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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1403834 |
Time | |
Date | 201611 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Engine Control |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240 Flight Crew Total 6417 Flight Crew Type 6417 |
Person 2 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown |
Narrative:
During normal landing roll-out; master caution light momentarily illuminated with door illuminated on the system annunciation panel. This occurred at approximately 80 KIAS. The mc (master caution) light went out after roughly 2 seconds and the forward entry door light was illuminated on the overhead instrument control panel. We rolled off the runway onto [the taxiway] leading to the south ramp. Shortly thereafter I noticed that the aircraft was not responding to my throttle inputs. I examined the engine instruments and saw that the rev was displayed above both engines indicating that the reversers were still deployed. I looked at the overhead instrument control panel and verified that the reversers were indicating deployed but not stowed. I also noticed that the engine control (eec) lights on the overhead instrument control panel were also illuminated. Throttle movements produced no visible results on the instrument panel and the aircraft was slowing down to a stop as it approached the bridge. My first officer was fairly busy with normal radio calls to the controlling agency and also with a quick call to the flight attendants to verify the forward entry door was closed/not open. At this point; I was getting multiple inputs of a malfunction but I couldn't determine what the exact malfunction was. I had a brief door open light; I had 2 reverser lights illuminated and 2 engine control lights illuminated. I also had two engines that showed no responses to throttle inputs. It was apparent the engines were still running as we still had electrical power on the airplane. I started the APU. I directed my first officer to contact the company operations center to dispatch a tug immediately to come to our assistance while I contacted ground control with our situation. Referencing the QRH for the eec problem produced no resolution. During our wait; I made a PA announcement to the passengers and shut down the number 2 engine. Somebody dispatched the fire department to our location. I do not know who initiated this or why this was done. I did not see this as a safety event and certainly did not feel it required [this level of attention]. Eventually a tug arrived and towed us off the taxiway and into the gate. During our tow-in; ramp tower talked to us and scolded us for not contacting the company or ground control during our incident. This despite our constant communications with both the company and ground control. I wrote up the details of what I saw in the aircraft logbook. Afterwards I took my first officer (first officer) to the operations center to show him our operations and to discuss this incident with the on-duty managers in the operations center.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: The flight crew of a B737 reported that after landing; during taxi; they received a momentary Master Caution for a door annunciator light; and the engines would not respond to thrust inputs due to reversers not stowing.
Narrative: During normal landing roll-out; Master Caution light momentarily illuminated with Door illuminated on the System Annunciation panel. This occurred at approximately 80 KIAS. The MC (Master Caution) light went out after roughly 2 seconds and the Forward Entry Door light was illuminated on the overhead instrument control panel. We rolled off the runway onto [the taxiway] leading to the south ramp. Shortly thereafter I noticed that the aircraft was not responding to my throttle inputs. I examined the Engine Instruments and saw that the REV was displayed above both engines indicating that the reversers were still deployed. I looked at the overhead instrument control panel and verified that the reversers were indicating deployed but not stowed. I also noticed that the Engine Control (EEC) lights on the overhead instrument control panel were also illuminated. Throttle movements produced no visible results on the instrument panel and the aircraft was slowing down to a stop as it approached the bridge. My first officer was fairly busy with normal radio calls to the controlling agency and also with a quick call to the flight attendants to verify the forward entry door was closed/not open. At this point; I was getting multiple inputs of a malfunction but I couldn't determine what the exact malfunction was. I had a brief Door Open light; I had 2 reverser lights illuminated and 2 Engine Control lights illuminated. I also had two engines that showed no responses to throttle inputs. It was apparent the engines were still running as we still had electrical power on the airplane. I started the APU. I directed my first officer to contact the company operations center to dispatch a tug immediately to come to our assistance while I contacted Ground control with our situation. Referencing the QRH for the EEC problem produced no resolution. During our wait; I made a PA announcement to the passengers and shut down the number 2 engine. Somebody dispatched the fire department to our location. I do not know who initiated this or why this was done. I did not see this as a safety event and certainly did not feel it required [this level of attention]. Eventually a tug arrived and towed us off the taxiway and into the gate. During our tow-in; ramp tower talked to us and scolded us for not contacting the company or ground control during our incident. This despite our constant communications with both the company and ground control. I wrote up the details of what I saw in the aircraft logbook. Afterwards I took my FO (First Officer) to the Operations Center to show him our operations and to discuss this incident with the on-duty managers in the Operations Center.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.