Narrative:

While climbing through 16;000 feet we were given a turn direct to the [destination] airport as well as a climb to 19;000 feet. I executed a direct to in the FMS and then selected 19;000 feet. It was at that time that the aircraft began to feel like it was skidding. The captain made the comment that the aircraft felt like something was wrong and it felt like we were losing an engine. We checked all the engine gauges and all were with in normal limits. We then looked at the inclinometer and found that the aircraft had full left ball. It was at the time [I] initiated rudder hard over immediate action items. Very shortly after pressing and holding the quick disconnect button we received master warning EICAS messages of dual pitch trim failures. The captain made the decision to return to [departure airport]. We [advised ATC]; and it was at that point we made a descent to 11;000 feet and requested vectors. I was purely focused on controlling the airplane because it was continually wanting to go in to a cross-controlled condition. The aircraft required heavy left rudder input. The captain ran the QRH for the pitch trim failures first; [and] he was able to get them back. Once that problem was fixed we ran the QRH for the rudder hard over and we kept that system off because they were not working properly after running the procedure. We then notified the flight attendant. We informed her we would be touching down in 15 min and that there would not be an evacuation. We then set up for approach. There was a slight crosswind but we elected to land on [the] largest runway; we also elected to land flaps 22 so that we could keep the speed up to maintain more rudder authority. We were able to land the aircraft safely and taxi the aircraft to the gate.the threats we had to deal with were two simultaneous failures; one of which (the rudder) did not present in an obvious manner. The only error that we as a crew made was we did not brief how were going to transfer controls after landing or how we would react if we lost control on the ground.I feel that the crew as a whole acted to near perfection in this situation. We took our time handling the problems. I focused solely on flying the airplane while the captain worked on the checklist and communications. We worked through the problems efficiently and were able to land the aircraft safely.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145LR First Officer reported returning to departure airport after experiencing issues with the rudder and stabilizer trim.

Narrative: While climbing through 16;000 feet we were given a turn direct to the [destination] airport as well as a climb to 19;000 feet. I executed a direct to in the FMS and then selected 19;000 feet. It was at that time that the aircraft began to feel like it was skidding. The Captain made the comment that the aircraft felt like something was wrong and it felt like we were losing an engine. We checked all the engine gauges and all were with in normal limits. We then looked at the inclinometer and found that the aircraft had full left ball. It was at the time [I] initiated rudder hard over immediate action items. Very shortly after pressing and holding the quick disconnect button we received master warning EICAS messages of dual pitch trim failures. The Captain made the decision to return to [departure airport]. We [advised ATC]; and it was at that point we made a descent to 11;000 feet and requested vectors. I was purely focused on controlling the airplane because it was continually wanting to go in to a cross-controlled condition. The aircraft required heavy left rudder input. The Captain ran the QRH for the pitch trim failures first; [and] he was able to get them back. Once that problem was fixed we ran the QRH for the rudder hard over and we kept that system off because they were not working properly after running the procedure. We then notified the Flight Attendant. We informed her we would be touching down in 15 min and that there would not be an evacuation. We then set up for approach. There was a slight crosswind but we elected to land on [the] largest runway; we also elected to land flaps 22 so that we could keep the speed up to maintain more rudder authority. We were able to land the aircraft safely and taxi the aircraft to the gate.The threats we had to deal with were two simultaneous failures; one of which (the rudder) did not present in an obvious manner. The only error that we as a crew made was we did not brief how were going to transfer controls after landing or how we would react if we lost control on the ground.I feel that the crew as a whole acted to near perfection in this situation. We took our time handling the problems. I focused solely on flying the airplane while the Captain worked on the checklist and communications. We worked through the problems efficiently and were able to land the aircraft safely.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.