Narrative:

The incident took place at the end of a relatively quick flight [inter island] to honolulu. On final approach we were given instructions to plan for a long roll out on runway 4R.on previous operations into honolulu; we have consistently been given two options for vacating runway 4R; either: taxi to the end; turn right on taxiway C; and hold short of runway 8L; or turn right onto runway 8L; then right onto taxiway C. Our instructions for a long roll out matched the first option.however; just before reaching taxiway east and while still at relatively high speed; we were suddenly asked if we could make the turnoff onto taxiway east. Due to our high speed we were unable and declined. We were then told to taxi to the end onto taxiway C and then hold short of runway 8L. The controller then informed us that an air carrier aircraft was on final for runway 8L with a lahso clearance to hold short of runway 4R. Although lahso operations are prohibited in our operation (which we declared on initial contact with approach control); this was understood to mean that the air carrier aircraft would land short of the runway 4R intersection. Finally; just prior to crossing the intersection of runway 4R/8L; the controller then gave us what sounded like a second set of instructions to make 2 right turns.the late request by tower to clear on east; the update on the landing aircraft; and what was perceived as a new set of instructions; all combined to create the impression that tower wanted us off runway 4R at the earliest opportunity. As a result; we erroneously interpreted these new instructions to mean the controller wanted us to change to the alternative option for vacating from runway 4R; by turning right onto runway 8L and then right again onto taxiway C. Although we asked the tower to 'confirm turn right now'; there was no reply. Due to our proximity to this turn-off; an immediate decision had to be made; and in an attempt to provide the tower with what we perceived they wanted; we vacated onto runway 8L and quickly onto taxiway C.it is apparent that there was a communications issue between the tower and our aircraft. In retrospect; it would have been better to simply continue with the original rollout plan following the initial instructions; and decline any further deviation without receiving absolute clarification of tower's meaning.however; rather than cause for blame; there are probably human factors lessons which can be learnt from this: if no further communications were made to us during a high workload phase when attention should be focused on aircraft control; we would have landed and vacated without any issue. Although ATC had good intentions by stating the landing aircraft's position; telling us that they had a lahso clearance to hold short of runway 4R made the second set of instructions to us seem more reasonable. As stated above; we are not trained for lahso and in this instance a confused situation developed. One would not expect that a second set of instructions would be exactly like the first and during this critical phase of flight; we thought ATC wanted us to execute the second option that is often given to us after landing on 4R.in the end; we were trying to do the right thing and thought that we were helping ATC by expediting off of the runway environment. We are all human and understand very well the demands placed on ATC and flight crews every day in this dynamic environment we operate in. The goal is always to make things better and safer for the people on both ends of the radio.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Corporate Captain reported being confused by Tower instructions during roll out on Runway 4R at HNL. Instead of continuing to the end of 4R he turns right on Runway 8L and right on Taxiway C.

Narrative: The incident took place at the end of a relatively quick flight [inter island] to Honolulu. On final approach we were given instructions to plan for a long roll out on Runway 4R.On previous operations into Honolulu; we have consistently been given two options for vacating Runway 4R; either: taxi to the end; turn right on Taxiway C; and hold short of Runway 8L; or turn right onto Runway 8L; then right onto Taxiway C. Our instructions for a long roll out matched the first option.However; just before reaching Taxiway E and while still at relatively high speed; we were suddenly asked if we could make the turnoff onto Taxiway E. Due to our high speed we were unable and declined. We were then told to taxi to the end onto Taxiway C and then hold short of Runway 8L. The controller then informed us that an air carrier aircraft was on final for Runway 8L with a LAHSO clearance to hold short of Runway 4R. Although LAHSO operations are prohibited in our operation (which we declared on initial contact with Approach Control); this was understood to mean that the air carrier aircraft would land short of the Runway 4R intersection. Finally; just prior to crossing the intersection of Runway 4R/8L; the Controller then gave us what sounded like a second set of instructions to make 2 right turns.The late request by Tower to clear on E; the update on the landing aircraft; and what was perceived as a new set of instructions; all combined to create the impression that Tower wanted us off Runway 4R at the earliest opportunity. As a result; we erroneously interpreted these new instructions to mean the controller wanted us to change to the alternative option for vacating from Runway 4R; by turning right onto Runway 8L and then right again onto Taxiway C. Although we asked the Tower to 'confirm turn right now'; there was no reply. Due to our proximity to this turn-off; an immediate decision had to be made; and in an attempt to provide the Tower with what we perceived they wanted; we vacated onto Runway 8L and quickly onto Taxiway C.It is apparent that there was a communications issue between the Tower and our aircraft. In retrospect; it would have been better to simply continue with the original rollout plan following the initial instructions; and decline any further deviation without receiving absolute clarification of Tower's meaning.However; rather than cause for blame; there are probably human factors lessons which can be learnt from this: if no further communications were made to us during a high workload phase when attention should be focused on aircraft control; we would have landed and vacated without any issue. Although ATC had good intentions by stating the landing aircraft's position; telling us that they had a LAHSO clearance to hold short of Runway 4R made the second set of instructions to us seem more reasonable. As stated above; we are not trained for LAHSO and in this instance a confused situation developed. One would not expect that a second set of instructions would be exactly like the first and during this critical phase of flight; we thought ATC wanted us to execute the second option that is often given to us after landing on 4R.In the end; we were trying to do the right thing and thought that we were helping ATC by expediting off of the runway environment. We are all human and understand very well the demands placed on ATC and flight crews every day in this dynamic environment we operate in. The goal is always to make things better and safer for the people on both ends of the radio.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.