Narrative:

This write up begins at the point the RNAV [D] circle approach into mso commenced. Until that point the flight proceeded to mso under normal and standard conditions with no deficiencies in the crew found. The captain; pilot flying; was given the instruction to cross the initial approach fix at or above 8000 and cleared the RNAV D into mso. He elected to use vs mode to descend at an inadequate rate causing him to be approximately 2000 feet high at the initial and fast. While attempting to slow down in flch mode the high approach situation was not corrected until PF called for the landing gear. At that point vs was selected to 3500 fpm through the initial fix and the speed began to build. Using this maneuvering PF was able to cross the FAF on speed and altitude. At this point an 1800 fpm descent was initiated to the MDA. Upon arrival at MDA the field was still not in sight. The crew continued towards the missed approach point (map). Just prior to reaching the map the runway threshold for runway 29 became discernible. However it was very close to the aircraft's position. In my opinion the aircraft was not in a position to descend from MDA normally and land safely on the runway. The crew elected to vacate MDA and began a banking descending turn towards the runway. No landing checklist had been completed. With both their heads out of the cockpit we proceeded through 1000 ft above the touchdown zone elevation descending between 1500-2000 fpm. No call was made by the first officer. The aircraft continued its banking descent at a high rate until approximately 700 feet where I no longer felt comfortable. The low speed awareness tape was within 5 KIAS of the approach speed in a loaded turn at 1500 FPM. From the jumpseat I called for the go-around. The go around was initiated however the airplane was still descending. I prompted this and a climb was initiated. The bank was never removed; in fact it increased causing the aural warning 'bank angle'. The pm never dialed up the speed causing the load in the bank to increase at a slow speed and the stall tape to approach the flying speed. I reached forward increased the speed and began making all the go around calls as they were not being made.I felt without intervention the safety of the flight was absolutely in question and both pilots were removed from flight status. Weather in mso was a factor as winds were high and visibility and cloud cover were dropping. The tower did inform the crew of this prior to arrival at the map. Additional training on non-precision step down approaches and circle to land procedures are necessary.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Check Airman and the First Officer involved described an RNAV approach to circling minimums at MSO in poor weather that ended in a missed approach. The check airman called for the go-around and felt without his intervention the safety of the flight was absolutely in question. The flight diverted to their alternate.

Narrative: This write up begins at the point the RNAV [D] circle approach into MSO commenced. Until that point the flight proceeded to MSO under normal and standard conditions with no deficiencies in the crew found. The Captain; pilot flying; was given the instruction to cross the initial approach fix at or above 8000 and cleared the RNAV D into MSO. He elected to use VS mode to descend at an inadequate rate causing him to be approximately 2000 feet high at the initial and fast. While attempting to slow down in FLCH mode the high approach situation was not corrected until PF called for the landing gear. At that point VS was selected to 3500 fpm through the Initial Fix and the speed began to build. Using this maneuvering PF was able to cross the FAF on speed and altitude. At this point an 1800 fpm descent was initiated to the MDA. Upon arrival at MDA the field was still not in sight. The crew continued towards the missed approach point (MAP). Just prior to reaching the MAP the runway threshold for RWY 29 became discernible. However it was very close to the aircraft's position. In my opinion the aircraft was not in a position to descend from MDA normally and land safely on the runway. The crew elected to vacate MDA and began a banking descending turn towards the runway. No Landing Checklist had been completed. With both their heads out of the cockpit we proceeded through 1000 ft above the touchdown zone elevation descending between 1500-2000 fpm. No call was made by the First Officer. The aircraft continued its banking descent at a high rate until approximately 700 feet where I no longer felt comfortable. The low speed awareness tape was within 5 KIAS of the approach speed in a loaded turn at 1500 FPM. From the Jumpseat I called for the Go-Around. The go around was initiated however the airplane was still descending. I prompted this and a climb was initiated. The bank was never removed; in fact it increased causing the aural warning 'Bank Angle'. The PM never dialed up the speed causing the load in the bank to increase at a slow speed and the stall tape to approach the flying speed. I reached forward increased the speed and began making all the go around calls as they were not being made.I felt without intervention the safety of the flight was absolutely in question and both pilots were removed from flight status. Weather in MSO was a factor as winds were high and visibility and cloud cover were dropping. The tower did inform the crew of this prior to arrival at the MAP. Additional training on Non-precision step down approaches and circle to land procedures are necessary.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.