Narrative:

We were running late due to two last minute maintenance write ups. While maintenance was busy finishing up the paperwork; we were getting things ready to close the doors and depart. There was also a pilot jump seating; who was sitting in seat 1W which added a little distraction.after we received the aml back; the first officer (first officer) and I reviewed the items that were MEL'd and verified everything was completed. I then placed a call to my dispatcher to amend the release for the newly added mels.once the revision was done; we received our load closeout summary and I gave the PA: 'flight attendants ready for door closure.' I remember doing my before start - below the line flow; but somehow I had missed the batteries. They were still in the off position because we were on gpu power. I called for my first officer to run 'below the line' and we did the checklist like normal but again; both of us missed that the batteries were off. I specifically remember looking up at the panel when the first officer called batteries and bus tie; but for some reason I hadn't caught the mistake.we then conducted normal procedures with the ramp agents; the brakes were released and the tug was connected. I then proceeded to start engine #2 at the gate on gpu power because the APU was MEL'd just minutes ago. Once engine #2 was started; I reached up and selected external power to off. This is when we started receiving strange errors and multiple master warnings/cautions. After a quick discussion with my first officer on what was happening; I elected to shut down the engine. Only after I shut down the engine did I notice that the batteries were in the off position.shutting down the engine led to multiple things; the first of which was a powerplant message on the ed. I called maintenance control to explain to them what had happened and to have mechanics come out to the aircraft. As we waited for the mechanics to arrive; I realized that the gear doors had opened with the tug attached. I asked the ramp agent to look at the nose gear area and he verified that the nose gear doors were resting on the tug. At this point; I coordinated with ops to deplane due to the lengthy inspection and maintenance process which would take place. After getting passengers deplaned; I went outside to observe the nose gear doors myself. Both nose gear doors received damage where they had made contact with the tug. After discussing with the mechanics what the course of action would be for the airplane; I made a call to the duty officer to explain what had happened. I then made two entries into the aml for the powerplant message and the nose gear doors damage. Causes; not visually verifying and touching the battery switches when they were called for in the checklist. Two MEL's during the boarding process which kept me busy just prior to departure. The previous flight we had encountered very moderate turbulence in our descent as well as moderate icing. The safety of my flight attendants ran through my mind when we hit the turbulence but thankfully they were seated and not injured.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Q400 Captain failed to select the battery switches ON so after engine start when the ground power was turned off; the nose gear doors lost hydraulic pressure; dropped open onto the tug and were damaged.

Narrative: We were running late due to two last minute maintenance write ups. While maintenance was busy finishing up the paperwork; we were getting things ready to close the doors and depart. There was also a pilot jump seating; who was sitting in seat 1W which added a little distraction.After we received the AML back; the FO (First Officer) and I reviewed the items that were MEL'd and verified everything was completed. I then placed a call to my dispatcher to amend the release for the newly added MELs.Once the revision was done; we received our load closeout summary and I gave the PA: 'Flight Attendants ready for door closure.' I remember doing my Before Start - Below the line flow; but somehow I had missed the batteries. They were still in the off position because we were on GPU power. I called for my FO to run 'Below the Line' and we did the checklist like normal but again; both of us missed that the batteries were off. I specifically remember looking up at the panel when the FO called Batteries and Bus Tie; but for some reason I hadn't caught the mistake.We then conducted normal procedures with the ramp agents; the brakes were released and the tug was connected. I then proceeded to start engine #2 at the gate on GPU power because the APU was MEL'd just minutes ago. Once engine #2 was started; I reached up and selected external power to OFF. This is when we started receiving strange errors and multiple Master Warnings/Cautions. After a quick discussion with my FO on what was happening; I elected to shut down the engine. Only after I shut down the engine did I notice that the batteries were in the OFF position.Shutting down the engine led to multiple things; the first of which was a POWERPLANT message on the ED. I called maintenance control to explain to them what had happened and to have mechanics come out to the aircraft. As we waited for the mechanics to arrive; I realized that the gear doors had opened with the tug attached. I asked the ramp agent to look at the nose gear area and he verified that the nose gear doors were resting on the tug. At this point; I coordinated with Ops to deplane due to the lengthy inspection and maintenance process which would take place. After getting passengers deplaned; I went outside to observe the nose gear doors myself. Both nose gear doors received damage where they had made contact with the tug. After discussing with the mechanics what the course of action would be for the airplane; I made a call to the Duty Officer to explain what had happened. I then made two entries into the AML for the POWERPLANT message and the nose gear doors damage. Causes; not visually verifying and touching the battery switches when they were called for in the checklist. Two MEL's during the boarding process which kept me busy just prior to departure. The previous flight we had encountered very moderate turbulence in our descent as well as moderate icing. The safety of my flight attendants ran through my mind when we hit the turbulence but thankfully they were seated and not injured.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.