Narrative:

There was no event. There was no conflict. The issue is bad handling by approach control; in and around a 'hot spot' near the ubg VOR. This report centers on events which transpired during an instrument approach into mmv. This is perhaps an unusual report; as to the best of my knowledge there were no conflicts or violations in that airspace around that time; and certainly none involving me or my aircraft. I make this report only to flag what I perceive to be an environment that may be unusually conducive to causing errors; violations and conflicts. I have flown in the northwest for decades; and mmv is my home airport. I was returning home. The weather had been extremely bad for several days; with snow; freezing rain; and icing in clouds; to where I was being very cautious and had delayed my flight; and even did an overnight in ZZZ in hopes that the clearing trends would continue; which they did.my flight back was uneventful; VFR on top in bright sunshine; and getting colder as I headed north. The temperature had been minus 7; but it dropped to about minus 14 as we approached portland. The reported weather was excellent. The AWOS at mmv said better than 5; with broken layers at 8;000 and 6;000 with a few clouds at 600. It was several degrees above freezing on the ground. As we passed eugene we could see dark layers of lower clouds in the distance. My plan was to stay as high as possible to avoid icing; and to then drop through quickly with anti-ice on. I used this technique often in the past with good results; despite the fact that I sometimes encountered moderate icing as I dropped through. To this end I asked seattle center if I could get a clearance to the IAF for the ILS; ozier. They gave me that clearance; but warned me that portland approach might change it. When I was switched to portland approach they kept that clearance for a time. I set up the approach with ozier as the initial fix. I was told to be at or below 6;000 at 16 DME from ubg. This seemed odd to me. I had been VFR on top; but was now descending into IMC; and ubg was not part of the routing I'd been given. The response from the controller was snappish. She repeated it; and asked me if I didn't comprehend crossing restrictions. I said that I did; and started my descent; still planning to stay as high as possible. She did not specify a final altitude. I assumed she intended to say 6;000; but was reluctant to question her again. Apparently I guessed correctly. As we got closer; I was unexpectedly told go direct ubg; with the same crossing restriction. I questioned this and got snapped at again. By now we were in IMC. She repeated the clearance; clearly irritated. I acknowledged; kept descending; and set to reprogramming my GPS for direct ubg. About the time I got this done; she changed my clearance to a vector away from ubg. Cockpit workload was getting high and I wasn't sure of her clearance or her intentions. I asked for a repeat. She had been in intense communications with another aircraft on the frequency. I was occupied with my own problems. What I got was harsh words; a vector; a sharp turn; and a warning to pay attention. I replied that I was paying attention and complied. She warned me I was getting close to my crossing restriction; so I increased my descent rate; to over 1;200 feet per minute. I had the feeling the controller was out of control as I leveled at 6;000.about the time I settled on the new vector; I was given another major heading change; a descent to 3;000; and a new frequency. I checked in. The new controller acknowledged and said to expect the ILS. The new controller was good. My vector was now in the opposite direction to the ILS; and close in; very tight. I kept descending and setting up for a vtf (vector to final). The controller then told me he had another aircraft and he needed me at 3;000 as soon as possible. I gave him our descent rate. I think we were within 500 feet of altitude and still at about 1;200 FPM. Whatever it was; I broadcast it to him and he was happy. The rest the traffic handling was excellent. My 180 degree intercept angle evolved into two precisely-called right angle turns; and I didn't even overshoot. My GPS; of course; was overwhelmed by all this. It correctly refused to enable the approach. It was well outside it's parameters for a vtf; but the localizer was there; VHF navigation and hand flying worked; and; when established; I was switched to unicom.the weather experienced on the approach wasn't much like the ATIS. The northwest is like that. We passed ozier at 2;900 feet still in solid IMC. About liyev; 1;900 feet; we did break out into good visibility except for one large cloud ahead of us on the localizer. There was VFR traffic at mmv; a helicopter as I recall; and he asked where we were. I told him we had just gone back into the clouds; and then gave him a report when we came out the other side at about 600 feet. The landing was uneventful; except that I had no communications on the ground with approach. I had to call on my cell phone from in front of the hangar after we were down to cancel and did.so that was the trip. Why this report? This was too much hassle; too much unnecessary work load; and this in a situation where the official weather was good; and there was only one or two other airplanes anywhere around. The airspace around the newberg VOR used to handle much more traffic; in much worse weather; and with fewer problems. It's not as safe as it used to be. I suggest this is not a good place to assign a less-than-expert controller without supervision; not even for the task of feeding traffic to a seasoned pro handing the final clearances himself. Nothing bad happened this time; but this airspace is becoming a 'hot spot' known for problematic traffic handling. My concern is that eventually there will be violations; conflicts; or incidents.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GA pilot reported poor handling from ATC in the vicinity of UBG VOR on approach to MMV in IMC and icing conditions.

Narrative: There was no event. There was no conflict. The issue is bad handling by approach control; in and around a 'hot spot' near the UBG VOR. This report centers on events which transpired during an instrument approach into MMV. This is perhaps an unusual report; as to the best of my knowledge there were no conflicts or violations in that airspace around that time; and certainly none involving me or my aircraft. I make this report only to flag what I perceive to be an environment that may be unusually conducive to causing errors; violations and conflicts. I have flown in the Northwest for decades; and MMV is my home airport. I was returning home. The weather had been extremely bad for several days; with snow; freezing rain; and icing in clouds; to where I was being very cautious and had delayed my flight; and even did an overnight in ZZZ in hopes that the clearing trends would continue; which they did.My flight back was uneventful; VFR on top in bright sunshine; and getting colder as I headed north. The temperature had been minus 7; but it dropped to about minus 14 as we approached Portland. The reported weather was excellent. The AWOS at MMV said better than 5; with broken layers at 8;000 and 6;000 with a few clouds at 600. It was several degrees above freezing on the ground. As we passed Eugene we could see dark layers of lower clouds in the distance. My plan was to stay as high as possible to avoid icing; and to then drop through quickly with anti-ice on. I used this technique often in the past with good results; despite the fact that I sometimes encountered moderate icing as I dropped through. To this end I asked Seattle Center if I could get a clearance to the IAF for the ILS; OZIER. They gave me that clearance; but warned me that Portland Approach might change it. When I was switched to Portland Approach they kept that clearance for a time. I set up the approach with OZIER as the Initial Fix. I was told to be at or below 6;000 at 16 DME from UBG. This seemed odd to me. I had been VFR on top; but was now descending into IMC; and UBG was not part of the routing I'd been given. The response from the controller was snappish. She repeated it; and asked me if I didn't comprehend crossing restrictions. I said that I did; and started my descent; still planning to stay as high as possible. She did not specify a final altitude. I assumed she intended to say 6;000; but was reluctant to question her again. Apparently I guessed correctly. As we got closer; I was unexpectedly told go direct UBG; with the same crossing restriction. I questioned this and got snapped at again. By now we were in IMC. She repeated the clearance; clearly irritated. I acknowledged; kept descending; and set to reprogramming my GPS for direct UBG. About the time I got this done; she changed my clearance to a vector away from UBG. Cockpit workload was getting high and I wasn't sure of her clearance or her intentions. I asked for a repeat. She had been in intense communications with another aircraft on the frequency. I was occupied with my own problems. What I got was harsh words; a vector; a sharp turn; and a warning to pay attention. I replied that I was paying attention and complied. She warned me I was getting close to my crossing restriction; so I increased my descent rate; to over 1;200 feet per minute. I had the feeling the controller was out of control as I leveled at 6;000.About the time I settled on the new vector; I was given another major heading change; a descent to 3;000; and a new frequency. I checked in. The new controller acknowledged and said to expect the ILS. The new controller was GOOD. My vector was now in the opposite direction to the ILS; and close in; very tight. I kept descending and setting up for a VTF (Vector to Final). The controller then told me he had another aircraft and he needed me at 3;000 as soon as possible. I gave him our descent rate. I think we were within 500 feet of altitude and still at about 1;200 FPM. Whatever it was; I broadcast it to him and he was happy. The rest the traffic handling was excellent. My 180 degree intercept angle evolved into two precisely-called right angle turns; and I didn't even overshoot. My GPS; of course; was overwhelmed by all this. It correctly refused to enable the approach. It was well outside it's parameters for a VTF; but the localizer was there; VHF NAV and hand flying worked; and; when established; I was switched to UNICOM.The weather experienced on the approach wasn't much like the ATIS. The Northwest is like that. We passed OZIER at 2;900 feet still in solid IMC. About LIYEV; 1;900 feet; we did break out into good visibility except for one large cloud ahead of us on the localizer. There was VFR traffic at MMV; a helicopter as I recall; and he asked where we were. I told him we had just gone back into the clouds; and then gave him a report when we came out the other side at about 600 feet. The landing was uneventful; except that I had no communications on the ground with approach. I had to call on my cell phone from in front of the hangar after we were down to cancel and did.So that was the trip. Why this report? This was too much hassle; too much unnecessary work load; and this in a situation where the official weather was good; and there was only one or two other airplanes anywhere around. The airspace around the Newberg VOR used to handle much more traffic; in much worse weather; and with fewer problems. It's not as safe as it used to be. I suggest this is not a good place to assign a less-than-expert controller without supervision; not even for the task of feeding traffic to a seasoned pro handing the final clearances himself. Nothing bad happened this time; but this airspace is becoming a 'hot spot' known for problematic traffic handling. My concern is that eventually there will be violations; conflicts; or incidents.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.