MEL or the FAA. The MEL does not identify a maximum number of life vests allowed to be out of position.[Airport] operations; Mr. A; came down from operations to the aircraft cockpit to try and get us to accept the poorly written MEL. Mr. A was only concerned with the delay the maintenance discrepancy was causing and tried to get us to take the incorrect interpretation of the MEL and unsatisfactory/incorrect placement of the life vests. He said this is a legal MEL and we need the gate. Mr. A came back to the cockpit after I made the decision to have the placement of the life vests returned to the 37 seats; as the maintenance manager had described; in the interest of passenger safety; after consultation with my crew and maintenance; and said you have 3 choices here Captain; 1) you can take the aircraft with the MEL (not complied with correctly); 2) have maintenance use the temporary securing procedure to put the life vests back under their seats which will take two hours to accomplish in a hangar (which I elected) or cancelling the flight. I chose option 2. The mechanics wanted to remove the aircraft off the gate; so the crew deplaned to the gate area. Mr. A was clearly upset with my decision; stating several aircraft had departed with the same problem; the same incorrect placement of loose vests in the cabinet and the same MEL. I told him that doesn't make the high number of inaccessible life vests; in a short notice situation; being crammed in a cabinet; correct or the safest course of action. Due to the high number of vests in the cabinet; it would be near impossible for the flight attendants to get those to passengers in a panicked cabin in the water. The placement of this many vests in a cabinet would hamper the safe evacuation of the aircraft on water. Once these passengers; without life vests; were in the water; even one mile offshore; their survival chances would be poor. I told Mr. A my decision stands on the maintenance corrective action discussed with the maintenance manager.The gate agents were taking comments from the passengers when I asked would you like me to make a PA. I announced to the passengers that we had a life vest problem due to the departure and arrival over water; and in the interest of safety the mechanics were replacing the life vests under the seats. Most people accepted my explanation. As I was departing the gate area; [a passenger] accosted me; yelling you need to apologize to all these passengers. I told him in a calm voice that I said what I needed to say. He continued with his loud rant yelling this is ridiculous and you need to apologize. I asked him his name; as I decided in his rage and temper; was not fit to fly on the aircraft. He refused to give me his name and said what is your name as I walked away with the FO. He chased me down the terminal; stepping in front of me; yelling what is your name. I returned to the gate; as I felt threatened when he impeded my movement in the terminal; as he chased me yelling like a mentally disturbed man; to call the police and have him removed from the flight. The police arrived at the gate and was briefed by the first officer and myself. We both identified ourselves as FFDOs (Federal Flight Deck Officers) to the police officer; although the FO was non-mission. The officer said the unstable; belligerent passenger was gone from our gate area and would be no further trouble. The passenger was subsequently rebooked on another flight; to my objection. I called operations and told them this passenger shouldn't be allowed on any flight due to his unstable; irritated; explosive behavior. I called the Captain of the other flight and briefed him on the belligerent passenger and told him he had been removed from my flight due to his threatening behavior; and the company put him on his flight. We were given another aircraft by operations and departed with a delay of 3+51.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.