Narrative:

Cleared for takeoff [and] PF applied standard takeoff power. At 300 ft [we experienced] loud multiple bangs with moderate vibration and airframe shake. PF called engine failure. PF set trim; flew jet and called confirm engine out; I as pm selected confirm engine out on mcdu then selected profile. PF noticed #1 engine rollback with N1 at 44%. We continued with appropriate company procedures; memory items and checklists. We were notified by tower that they saw a problem or did we have a problem? I called standby. We continued to work the engine failure as well as complete our appropriate checklist items. We then switched to departure and had vectors back [to departure airport]. We completed engine fire and severe damage checklist; approach checklist and configured for landing. We were airborne a total of 13 minutes. We had no alerts; warnings or early indications of impending engine failure. All engine parameters were normal upon application of takeoff power. After landing we ran appropriate checklists but kept our flight controls in the landing configuration in the event of damage. Upon landing we had emergency personnel waiting. We cleared the runway under our own power. Emergency personnel then proceeded to inspect the aircraft and gave us the all clear. We proceeded to parking under the guidance of a follow me truck. Engine failure at or after V1. Continued takeoff. We await information from company technical/maintenance to hear why the engine failed. This type of event is random and will occur from time to time. Proper preventive maintenance and operations are the best prevention. Continued quality training for crews and ground personnel make events like this when encountered easier to handle and prepare for. As a takeaway; in international operations the terminology can be a deciding factor in expediting proper handling. Appropriate training is necessary as well as required in the event of an emergency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD-11 First Officer reported returning to the departure airport after experiencing engine failure at 300 ft AGL after takeoff.

Narrative: Cleared for takeoff [and] PF applied standard takeoff power. At 300 ft [we experienced] loud multiple bangs with moderate vibration and airframe shake. PF called engine failure. PF set trim; flew jet and called confirm engine out; I as PM selected confirm engine out on MCDU then selected PROFILE. PF noticed #1 engine rollback with N1 at 44%. We continued with appropriate company procedures; memory items and checklists. We were notified by tower that they saw a problem or did we have a problem? I called standby. We continued to work the engine failure as well as complete our appropriate checklist items. We then switched to departure and had vectors back [to departure airport]. We completed engine fire and severe damage checklist; approach checklist and configured for landing. We were airborne a total of 13 minutes. We had no alerts; warnings or early indications of impending engine failure. All engine parameters were normal upon application of takeoff power. After landing we ran appropriate checklists but kept our flight controls in the landing configuration in the event of damage. Upon landing we had emergency personnel waiting. We cleared the runway under our own power. Emergency personnel then proceeded to inspect the aircraft and gave us the all clear. We proceeded to parking under the guidance of a follow me truck. Engine failure at or after V1. Continued takeoff. We await information from company technical/maintenance to hear why the engine failed. This type of event is random and will occur from time to time. Proper preventive maintenance and operations are the best prevention. Continued quality training for crews and ground personnel make events like this when encountered easier to handle and prepare for. As a takeaway; in international operations the terminology can be a deciding factor in expediting proper handling. Appropriate training is necessary as well as required in the event of an emergency.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.