Narrative:

Night time approach. Within 5 miles from runway we received amber '50% brake degrade' caution cas message (loss of two symmetrical brakes). PF (left seat) asked the jump seat pilot (also a PIC) to review checklist. Jumpseat pilot turned the area lights on bright; which became distracting; so both crew asked them to turn off area lights and use phone light instead. Checklist advised to increase landing roll by 60%. This was within limits (since the aircraft was light) and elected to continue. Safe landing was made and runway exit was taken; however we were then told by ATC that he had wanted us to take [an earlier exit]. The aircraft on approach behind us was sent around due to spacing. The PF recalls hearing ATC chatter early on in the landing rollout; but did not hear the content of the call or the call sign that it was addressing - at this time the crew were exercising extra caution to monitor the braking action and slow the aircraft safely. The PF then queried the pm about the ATC call; but the pm hadn't heard the call and was unable to advise the PF. Recall being 50-60 kts when this 'call' from ATC was heard; which can generally be a high workload time for handling radio calls if pm is engaging in sops such as speed callouts and monitoring spoilers/reversers.as per our company operating manual if ATC provides instructions on rollout; crew should not acknowledge until less than 60 kts or clear of the runway. It was a high workload environment; compounded by the potential loss of braking. Ultimately; there was no abnormal braking action experienced and the cas message later cleared.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BD-700 Captain reported workload from a brake system anomaly resulted in missing a call from the Tower directing a turnoff after landing onto a certain taxiway. The subsequent aircraft was sent around.

Narrative: Night time approach. Within 5 miles from runway we received amber '50% brake degrade' caution CAS message (loss of two symmetrical brakes). PF (left seat) asked the jump seat pilot (also a PIC) to review checklist. Jumpseat pilot turned the area lights on bright; which became distracting; so both crew asked them to turn off area lights and use phone light instead. Checklist advised to increase landing roll by 60%. This was within limits (since the aircraft was light) and elected to continue. Safe landing was made and runway exit was taken; however we were then told by ATC that he had wanted us to take [an earlier exit]. The aircraft on approach behind us was sent around due to spacing. The PF recalls hearing ATC chatter early on in the landing rollout; but did not hear the content of the call or the call sign that it was addressing - at this time the crew were exercising extra caution to monitor the braking action and slow the aircraft safely. The PF then queried the PM about the ATC call; but the PM hadn't heard the call and was unable to advise the PF. Recall being 50-60 kts when this 'call' from ATC was heard; which can generally be a high workload time for handling radio calls if PM is engaging in SOPs such as speed callouts and monitoring spoilers/reversers.As per our company operating manual if ATC provides instructions on rollout; crew should not acknowledge until less than 60 kts or clear of the runway. It was a high workload environment; compounded by the potential loss of braking. Ultimately; there was no abnormal braking action experienced and the CAS message later cleared.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.