Narrative:

The night started with the captain and I arriving at the airport 1 hr and 15 mins prior to our departure (pushback) time. I arrived at the aircraft 1 hr prior to departure time and began the preflight. The preflight and checklist accomplishment were uneventful. During our briefing and on the transportation to the airport the captain and I discussed the possibility that the field would go uncontrolled before our departure. We discussed the V15 routing on our clearance and thought we would get a heading from tower or hcf center (if it went uncontrolled) to a V15 intercept. Our departure clearance from clearance delivery did not include a heading to V15. Either way we were going to clarify. I have never flown an uncontrolled field departure out of the hawaiian islands. The other 2 times I have departed on runway 3 at lih we were given runway heading or a heading pretty close to runway heading when the tower is open. The field went uncontrolled as we taxied up to runway 3. We were told to contact hcf center on 134.0 for our release for departure. We tried this frequency a couple times with no answer so we went to the main hcf frequency of 126.5 and were able to contact a controller who said it would be about 5 mins. The radios with hcf center on the ground on 126.5 were readable; but kind of scratchy. I do not think the poorer quality of the hcf transmissions contributed to the incident. We could hear hcf center release one and then two aircraft for the uncontrolled field ILS approach to runway 35. We were monitoring the CTAF freq on 118.9 as the aircraft approached for their uncontrolled field calls and were also monitoring hcf center for our release. I told the captain that at some point prior to departure I would ask ATC what kind of heading they wanted for a V15 intercept. Unfortunately; I never did due to time constraints and distractions. This was a mistake I made. When we did get the release; we received a very short release time due to the fact we were departing between the two inbound aircraft. We were trying to figure out where the jet went that just landed on runway 35 and were making our required uncontrolled field calls taking runway 3. The aircraft announced they were holding short of runway 3 so we began our takeoff roll. I was the pilot flying and called for runway heading on climb out and shortly after I heard the captain tell hcf center that we were on runway heading. Hcf center then said we were radar contact and I'm pretty sure we were still below 1500 feet at this point. Since I heard the earlier runway heading announcement by the captain to ATC; I assumed that this was an ok course of action to be on runway heading. This was a bad assumption. As things settled down in the climb out at about 8 to 10 nm from the field; we then talked about whether we should be on runway heading and the captain decided that we should start a right turn and that she would query what heading we should go to if any. At about that time ATC queried us why we did not start a right turn on departure to V15. He then cleared us direct to ebber after we were about 20 to 30 degrees into our right turn. So the turn was reversed to go back to ebber. The captain and controller talked about the incident for a while and the controller remarked that there were other aircraft that had made the same mistake and that this problem needed to stop. He also remarked that the word needed to get out that an immediate turn needs to be made on departure toward V15 in uncontrolled airspace. A later controller said we needed to call them after we landed and the captain did call. Overall; the two errors I feel accountable for was not asking hcf center on the ground what was expected and not beginning or asking about the turn immediately after getting airborne. The climb out into that black hole effect over the ocean at night does make the departure a little more challenging.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier flight crew departed LIH while the Tower was closed at night and maintained runway heading without other instructions. ATC instructed them they should have known to intercept V15 even though they were never cleared via that route.

Narrative: The night started with the Captain and I arriving at the airport 1 hr and 15 mins prior to our departure (pushback) time. I arrived at the aircraft 1 hr prior to departure time and began the preflight. The preflight and checklist accomplishment were uneventful. During our briefing and on the transportation to the airport the Captain and I discussed the possibility that the field would go uncontrolled before our departure. We discussed the V15 routing on our clearance and thought we would get a heading from tower or HCF center (if it went uncontrolled) to a V15 intercept. Our departure clearance from clearance delivery did not include a heading to V15. Either way we were going to clarify. I have never flown an uncontrolled field departure out of the Hawaiian Islands. The other 2 times I have departed on runway 3 at LIH we were given runway heading or a heading pretty close to runway heading when the tower is open. The field went uncontrolled as we taxied up to runway 3. We were told to contact HCF Center on 134.0 for our release for departure. We tried this frequency a couple times with no answer so we went to the main HCF frequency of 126.5 and were able to contact a controller who said it would be about 5 mins. The radios with HCF Center on the ground on 126.5 were readable; but kind of scratchy. I do not think the poorer quality of the HCF transmissions contributed to the incident. We could hear HCF center release one and then two aircraft for the uncontrolled field ILS approach to runway 35. We were monitoring the CTAF freq on 118.9 as the aircraft approached for their uncontrolled field calls and were also monitoring HCF Center for our release. I told the Captain that at some point prior to departure I would ask ATC what kind of heading they wanted for a V15 intercept. Unfortunately; I never did due to time constraints and distractions. This was a mistake I made. When we did get the release; we received a very short release time due to the fact we were departing between the two inbound aircraft. We were trying to figure out where the jet went that just landed on runway 35 and were making our required uncontrolled field calls taking runway 3. The aircraft announced they were holding short of runway 3 so we began our takeoff roll. I was the pilot flying and called for runway heading on climb out and shortly after I heard the Captain tell HCF center that we were on runway heading. HCF center then said we were radar contact and I'm pretty sure we were still below 1500 feet at this point. Since I heard the earlier runway heading announcement by the Captain to ATC; I assumed that this was an OK course of action to be on runway heading. This was a bad assumption. As things settled down in the climb out at about 8 to 10 nm from the field; we then talked about whether we should be on runway heading and the Captain decided that we should start a right turn and that she would query what heading we should go to if any. At about that time ATC queried us why we did not start a right turn on departure to V15. He then cleared us direct to EBBER after we were about 20 to 30 degrees into our right turn. So the turn was reversed to go back to EBBER. The Captain and controller talked about the incident for a while and the controller remarked that there were other aircraft that had made the same mistake and that this problem needed to stop. He also remarked that the word needed to get out that an immediate turn needs to be made on departure toward V15 in uncontrolled airspace. A later controller said we needed to call them after we landed and the Captain did call. Overall; the two errors I feel accountable for was not asking HCF Center on the ground what was expected and not beginning or asking about the turn immediately after getting airborne. The climb out into that black hole effect over the ocean at night does make the departure a little more challenging.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.