Narrative:

Landing 16R in denver; we were vectored per denver approach SOP of nose to nose with a [large transport] landing 16L. Traffic was called out by approach; we spotted them easily and continued to fly our visual approach. As [the large transport] intercepted their final; we got a TCAS RA to climb. I stated that the aircraft was in sight and that we would continue. Then we got another 'climb' command followed by 'descend'. We reconfirmed aircraft in sight and continued the approach. The TCAS continued to alert of imminent death for the remainder of the approach; down to about 500 feet AGL.denver's policy of placing aircraft on a collision course for the parallel south runways has never been; is not and will never be safe. Adding super-sensitive safety equipment bellowing about imminent demise during the most critical phase of flight does not enhance an already unsafe situation. I remain stymied as to why this remains an acceptable method of doing business.offset arriving aircraft on parallel approaches. It can't be that hard. Incidentally; the individual factors noted above were all induced systemically by FAA procedure and normal TCAS operation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier pilot reported receiving an RA and ignoring it due to DEN TRACON SOP of running nose to nose approaches to Runways 16L and 16R.

Narrative: Landing 16R in Denver; we were vectored per Denver Approach SOP of nose to nose with a [large transport] landing 16L. Traffic was called out by Approach; we spotted them easily and continued to fly our visual approach. As [the large transport] intercepted their final; we got a TCAS RA to climb. I stated that the aircraft was in sight and that we would continue. Then we got another 'climb' command followed by 'descend'. We reconfirmed aircraft in sight and continued the approach. The TCAS continued to alert of imminent death for the remainder of the approach; down to about 500 feet AGL.Denver's policy of placing aircraft on a collision course for the parallel south runways has never been; is not and will never be safe. Adding super-sensitive safety equipment bellowing about imminent demise during the most critical phase of flight does not enhance an already unsafe situation. I remain stymied as to why this remains an acceptable method of doing business.Offset arriving aircraft on parallel approaches. It can't be that hard. Incidentally; the individual factors noted above were all induced systemically by FAA procedure and normal TCAS operation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.