Narrative:

On our way to [our destination] and during the flight we went below minimums at our destination. This was not forecasted; but not unexpected. We slowed down enroute and discussed a plan where we would ask to hold at fix zzzzz if needed. We had approximately 30 minutes of excess fuel on top of our fuel to travel to our alternate.the RVR was between 4;500 and 6;000 when we shot the first ILS and we didn't enter the top of the fog until about 400 feet above the ground. We flew to minimums and did not see the approach lights or runway so we executed a missed approach. The tower instructed us to go to 3;000 on a 290 heading (may have been 270 or 320) and we executed our go around checklist and after takeoff checklist. This is where I noticed the first confusion from my second in command (sic). He seemed to be overwhelmed and could not prioritize tasks effectively. I questioned him 'are you here with me' and he said yes.I was trying to develop a plan with him and he kept wanted to talk to ATC and was very distracted. I took over and told him to 'load the full ILS 5 in the FMS and set it up to hold at zzzzz'. I asked him if he was ok holding there for 15 or 20 minutes to see if the weather improved before we would have to go to our alternate and he agreed that it was a good plan.I looked at the FMS after he set it up and I saw it said 'holding' as we entered the hold and I asked him to report entering the hold; which he did with the incorrect time; until he corrected and confirmed it with ATC and he still seemed lost. I asked him again if he was okay with our plan and asked him if he had any questions or concerns; he said he was and no.I lost track of time as I was checking our alternate weather while trying to fly the hold. I realize now I should have paid closer attention to our holding pattern; but I didn't trust the sic to get the weather I needed or communicate it to me effectively.we flew through our holding fix; towards the airport. It was approximately 90 seconds after that; I realized we were not in the hold so I started a turn back to the holding fix with a plan to manually fly the hold. I told the sic what I was doing and once again asked him to set up the FMS so we had a hold at zzzzz. He inadvertently set the FMS direct to zzzzz; but told me the hold was set up. I saw the CDI center so I thought he had it right and I engaged the navigation mode thinking I was flying outbound on the hold. In reality I was flying direct to the fix again. I did not realize this until it sequenced at zzzzz and turned left; as it should have to do a parallel entry to start over with the hold. During this time we told the controller; ineffectively; that we would shoot the approach at the completion of this turn. The controller understood; but the sic was confused again and questioned me on our plan; just after he told ATC what it was.at this point I was very frustrated and since we were cleared for the approach and in good VFR weather and we could see the ground I made a tight right turn to join the localizer. The sic showed some concern and made a comment to the effect of 'keep it tight and I hope we join the localizer before the glideslope (or something to that effect)'.we joined the localizer; configured the plane; intercepted the glideslope after 3 miles on the centerline and landed uneventfully.in hindsight I should have paid much closer attention to what my sic was doing; especially since this is not the first time a situation similar to this has arisen and I do not like babysitting this sic; who is PIC qualified in our company. I also should have been more aware of our location on the hold after our missed approach. I saturated myself with tasks because I did not trust the info I was receiving from my sic or the info he was relaying to ATC. Also; I confused myself more than once by incorrectly swapping the locations of ZZZZZ1 and zzzzz in my head and verbally. This may have led to some confusion; but does not excuseme for not paying closer attention.at no time did ATC question our location in the hold; what we did was not what we planned to do.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Learjet 45 crew reported entering IMC at 400 feet and executed a go around at minimums. After two failed attempts to enter the holding pattern because of First Officer FMC errors; a visual approach was flown when the weather suddenly improved.

Narrative: On our way to [our destination] and during the flight we went below minimums at our destination. This was not forecasted; but not unexpected. We slowed down enroute and discussed a plan where we would ask to hold at fix ZZZZZ if needed. We had approximately 30 minutes of excess fuel on top of our fuel to travel to our alternate.The RVR was between 4;500 and 6;000 when we shot the first ILS and we didn't enter the top of the fog until about 400 feet above the ground. We flew to minimums and did not see the approach lights or runway so we executed a missed approach. The Tower instructed us to go to 3;000 on a 290 heading (may have been 270 or 320) and we executed our go around checklist and after takeoff checklist. This is where I noticed the first confusion from my Second In Command (SIC). He seemed to be overwhelmed and could not prioritize tasks effectively. I questioned him 'are you here with me' and he said yes.I was trying to develop a plan with him and he kept wanted to talk to ATC and was very distracted. I took over and told him to 'load the full ILS 5 in the FMS and set it up to hold at ZZZZZ'. I asked him if he was OK holding there for 15 or 20 minutes to see if the weather improved before we would have to go to our alternate and he agreed that it was a good plan.I looked at the FMS after he set it up and I saw it said 'HOLDING' as we entered the hold and I asked him to report entering the hold; which he did with the incorrect time; until he corrected and confirmed it with ATC and he still seemed lost. I asked him again if he was okay with our plan and asked him if he had any questions or concerns; he said he was and no.I lost track of time as I was checking our alternate weather while trying to fly the hold. I realize now I should have paid closer attention to our holding pattern; but I didn't trust the SIC to get the weather I needed or communicate it to me effectively.We flew through our holding fix; towards the airport. It was approximately 90 seconds after that; I realized we were not in the hold so I started a turn back to the holding fix with a plan to manually fly the hold. I told the SIC what I was doing and once again asked him to set up the FMS so we had a hold at ZZZZZ. He inadvertently set the FMS direct to ZZZZZ; but told me the hold was set up. I saw the CDI center so I thought he had it right and I engaged the NAV mode thinking I was flying outbound on the hold. In reality I was flying direct to the fix again. I did not realize this until it sequenced at ZZZZZ and turned left; as it should have to do a parallel entry to start over with the hold. During this time we told the controller; ineffectively; that we would shoot the approach at the completion of this turn. The controller understood; but the SIC was confused again and questioned me on our plan; just after he told ATC what it was.At this point I was very frustrated and since we were cleared for the approach and in good VFR weather and we could see the ground I made a tight right turn to join the localizer. The SIC showed some concern and made a comment to the effect of 'keep it tight and I hope we join the localizer before the glideslope (or something to that effect)'.We joined the localizer; configured the plane; intercepted the glideslope after 3 miles on the centerline and landed uneventfully.In hindsight I should have paid much closer attention to what my SIC was doing; especially since this is not the first time a situation similar to this has arisen and I do not like babysitting this SIC; who is PIC qualified in our company. I also should have been more aware of our location on the hold after our missed approach. I saturated myself with tasks because I did not trust the info I was receiving from my SIC or the info he was relaying to ATC. Also; I confused myself more than once by incorrectly swapping the locations of ZZZZZ1 and ZZZZZ in my head and verbally. This may have led to some confusion; but does not excuseme for not paying closer attention.At no time did ATC question our location in the hold; what we did was not what we planned to do.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.