Narrative:

We got to the aircraft about 45 minutes before push time. We noticed that the #2 aft override/jettison fuel pump was placarded with a yellow deferral sticker with a deferral number written on it that did not match our dil (deferred items list); log history; or the initial mrd (maintenance release document) that came to us on the ACARS printer while we were doing our preflight checks. We also noticed that the navigation and beacon lights had yellow deferral stickers on them that we were unaware of during our preflight briefing in flight operations since they were not in the dil. We questioned maintenance about what was going on. In the meantime the relief pilot doing the walk around said the left forward navigation light was inoperative and there was tape that was coming loose inside the #2 engine near the forward compressor blades. We called all of these defects in to maintenance and entered them into ACARS as an electronic logbook entry. Maintenance sent a person to fix the #2 engine problem and we got a new mrd over ACARS indicating the problems we found and the yellow deferral stickers on the #2 aft override/jettison fuel pump; beacon; and navigation lights. There was no MEL/cdl items with 'flight crew:' in the mrd indicating the flight crew needed to do anything extra regarding any deferred items. The maintenance technician; came to the flight deck and indicated the #2 engine tape was repaired and all was well. We got a mrd over ACARS indicating all the items above were taken care of or properly deferred. Again; there were no MEL/cdl items with 'flight crew:' in the mrd or given to us as to special flight crew instructions. After the flight; I discovered that there should have been MEL information relevant to the flight crew for the deferred #2 aft override/jettison fuel pump. All of these maintenance problems and the confusion as to the maintenance status of our aircraft resulted in a late push in order to be resolved.our taxi to [the] runway was uneventful. Once we began the takeoff we encountered 4 separate and unrelated aircraft problems (outflow vlv right; #2 engine compressor stall; inoperative sat comm voice; and inoperative fuel jettison system). Our takeoff was reduced thrust 55C flaps 20 with winds 340/18 and cavok. The relief pilot noticed EICAS message outfow vlv right at about 110 kias but did not announce this while on the ground in the 'high speed regime' of takeoff as per our flight manual procedures. The flying pilots noticed the EICAS once airborne shortly after liftoff and capt told the relief pilot to run that checklist in the QRH. I noticed my ears 'popping' so I believed we had a pressurization problem. At about 1200 feet the #2 engine began compressor stalling. At first we thought it was a bird strike but the capt noticed the engine indications supported a compressor stall on #2 engine and stated this to the crew. He stated and elected to pull back the throttle on #2 engine until the stall quit with confirmation from all pilots. The compressor stall stopped when the throttle was about 1/3 of the distance from idle position. He then left the throttle at that position until we leveled at 8000 feet where we ran the QRH 'engine limit or surge or stall' checklist.once we ascertained our engine problem the capt asked ATC if we could continue on our present heading because we were past the turn associated with the engine failure on takeoff procedure and the terrain was visible and not a conflict for our climb out. While on climb to 8000 feet ATC told us that a plane at [departure airport] had noticed flames coming from our engine. The capt told them this was what was expected with our engine problem. He had the purser scan the engine. She saw nothing abnormal. The capt and relief pilot ran the 'engine limit or surge or stall' checklist while I flew the airplane and monitored ATC. We found the engine compressor stalled when advanced to about 1.30 EPR. We discussed that we would not go to [destination] withthis problem so the engine was shut down having abnormal indications associated with the compressor stall. After shutting down the engine we voice called dispatch on inmarsat sat comm but it showed 'queue call' instead of 'place call'. We disconnected satcom from the cabin and waited for our call to go through in priority 'emg.' we eventually switched to iridium to call dispatch and got the call through but it was very garbled audio which was unusable. ACARS worked but sat voice appeared to be unusable. We later got an EICAS message sat voice. We elected to dump fuel to 170;000 lbs to be below our max landing weight of 630;000 and return to [departure airport]. We coordinated this with ATC and were given 'box' vectors over the ocean to dump fuel and prepare for our approach. While jettisoning fuel the jettison stopped shortly after turning off the center tank pumps based on EICAS message fuel pres center left;right as per the fuel jettison checklist. We tried numerous times to reset the fuel jettison but we were unsuccessful. Since we had dumped enough to be close to our max landing weight we elected to use drag (early configuration of flaps and gear) to decrease our weight below max landing weight.after completing the fuel jettison checklist we ran the outfow vlv right checklist turning pack two off and manually closed the right outflow valve as per the checklist. It should be noted that before running the outflow vlv right checklist the right outflow valve was fully open; the left outflow valve was not fully closed but at the 7 o'clock position. Our cabin altitude was 7900 feet while our aircraft altitude was 8000 feet.after accomplishing the appropriate checklists we returned to fly an uneventful 3 engine ILS approach. Since ATC had reported that there were flames shooting out of the #2 engine on takeoff; we had the fire department scan the #2 engine after exiting the runway. The fire department said all was normal so we taxied to gate.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Two B747 first officers reported returning to departure airport after experiencing Number 2 engine compressor stall after takeoff that led to fuel dumping and inflight shutdown.

Narrative: We got to the aircraft about 45 minutes before push time. We noticed that the #2 aft override/jettison fuel pump was placarded with a yellow deferral sticker with a deferral number written on it that did not match our DIL (Deferred Items List); Log History; or the initial MRD (Maintenance Release Document) that came to us on the ACARS printer while we were doing our preflight checks. We also noticed that the Navigation and Beacon lights had yellow deferral stickers on them that we were unaware of during our preflight briefing in flight operations since they were not in the DIL. We questioned maintenance about what was going on. In the meantime the relief pilot doing the walk around said the left forward navigation light was inoperative and there was tape that was coming loose inside the #2 engine near the forward compressor blades. We called all of these defects in to maintenance and entered them into ACARS as an Electronic Logbook Entry. Maintenance sent a person to fix the #2 engine problem and we got a new MRD over ACARS indicating the problems we found and the yellow deferral stickers on the #2 aft override/jettison fuel pump; beacon; and navigation lights. There was no MEL/CDL items with 'Flight Crew:' in the MRD indicating the flight crew needed to do anything extra regarding any deferred items. The maintenance technician; came to the flight deck and indicated the #2 engine tape was repaired and all was well. We got a MRD over ACARS indicating all the items above were taken care of or properly deferred. Again; there were no MEL/CDL items with 'Flight Crew:' in the MRD or given to us as to special flight crew instructions. After the flight; I discovered that there should have been MEL information relevant to the flight crew for the deferred #2 aft override/jettison fuel pump. All of these maintenance problems and the confusion as to the maintenance status of our aircraft resulted in a late push in order to be resolved.Our taxi to [the] runway was uneventful. Once we began the takeoff we encountered 4 separate and unrelated aircraft problems (OUTFLOW VLV R; #2 engine compressor stall; inoperative SAT Comm voice; and inoperative Fuel Jettison system). Our takeoff was reduced thrust 55C flaps 20 with winds 340/18 and CAVOK. The relief pilot noticed EICAS message OUTFOW VLV R at about 110 kias but did not announce this while on the ground in the 'high speed regime' of takeoff as per our Flight Manual procedures. The flying pilots noticed the EICAS once airborne shortly after liftoff and Capt told the Relief Pilot to run that checklist in the QRH. I noticed my ears 'popping' so I believed we had a pressurization problem. At about 1200 feet the #2 engine began compressor stalling. At first we thought it was a bird strike but the Capt noticed the engine indications supported a compressor stall on #2 engine and stated this to the crew. He stated and elected to pull back the throttle on #2 engine until the stall quit with confirmation from all pilots. The compressor stall stopped when the throttle was about 1/3 of the distance from idle position. He then left the throttle at that position until we leveled at 8000 feet where we ran the QRH 'Engine Limit or Surge or Stall' checklist.Once we ascertained our engine problem the Capt asked ATC if we could continue on our present heading because we were past the turn associated with the engine failure on takeoff procedure and the terrain was visible and not a conflict for our climb out. While on climb to 8000 feet ATC told us that a plane at [departure airport] had noticed flames coming from our engine. The Capt told them this was what was expected with our engine problem. He had the Purser scan the engine. She saw nothing abnormal. The Capt and Relief Pilot ran the 'Engine Limit or Surge or Stall' checklist while I flew the airplane and monitored ATC. We found the engine compressor stalled when advanced to about 1.30 EPR. We discussed that we would not go to [destination] withthis problem so the engine was shut down having abnormal indications associated with the compressor stall. After shutting down the engine we voice called Dispatch on INMARSAT Sat Comm but it showed 'QUEUE CALL' instead of 'PLACE CALL'. We disconnected SATCOM from the Cabin and waited for our call to go through In priority 'EMG.' We eventually switched to IRIDIUM to call dispatch and got the call through but it was very garbled audio which was unusable. ACARS worked but SAT VOICE appeared to be unusable. We later got an EICAS message SAT VOICE. We elected to dump fuel to 170;000 lbs to be below our max landing weight of 630;000 and return to [departure airport]. We coordinated this with ATC and were given 'box' vectors over the ocean to dump fuel and prepare for our approach. While jettisoning fuel the jettison stopped shortly after turning off the Center Tank pumps based on EICAS message FUEL PRES CTR L;R as per the Fuel Jettison checklist. We tried numerous times to reset the fuel jettison but we were unsuccessful. Since we had dumped enough to be close to our max landing weight we elected to use drag (early configuration of flaps and gear) to decrease our weight below max landing weight.After completing the fuel jettison checklist we ran the OUTFOW VLV R checklist turning pack two off and manually closed the right outflow valve as per the checklist. It should be noted that before running the OUTFLOW VLV R checklist the right outflow valve was fully open; the left outflow valve was not fully closed but at the 7 o'clock position. Our cabin altitude was 7900 feet while our aircraft altitude was 8000 feet.After accomplishing the appropriate checklists we returned to fly an uneventful 3 engine ILS approach. Since ATC had reported that there were flames shooting out of the #2 engine on takeoff; we had the Fire Department scan the #2 engine after exiting the runway. The Fire Department said all was normal so we taxied to gate.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.