Narrative:

We were descending to cross konzl at 17000 ft as briefed and instructed on our arrival into lax; expecting to continue via our filed/briefed STAR and a south complex runway (indicated as available on ATIS). Approach issued a change of arrival (BASET4 instead of the RDEYE2); direct to a fix on the arrival (baset); different runway than expected (6L instead of 7R); 'descend via' clearance on the new arrival; and the ACARS chimed with a 'call crew scheds on arrival' all at about the same time. As we tried to type/reconcile/brief; we got caught up in what appeared to be a discrepancy between the FMS database STAR and the chart. The BASET4 chart illustrates a descent to cross reedr at/above 9000 followed by a 210 degree heading. Lined up with that heading (on the chart) is 'zusgi'; annotated with at/above 8000. The FMS database routing showed the turn at reedr; subsequent heading; and a reedr crossing altitude of 9000 ft. As we had been cleared to 'descend via' the baset; the last applicable altitude was the item we were paying lots of attention to but as tired as we were; it didn't make sense. We were almost caught up again when we were given direct smo with instructions to depart smo on a 250 degree heading and descend to 8000 ft; and told to expect 7R. With all the mode changes; typing; button pushing; briefing; and radio calls crammed into a couple short minutes; neither of us noticed the speed window was open as we approached 10000 ft. The captain caught it at about 9000 ft and immediately leveled to slow. I looked up and saw 290 kias. The airplane slowed rapidly to 250 and we continued our descent. No comment was made by approach and we made it to the gate without any further incident (to the best of our knowledge). The simplest explanation is that the speed window was open in a VNAV descent and we didn't notice. More directly; though; I should have kept our current lateral and vertical modes in my scan each time I transitioned to/from heads-down and typing. While I was programming the FMS; I neglected to serve adequately in my role as pilot monitoring. Increased scan; slowing down; and backing each other up in a more positive manner.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 Flight Crew reported exceeding 250 knots below 10000 feet during a late night arrival to LAX after several changes to their arrival and landing runway. Fatigue and distractions were cited as factors in the incident.

Narrative: We were descending to cross KONZL at 17000 ft as briefed and instructed on our arrival into LAX; expecting to continue via our filed/briefed STAR and a south complex runway (indicated as available on ATIS). Approach issued a change of arrival (BASET4 instead of the RDEYE2); direct to a fix on the arrival (BASET); different runway than expected (6L instead of 7R); 'Descend via' clearance on the new arrival; and the ACARS chimed with a 'Call Crew Scheds on arrival' all at about the same time. As we tried to type/reconcile/brief; we got caught up in what appeared to be a discrepancy between the FMS database STAR and the chart. The BASET4 chart illustrates a descent to cross REEDR at/above 9000 followed by a 210 degree heading. Lined up with that heading (on the chart) is 'ZUSGI'; annotated with at/above 8000. The FMS database routing showed the turn at REEDR; subsequent heading; and a REEDR crossing altitude of 9000 ft. As we had been cleared to 'descend via' the BASET; the last applicable altitude was the item we were paying lots of attention to but as tired as we were; it didn't make sense. We were almost caught up again when we were given direct SMO with instructions to depart SMO on a 250 degree heading and descend to 8000 ft; and told to expect 7R. With all the mode changes; typing; button pushing; briefing; and radio calls crammed into a couple short minutes; neither of us noticed the speed window was open as we approached 10000 ft. The Captain caught it at about 9000 ft and immediately leveled to slow. I looked up and saw 290 kias. The airplane slowed rapidly to 250 and we continued our descent. No comment was made by approach and we made it to the gate without any further incident (to the best of our knowledge). The simplest explanation is that the speed window was open in a VNAV descent and we didn't notice. More directly; though; I should have kept our current lateral and vertical modes in my scan each time I transitioned to/from heads-down and typing. While I was programming the FMS; I neglected to serve adequately in my role as Pilot Monitoring. Increased scan; slowing down; and backing each other up in a more positive manner.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.