Narrative:

All procedures occurred normally and without rushing prior to taxiing onto runway. I was the pm. As we began the takeoff roll; the first officer called 'set thrust.' I set the thrust; called 'thrust set;' and placed my hands on top of the thrust levers. Passing 80 knots I called '80 knots.' the first officer replied 'check.' somewhere between 80 knots and V1 I momentarily glanced at ED1 and ED2 and noted that our flaps were set at 8. As I looked back to the speed tape; I realized that the V1 speed moving downward on my pfd was set just above 130 knots. For a split second a thought flashed through my mind that a V1 speed in the low 130s was more appropriate for a flaps 20 departure than it was for a flaps 8 departure. Knowing how potentially catastrophic a rotation at the lower speed with [an incorrect] flap setting might be; my gut reaction was that the aircraft was unsafe to fly. I immediately made the decision to abort just prior to V1. I stated 'abort; I have the controls.' I took the controls and carried out the aborted takeoff procedure. My first officer notified ATC that we had aborted the takeoff. After we pulled off the runway; we stopped and I set the parking brake. I immediately made an announcement to the cabin that we had discontinued our takeoff and that the passengers should remain seated with their seat belts fastened. I then called for the aborted takeoff immediate action items and we completed the aborted takeoff QRH procedure. I then called the flight attendant to make sure everything was ok in the cabin. I also made an announcement letting the passengers know that we had elected to discontinue the takeoff due to an indication discrepancy on takeoff. At this point my first officer and I had a detailed discussion as to why I had elected to abort the takeoff. We pulled up our takeoff data; verified that we had been given a flaps 8 departure; and quickly discovered that all the speeds had been set correctly. There were no mistakes made in setting the flaps or the speeds after all. After conducting an after landing check; we noted that our brake temperatures were rising rapidly. The inboard right brake in particular had risen to 11 and had turned red. Because we now also had a brake ovht warning message displayed; we ran the brake ovht QRH procedure. At the first officer's suggestion; we called the tower and requested that the fire trucks come out to verify that we did not have a brake fire. We taxied to and parked on taxiway while the firemen inspected our brakes. After getting an all clear from the tower; we contacted the station and proceeded to taxi back to the gate. I notified my dispatcher of the aborted takeoff. He then transferred me to maintenance control and I informed them as well. Due to one brake temperature readout turning red; maintenance control made the decision that an inspection for a high energy abort should be accomplished prior to departing again. I informed the passengers of the situation and we deplaned. I contacted my chief pilot to verify if anything else needed to be accomplished. I also called the tower per their request and briefly explained to them that we had conducted a precautionary abort due to an uncertainty with our flap settings. A contract mechanic inspected the aircraft and signed off the aircraft. We requested a new release; added fuel; reboarded; and departed again; this time uneventfully. The possible threat was that the aircraft flaps or V speeds had been set incorrectly. There was no error that occurred; only the perception of one. The potential undesired aircraft state was that the aircraft was not configured properly for takeoff. Prior to pushback and as we were requesting the takeoff data; I had made a mental note that we should expect a flaps 20 departure. I came to this conclusion because I have operated out of this airport many times with that flap setting. After pushback; I am positive that we as a flight crew conducted the performance check exactly as isrequired. However; my mind did not resolve my previous expectation of a flaps 20 departure and the fact that we had now been given a flaps 8 setting. The thought process in my mind as we approached V1 went as follows: 1) 'if the flaps are set at 8; why are the speeds I'm seeing more appropriate for a flaps 20 departure?'2) 'I expected a flaps 20 departure; why are the flaps now set at 8?'3) 'if it's possible that the flaps are set incorrectly; the aircraft will likely not be able to fly if we rotate at the speeds that are set.'3) 'since I know that changing the flaps during takeoff will produce a takeoff configuration warning; I cannot touch the flaps.'4) 'therefore; we must abort the takeoff as there is a high probability that the aircraft is in an undesired state.'in retrospect; the reason the V1 and vr speeds (133 knots I believe) were set as such was directly due to the light load of passengers on board. Typically on this aircraft we see V1 and vr speeds above 140 knots for a flaps 8 departure. Only when the aircraft is extremely light do we see flaps 8 speeds under 140. As we conducted the performance check; my mind did not make the connection between a light aircraft; a flaps 8 setting; and V speeds in the 130s. In the future I can guarantee that I will mentally ask myself two questions prior to each performance check:1) 'does the flap setting and V speeds I'm seeing make sense for this departure given our runway length and weight?'2) 'does this flap setting and V speeds match my expectations for this departure?'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 Captain reported rejecting the takeoff after 80 knots because of an erroneous concern that the flaps may have been improperly set.

Narrative: All procedures occurred normally and without rushing prior to taxiing onto runway. I was the PM. As we began the takeoff roll; the First Officer called 'Set Thrust.' I set the thrust; called 'Thrust Set;' and placed my hands on top of the thrust levers. Passing 80 knots I called '80 knots.' The First Officer replied 'Check.' Somewhere between 80 knots and V1 I momentarily glanced at ED1 and ED2 and noted that our flaps were set at 8. As I looked back to the speed tape; I realized that the V1 speed moving downward on my PFD was set just above 130 knots. For a split second a thought flashed through my mind that a V1 speed in the low 130s was more appropriate for a flaps 20 departure than it was for a flaps 8 departure. Knowing how potentially catastrophic a rotation at the lower speed with [an incorrect] flap setting might be; my gut reaction was that the aircraft was unsafe to fly. I immediately made the decision to abort just prior to V1. I stated 'Abort; I have the controls.' I took the controls and carried out the Aborted Takeoff procedure. My First Officer notified ATC that we had aborted the takeoff. After we pulled off the runway; we stopped and I set the parking brake. I immediately made an announcement to the cabin that we had discontinued our takeoff and that the passengers should remain seated with their seat belts fastened. I then called for the Aborted Takeoff Immediate Action Items and we completed the Aborted Takeoff QRH procedure. I then called the flight attendant to make sure everything was OK in the cabin. I also made an announcement letting the passengers know that we had elected to discontinue the takeoff due to an indication discrepancy on takeoff. At this point my First Officer and I had a detailed discussion as to why I had elected to abort the takeoff. We pulled up our takeoff data; verified that we had been given a flaps 8 departure; and quickly discovered that all the speeds had been set correctly. There were no mistakes made in setting the flaps or the speeds after all. After conducting an After Landing Check; we noted that our brake temperatures were rising rapidly. The inboard right brake in particular had risen to 11 and had turned red. Because we now also had a BRAKE OVHT warning message displayed; we ran the BRAKE OVHT QRH procedure. At the First Officer's suggestion; we called the tower and requested that the fire trucks come out to verify that we did not have a brake fire. We taxied to and parked on taxiway while the Firemen inspected our brakes. After getting an all clear from the tower; we contacted the station and proceeded to taxi back to the gate. I notified my dispatcher of the Aborted Takeoff. He then transferred me to Maintenance Control and I informed them as well. Due to one brake temperature readout turning red; Maintenance Control made the decision that an inspection for a high energy abort should be accomplished prior to departing again. I informed the passengers of the situation and we deplaned. I contacted my chief pilot to verify if anything else needed to be accomplished. I also called the tower per their request and briefly explained to them that we had conducted a precautionary abort due to an uncertainty with our flap settings. A contract mechanic inspected the aircraft and signed off the aircraft. We requested a new release; added fuel; reboarded; and departed again; this time uneventfully. The possible threat was that the aircraft flaps or V speeds had been set incorrectly. There was no error that occurred; only the perception of one. The potential undesired aircraft state was that the aircraft was not configured properly for takeoff. Prior to pushback and as we were requesting the takeoff data; I had made a mental note that we should expect a flaps 20 departure. I came to this conclusion because I have operated out of this airport many times with that flap setting. After pushback; I am positive that we as a flight crew conducted the Performance Check exactly as isrequired. However; my mind did not resolve my previous expectation of a flaps 20 departure and the fact that we had now been given a flaps 8 setting. The thought process in my mind as we approached V1 went as follows: 1) 'If the flaps are set at 8; why are the speeds I'm seeing more appropriate for a flaps 20 departure?'2) 'I expected a flaps 20 departure; why are the flaps now set at 8?'3) 'If it's possible that the flaps are set incorrectly; the aircraft will likely not be able to fly if we rotate at the speeds that are set.'3) 'Since I know that changing the flaps during takeoff will produce a Takeoff Configuration Warning; I cannot touch the flaps.'4) 'Therefore; we must abort the takeoff as there is a high probability that the aircraft is in an Undesired State.'In retrospect; the reason the V1 and Vr speeds (133 knots I believe) were set as such was directly due to the light load of passengers on board. Typically on this aircraft we see V1 and Vr speeds above 140 knots for a flaps 8 departure. Only when the aircraft is extremely light do we see flaps 8 speeds under 140. As we conducted the performance check; my mind did not make the connection between a light aircraft; a flaps 8 setting; and V speeds in the 130s. In the future I can guarantee that I will mentally ask myself two questions prior to each Performance Check:1) 'Does the flap setting and V speeds I'm seeing make sense for this departure given our runway length and weight?'2) 'Does this flap setting and V speeds match my expectations for this departure?'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.