Narrative:

Initial ECAM fuel left tk pump 1 lo pr followed immediately by another ECAM fuel ltk pump 1+2 lo pr. I continued to fly the aircraft and handled ATC radios. First officer (first officer) began completing ECAM steps. After completion of first step fuel xfeed open; the circuit breaker A14 smoke configuration pump control popped; the remaining ECAM to do steps disappeared. The ECAM screen then showed three items; overhead circuit breaker (or some text similar to this); fuel left tk pump 1 lo pr; fuel right tk pump 1 lo pr. The fuel system display page showed that pump 1 was off in both left and right fuel tanks and pump 2 was powered in both pumps. However; we noticed a growing imbalance between left and right fuel tanks. A visual inspection by a deadheading airbus first officer of the left wing; as well as adding up our fuel burned and fuel remaining and comparing to boarded fuel; lead us to conclude that we were not leaking fuel. The right tank appeared to be feeding both engines. I spoke with dispatch and [maintenance control] via radio (required two patches to complete due to poor quality and leaving one frequency range); and on the last call; I advised that the engines appeared to be feeding only from the right tank and that I would not have sufficient [fuel] to continue to [destination] but would land at ZZZ; about 70-80 miles away. We had also had the deadheading first officer come to the flight deck and assist with briefing the flight attendants; passengers; and backing up checklists. We [advised ATC]; received vectors from ATC; and landed uneventfully in ZZZ. Fire crew in ZZZ met aircraft and did a visual inspection of aircraft after we cleared the runway; confirming no fuel leak.following a safe diversion into ZZZ; the first officer and I made multiple phone calls to dispatch and [maintenance control] to arrange for the aircraft repairs; while coordinating with the station manager and purser for the deplaning and feeding of 126 passengers. The first officer and I were also debriefed by the flight operations office regarding our level of the fatigue and any risk factors present for continuing to [destination] after the aircraft was repaired. I said that following a meal; I felt I was safe to continue as a crew member to [destination]. But that I was not feeling safe about continuing as scheduled to fly as a crew member following arriving; doing a quick turn into another airplane; along with another first officer; for a night flight; concluding nearly 7 hours later.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 flight crew reported losing the Left fuel boost pump in both the left and right fuel tanks. It was determined that both engines were feeding from the right fuel tank only.

Narrative: Initial ECAM FUEL L TK PUMP 1 LO PR followed immediately by another ECAM FUEL LTK PUMP 1+2 LO PR. I continued to fly the aircraft and handled ATC radios. First Officer (FO) began completing ECAM steps. After completion of first step FUEL XFEED OPEN; the circuit breaker A14 SMOKE CONFIG PUMP CTL popped; the remaining ECAM to do steps disappeared. The ECAM screen then showed three items; OVERHEAD CB (or some text similar to this); FUEL L TK PUMP 1 LO PR; FUEL R TK PUMP 1 LO PR. The fuel system display page showed that pump 1 was off in both left and right fuel tanks and pump 2 was powered in both pumps. However; we noticed a growing imbalance between left and right fuel tanks. A visual inspection by a deadheading Airbus FO of the left wing; as well as adding up our fuel burned and fuel remaining and comparing to boarded fuel; lead us to conclude that we were not leaking fuel. The right tank appeared to be feeding both engines. I spoke with dispatch and [maintenance control] via radio (required two patches to complete due to poor quality and leaving one frequency range); and on the last call; I advised that the engines appeared to be feeding only from the right tank and that I would not have sufficient [fuel] to continue to [destination] but would land at ZZZ; about 70-80 miles away. We had also had the deadheading FO come to the flight deck and assist with briefing the Flight Attendants; passengers; and backing up checklists. We [advised ATC]; received vectors from ATC; and landed uneventfully in ZZZ. Fire crew in ZZZ met aircraft and did a visual inspection of aircraft after we cleared the runway; confirming no fuel leak.Following a safe diversion into ZZZ; the FO and I made multiple phone calls to dispatch and [maintenance control] to arrange for the aircraft repairs; while coordinating with the station manager and purser for the deplaning and feeding of 126 passengers. The FO and I were also debriefed by the flight operations office regarding our level of the fatigue and any risk factors present for continuing to [destination] after the aircraft was repaired. I said that following a meal; I felt I was safe to continue as a crew member to [destination]. But that I was not feeling safe about continuing as scheduled to fly as a crew member following arriving; doing a quick turn into another airplane; along with another first officer; for a night flight; concluding nearly 7 hours later.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.