Narrative:

I was training a deviation who is very close to chkout for fpl. Had pointed out to tower controller a VFR overflt crossing departure end at 2500', northbound. 10 mi southwest of airport an small aircraft was descending VFR out of 5500', also northbound. An large transport departed wbound climbing to 3000'. The trnee told the large transport about the 2500' traffic and also told the 2500' traffic about the large transport. Both saw each other right off. The large transport was then told to climb to 10000'. Then the large transport and small aircraft were advised of each other's position. I then waited to see what the trnee's next plan of action was going to be. The trnee hesitated, so I instructed her to stop the small aircraft at 4000' and the large transport at 3500'. The large transport came back. Leveling at 3600', traffic in sight. The large transport was concerned with the sep, however sep standards were not compromised. Had the large transport not seen the small aircraft, there was still time to turn the small aircraft to pass behind the large transport. These are far from ideal situations, but in this situation, where the trnee is very close to chkout, it is sometimes necessary to let the trnee make the decisions first to see how they would handle different situations, and ascertain whether or not they are ready for chkout.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NO POSITIVE ACTION TAKEN BY TRACON DEP CTLR (DEVELOPMENTAL) TO SEPARATE THE NORTHBOUND ACFT OVERFLT DESCENDING UNRESTRICTED FROM THE LGT ACFT DEPARTING AND CLBING TO 10000'.

Narrative: I WAS TRNING A DEV WHO IS VERY CLOSE TO CHKOUT FOR FPL. HAD POINTED OUT TO TWR CTLR A VFR OVERFLT XING DEP END AT 2500', NBND. 10 MI SW OF ARPT AN SMA WAS DSNDING VFR OUT OF 5500', ALSO NBND. AN LGT DEPARTED WBOUND CLBING TO 3000'. THE TRNEE TOLD THE LGT ABOUT THE 2500' TFC AND ALSO TOLD THE 2500' TFC ABOUT THE LGT. BOTH SAW EACH OTHER RIGHT OFF. THE LGT WAS THEN TOLD TO CLB TO 10000'. THEN THE LGT AND SMA WERE ADVISED OF EACH OTHER'S POS. I THEN WAITED TO SEE WHAT THE TRNEE'S NEXT PLAN OF ACTION WAS GOING TO BE. THE TRNEE HESITATED, SO I INSTRUCTED HER TO STOP THE SMA AT 4000' AND THE LGT AT 3500'. THE LGT CAME BACK. LEVELING AT 3600', TFC IN SIGHT. THE LGT WAS CONCERNED WITH THE SEP, HOWEVER SEP STANDARDS WERE NOT COMPROMISED. HAD THE LGT NOT SEEN THE SMA, THERE WAS STILL TIME TO TURN THE SMA TO PASS BEHIND THE LGT. THESE ARE FAR FROM IDEAL SITUATIONS, BUT IN THIS SITUATION, WHERE THE TRNEE IS VERY CLOSE TO CHKOUT, IT IS SOMETIMES NECESSARY TO LET THE TRNEE MAKE THE DECISIONS FIRST TO SEE HOW THEY WOULD HANDLE DIFFERENT SITUATIONS, AND ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE READY FOR CHKOUT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.