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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1413586 |
Time | |
Date | 201612 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | MYAM.Airport |
State Reference | FO |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Conflict Airborne Conflict Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach |
Narrative:
When on arrival in to marsh harbor my first officer tried contacting station operations for 15 minutes on their dedicated frequency to request a weather report as well as determine the runway in use as the winds were light; all to no avail. After roughly 15 minutes the dispatcher supplied us the weather observer's weather report.on arrival into myam there was an abundance of VFR traffic enroute. On arrival into the airport environment there was so much VFR traffic that most of our attention was diverted to traffic avoidance. On downwind we were cut off by a [small transport aircraft] that entered a 45 to strait in to final on runway 9. After turning final there was another aircraft that decided to takeoff when we were inside a 3 mile final and our concern was there momentarily. Afterwards as we are about 500 feet AGL I notice we are only at flaps 30; I call for flaps 45 landing check. The first officer completed the landing check and we continue in for a safe landing. After landing I realize that per the fom; not only are we supposed to be stable by 500 feet; but we are supposed to be configured by 1;000 feet; not by 500 feet like I was thinking when the flaps 45 were extended on approach at 500 feet.there were many threats associated with this. First is the fact that we were flying into an unfamiliar airport outside of the country. Second is the fact that there is no onsite weather or airport information system readily available. Lastly and probably most dangerous was the fact that there was an abundance of VFR traffic entering and exiting the traffic pattern in nonstandard ICAO recommended procedures. Because of the extra vigilance; our focus wasn't as diligent as much as it should have been at the task at hand.in hindsight I believe that even though all the prep work was done in a very reasonable time manner; the decision to go around should have been excused when the flaps were discovered to be at 30 degrees at 500 feet.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Air carrier Captain reported an abundance of VFR traffic in MYAM; with several not following standard ICAO procedures which distracted the crew from making a stable approach.
Narrative: When on arrival in to Marsh Harbor my First Officer tried contacting station operations for 15 minutes on their dedicated frequency to request a weather report as well as determine the runway in use as the winds were light; all to no avail. After roughly 15 minutes the Dispatcher supplied us the weather observer's weather report.On arrival into MYAM there was an abundance of VFR traffic enroute. On arrival into the airport environment there was so much VFR traffic that most of our attention was diverted to traffic avoidance. On downwind we were cut off by a [small transport aircraft] that entered a 45 to strait in to final on Runway 9. After turning final there was another aircraft that decided to takeoff when we were inside a 3 mile final and our concern was there momentarily. Afterwards as we are about 500 feet AGL I notice we are only at flaps 30; I call for flaps 45 landing check. The First Officer completed the landing check and we continue in for a safe landing. After landing I realize that per the FOM; not only are we supposed to be stable by 500 feet; but we are supposed to be configured by 1;000 feet; not by 500 feet like I was thinking when the flaps 45 were extended on approach at 500 feet.There were many threats associated with this. First is the fact that we were flying into an unfamiliar airport outside of the country. Second is the fact that there is no onsite weather or airport information system readily available. Lastly and probably most dangerous was the fact that there was an abundance of VFR traffic entering and exiting the traffic pattern in nonstandard ICAO recommended procedures. Because of the extra vigilance; our focus wasn't as diligent as much as it should have been at the task at hand.In hindsight I believe that even though all the prep work was done in a very reasonable time manner; the decision to go around should have been excused when the flaps were discovered to be at 30 degrees at 500 feet.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.