Narrative:

This morning (XA15Z) we were notified [military training] was active today. [This military training event] is a major military activity using multiple battlegroups from the USAF (tankers); the navy with aircraft carriers tankers and fighters; as well as other various operators. We were not notified ahead of time; although the airspace (finns/R2901/placid east/west/north) takes up a significant amount of airspace and increases traffic complexity greatly. Proper briefing would have allowed us to prepare for issues that we typically do not see except once a year. We did not receive a briefing; and we were told 'well; there's paperwork at the sector; if you have questions.' this event is planned out months/weeks in advance; and there's absolutely no reason why we shouldn't receive a briefing with what to expect prior to the activation of the operation.the paperwork indicated that placid north/east/west as well as avon hi would be activated sfc-FL230 (70-230 for placid). It also indicated the use of crystal ii. The esis [enhanced status information system] showed - avon hi FL310 and below; east 70-310; west 70-310; north 70-310. The shfty arrival had a scheduled closure prior to the military airspace going active. The altitudes were contradictory to the paperwork at the sector.around XB00Z; the esis was updated; and traffic management unit (tmu) called to notify us that north was not going active; and they lowered west 70-150. This allowed them to subsequently cancel the shfty arrival closure. Again; altitudes and airspace were now completely contradictory to what the [military training] briefing paperwork said.aircraft X came off mcf for the placid airspace; specifically crystal ii. He was 53 minutes early for the scheduled time. He was requesting to enter placids; crystal 2; and avon hi. We subsequently notified tmu.in preparation for this; I called ZJX mayo to tell them shfty would be closing. Aircraft X began orbiting (for approximately 53 mins) on the crystal ii ar track in a block altitude because the airspace was not released. There is confusion that exists in our center whether the sector can release restricted airspace (when properly NOTAM'ed out; or whether they can release ATC assigned airspace (atcaa) R2901 above FL180). We have been told repeatedly by management that we cannot activate restricted atcaa's or airspace; as we 'do not own the airspace' and that 'we only own the moas'.we could not activate placid north/west because of numerous shfty arrivals that had yet to be rerouted. After calling ZJX; I had an additional 5 shfty arrivals spread out over the next 30 minutes.tmu was arguing that placid west/east could stay cold with the use of crystal ii. While I believe that it might be able to be; it typically [is] not in the past; due to the southwest refueling track point being 1.1 miles from the inside boundary. This means that if an aircraft travels 1.1 miles; makes a wide turn back to the east point; it would be a whiskey / spill out and be in our airspace; immediately adjacent to the shfty arrival. Because we use 3 miles separation from the placid MOA (as required in 7110); it could result in an automatic loss. At high altitude; the potential would be even greater; as we have no 3 mile areas. An aircraft could exit on a whiskey alert and as it's exiting result in a loss [lack of standard separation]. Without placid north or placid west being active; we are looking at no safety margin. This crystal ii track was depicted with 4 points in the [military training event] briefing handout. It did not specify whether the ar track (including turns) were also mandated; or if the aircraft had to simply fly between the points. If the aircraft were to make a wider turn; then they could potentially still violate our airspace on a whiskey alert.in response and in conjunction with safety of the sectors involved; we asked for the west/north to be active as originally described from the morning & inthe [military training event] packet. We were advised that west/north/east/hi would be active FL310 and below. The esis still reflected east/hi only 230 and below. At approximately 10 minutes prior to east activation; the esis was updated to reflect this new change.aircraft X; who had been orbiting above placid/avon airspace in a similar track to crystal; had been calling for clearance into the range to the range commanding officer; he didn't get clearance from the range officer until approximately 40 seconds before the R2901 went active. Absent this clearance; when the tmu mos [traffic management unit; military operations specialist] released the airspace; it would have resulted in a loss.aircraft Y was on the CSHEL4; orl transition. Due to the aircraft's high performance; he was able to out-climb placid north; but the transition should have been closed the entire time of the planned activation; with a buffer of time before hand. Aircraft on the CSHEL4.orl transition would typically result in an immediate loss with the placid north complex. Tmu normally takes care of these reroutes and closes the orl transition. This did not happen until 20 minutes after activation and after our supervisor went over to have a discussion with tmu.additionally; after the airspace was active; aircraft Z from mco was destined to [the south]. Because of klman being closed; he came out [heading towards] atlas. The ZMA coastal area sector 22 accepted the handoff on the airplane; turned him from a 170 heading to parallel the east side of the range and attempted to put him on a northwest bound heading. This turn resulted in a very close proximity to the range complex. The coastal controller then vectored the aircraft back into approach control airspace; and attempted to hand the aircraft off to sector 67; while westbound and potentially without standard separation from the restricted area. Aircraft Z had to fly around the west side of the restricted airspace (and underneath) instead of the east side at his requested final. The east side would have been the standard routing; not resulted in increased complexity; and potentially an airspace deviation. There was no reason to route aircraft Z back to the northwest to go around the other side of the restricted airspace; other than sector 22's refusal to work the aircraft.first; all major military exercises should be briefed in an all hands briefing at least 2 weeks prior to the aforementioned event. This should be done by our military office; and should address all of the potential issues we may face; aerial refueling; breakups; airspace activations; etc. These should be required cedar items to be signed off; as well.second; the sector should be the position releasing the airspace. We are told that it goes hot at XXXX time whether we approve or not; which as with aircraft X; could have been very dangerous. The primary communication for the range officer should be from the sector; not from tmu mos. Third; our LOA with the R2901 complex needs to be revisited. The 9th air force letter is greater than 30 years old; has not been updated to the current users; and is not followed in any way. Our facsfac [fleet area control and surveillance facility] LOA does not reflect the current usage of the airspace; either. Our military procedures are outdated and need to be adjusted. A 30 year old LOA with no current parties involved makes absolutely no sense and should not be continued to be used until a new agreement and procedures are reached. I would suggest that we follow other center's suit and make specific restricted/MOA loas; versus a LOA for an entire base or armed service group.fourth; typical routes to use during these operations should be briefed; so that an issue with aircraft Z does not happen again. This could also cover the issue with aircraft Y almost penetrating the placid north MOA; procedures for tmu to follow so they immediately can close the shfty; or close the CSHEL4.orl. A complete list of what needs to be closed based on what is active is needed.fifth; a list of what airspace each ar track envelops and what air space has to be active if these are hot.sixth; the removal of force active; as it imposes a safety risk with the constant changing and fluctuations by tmu in the execution of the day's mission. The sector should release the airspace; tell tmu & the range officer it is released. Not the other way around; where tmu releases the airspace and tells the sector.seventh; as tmu implements various procedures in preparation for these events; they should specifically tell the sector what they are done; so that the sector team can work together to ensure that they didn't miss any major items; for example; not closing the CSHEL4 orl transition. An open communication both ways will ensure that no safety related items are missed.eight; an emphasis on what is in the packet needs to be followed. It can be adjusted; with direct communication from the sector to the range officer; or vice versa; on a recorded line; but not by word of mouth in the control room. Ninth; the esis should be updated consistently and immediately with what we are being told. It is the most up to date information and needs to stay that way. We cannot afford to let it lag behind.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Miami Center Controller reported of problems associated with Restricted Areas being hot or cold.

Narrative: This morning (XA15Z) we were notified [Military training] was active today. [This military training event] is a major military activity using multiple battlegroups from the USAF (Tankers); the Navy with Aircraft Carriers tankers and fighters; as well as other various operators. We were not notified ahead of time; although the airspace (FINNS/R2901/Placid East/West/North) takes up a significant amount of airspace and increases traffic complexity greatly. Proper briefing would have allowed us to prepare for issues that we typically do not see except once a year. We did not receive a briefing; and we were told 'Well; there's paperwork at the sector; if you have questions.' This event is planned out months/weeks in advance; and there's absolutely no reason why we shouldn't receive a briefing with what to expect prior to the activation of the operation.The paperwork indicated that Placid North/East/West as well as AVON HI would be activated SFC-FL230 (70-230 for PLACID). It also indicated the use of CRYSTAL II. The ESIS [Enhanced Status Information System] showed - AVON HI FL310 and below; East 70-310; West 70-310; North 70-310. The SHFTY arrival had a scheduled closure prior to the military airspace going active. The altitudes were contradictory to the paperwork at the sector.Around XB00Z; the ESIS was updated; and Traffic Management Unit (TMU) called to notify us that North was not going active; and they lowered WEST 70-150. This allowed them to subsequently cancel the SHFTY ARRIVAL closure. Again; altitudes and airspace were now completely contradictory to what the [military training] briefing paperwork said.Aircraft X came off MCF for the Placid Airspace; specifically Crystal II. He was 53 minutes early for the scheduled time. He was requesting to enter PLACIDs; CRYSTAL 2; and AVON HI. We subsequently notified TMU.In preparation for this; I called ZJX Mayo to tell them SHFTY would be closing. Aircraft X began orbiting (for approximately 53 mins) on the CRYSTAL II AR track in a block altitude because the airspace was not released. There is confusion that exists in our center whether the sector can release restricted airspace (when properly NOTAM'ed out; or whether they can release ATC Assigned Airspace (ATCAA) R2901 above FL180). We have been told repeatedly by management that we cannot activate restricted ATCAA's or Airspace; as we 'do not own the airspace' and that 'we only own the MOAs'.We could not activate Placid North/West because of numerous SHFTY arrivals that had yet to be rerouted. After calling ZJX; I had an additional 5 SHFTY arrivals spread out over the next 30 minutes.TMU was arguing that Placid West/East could stay cold with the use of CRYSTAL II. While I believe that it might be able to be; it typically [is] not in the past; due to the southwest refueling track point being 1.1 miles from the inside boundary. This means that if an aircraft travels 1.1 miles; makes a wide turn back to the east point; it would be a WHISKEY / SPILL OUT and be in our airspace; immediately adjacent to the SHFTY Arrival. Because we use 3 miles separation from the Placid MOA (as required in 7110); it could result in an automatic loss. At high altitude; the potential would be even greater; as we have no 3 mile areas. An aircraft could exit on a WHISKEY alert and as it's exiting result in a LoSS [Lack of Standard Separation]. Without Placid North or Placid West being active; we are looking at no safety margin. This CRYSTAL II track was depicted with 4 points in the [military training event] briefing handout. It did not specify whether the AR Track (including turns) were also mandated; or if the aircraft had to simply fly between the points. If the aircraft were to make a wider turn; then they could potentially still violate our airspace on a WHISKEY alert.In response and in conjunction with safety of the sectors involved; we asked for the WEST/NORTH to be active as originally described from the morning & inthe [military training event] packet. We were advised that WEST/NORTH/EAST/HI would be active FL310 and below. The ESIS still reflected EAST/HI Only 230 and below. At approximately 10 minutes prior to East activation; the ESIS was updated to reflect this new change.Aircraft X; who had been orbiting above PLACID/AVON airspace in a similar track to CRYSTAL; had been calling for clearance into the range to the Range Commanding Officer; he didn't get clearance from the range officer until approximately 40 seconds before the R2901 went active. Absent this clearance; when the TMU MOS [Traffic Management Unit; Military Operations Specialist] released the airspace; it would have resulted in a LoSS.Aircraft Y was on the CSHEL4; ORL transition. Due to the aircraft's high performance; he was able to out-climb Placid North; but the transition should have been closed the entire time of the planned activation; with a buffer of time before hand. Aircraft on the CSHEL4.ORL transition would typically result in an immediate LoSS with the Placid North Complex. TMU normally takes care of these reroutes and closes the ORL transition. This did not happen until 20 minutes after activation and after our Supervisor went over to have a discussion with TMU.Additionally; after the airspace was active; Aircraft Z from MCO was destined to [the south]. Because of KLMAN being closed; he came out [heading towards] ATLAS. The ZMA Coastal area Sector 22 accepted the handoff on the airplane; turned him from a 170 heading to parallel the east side of the range and attempted to put him on a northwest bound heading. This turn resulted in a very close proximity to the range complex. The Coastal Controller then vectored the aircraft back into approach control airspace; and attempted to hand the aircraft off to Sector 67; while westbound and potentially without standard separation from the restricted area. Aircraft Z had to fly around the west side of the restricted airspace (and underneath) instead of the east side at his requested final. The east side would have been the standard routing; not resulted in increased complexity; and potentially an airspace deviation. There was no reason to route Aircraft Z back to the northwest to go around the other side of the restricted airspace; other than Sector 22's refusal to work the aircraft.First; all major military exercises should be briefed in an all hands briefing at least 2 weeks prior to the aforementioned event. This should be done by our military office; and should address all of the potential issues we may face; Aerial Refueling; Breakups; Airspace Activations; etc. These should be required CEDAR items to be signed off; as well.Second; the sector should be the position releasing the airspace. We are told that it goes hot at XXXX time whether we approve or not; which as with Aircraft X; could have been very dangerous. The primary communication for the Range Officer should be from the sector; not from TMU MOS. Third; our LOA with the R2901 complex needs to be revisited. The 9th Air Force Letter is greater than 30 years old; has not been updated to the current users; and is not followed in any way. Our FACSFAC [Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility] LOA does not reflect the current usage of the airspace; either. Our military procedures are outdated and need to be adjusted. A 30 year old LOA with no current parties involved makes absolutely no sense and should not be continued to be used until a new agreement and procedures are reached. I would suggest that we follow other Center's suit and make specific restricted/MOA LOAs; versus a LOA for an entire base or armed service group.Fourth; typical routes to use during these operations should be briefed; so that an issue with Aircraft Z does not happen again. This could also cover the issue with Aircraft Y almost penetrating the Placid North MOA; procedures for TMU to follow so they immediately can close the SHFTY; or close the CSHEL4.ORL. A complete list of what needs to be closed based on what is active is needed.Fifth; a list of what airspace each AR track envelops and what air space has to be active if these are HOT.Sixth; the removal of Force Active; as it imposes a safety risk with the constant changing and fluctuations by TMU in the execution of the day's mission. The sector should release the airspace; tell TMU & the Range Officer it is released. Not the other way around; where TMU releases the airspace and tells the sector.Seventh; as TMU implements various procedures in preparation for these events; they should specifically tell the sector what they are done; so that the sector team can work together to ensure that they didn't miss any major items; for example; not closing the CSHEL4 ORL transition. An open communication both ways will ensure that no safety related items are missed.Eight; an emphasis on what is in the packet needs to be followed. It can be adjusted; with direct communication from the sector to the Range Officer; or vice versa; on a recorded line; but not by word of mouth in the control room. Ninth; the ESIS should be updated consistently and immediately with what we are being told. It is the most up to date information and needs to stay that way. We cannot afford to let it lag behind.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.