Narrative:

Our flight had a multitude of human errors resulting in an overweight takeoff. Runway xx had just reopened. This flight was the first departure on the long runway and all the restrictions from load planning had not been updated. Consequently the station was having difficulty closing the flight using runway xx because the load close out program showed it closed. While the station worked on the problem we requested a manual form. Neither of us had one in our bag; and while I was waiting for that I went to the gate to work with the agents and see if I could help. A flaps 22 takeoff on runway yy was suggested so I called dispatch to see if that was acceptable or authorized. The dispatcher told me we could not; I found out later the dispatcher was looking at runway xx. I conveyed to the agents a flaps 22 takeoff was not acceptable. I also asked the dispatcher if she could get performance numbers for runway xx so I could work on a manual sheet. She could override the program and send us numbers via ACARS. The problem here was some agents were focused on fixing the performance fault in the load program and my message about flaps 22 was not heard and I did not convey it well enough. Other agents were working on alternatives to runway xx; one of which was flaps 22; and running the program they said it would calculate so I agreed to go with that thinking it was based on flaps 9. Once I got the close out I focused on weights and passenger counts; I did not do a good review of the close out and did not catch that it was based on flaps 22 until we were enroute. I had thought we were doing flaps 9 and we were almost an hour late. Because I thought we had workable numbers and we had not gotten a manual form yet was another reason to forgo the manual process and depart. Had we gotten a manual form when we asked for it; that process could have progressed while all the other aspects of solving our problem and the various options being worked on would have come together around the same time. Clearly runway xx would be the better option and we would have used that if given several options to choose from.as the captain I should have restricted the solutions to focus on only the effected runway where the crew works a manual solution while the station works the problem. We were already late so there was no hurry. I also relied on the automation being totally correct and did not verify all information on the close out.suggest including the first officer in what transpired out of earshot and be more diligent in my communication not only to the first officer but to the station agents as well.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB145 flight crew reported departing from a shorter runway even though the longer runway had just opened due to a flight planning software issue. They made an overweight takeoff with an incorrect flap setting.

Narrative: Our flight had a multitude of human errors resulting in an overweight takeoff. Runway XX had just reopened. This flight was the first departure on the long runway and all the restrictions from load planning had not been updated. Consequently the station was having difficulty closing the flight using Runway XX because the load close out program showed it closed. While the station worked on the problem we requested a manual form. Neither of us had one in our bag; and while I was waiting for that I went to the gate to work with the agents and see if I could help. A flaps 22 takeoff on Runway YY was suggested so I called dispatch to see if that was acceptable or authorized. The dispatcher told me we could not; I found out later the dispatcher was looking at Runway XX. I conveyed to the agents a flaps 22 takeoff was not acceptable. I also asked the dispatcher if she could get performance numbers for Runway XX so I could work on a manual sheet. She could override the program and send us numbers via ACARS. The problem here was some agents were focused on fixing the performance fault in the load program and my message about flaps 22 was not heard and I did not convey it well enough. Other agents were working on alternatives to Runway XX; one of which was flaps 22; and running the program they said it would calculate so I agreed to go with that thinking it was based on flaps 9. Once I got the close out I focused on weights and passenger counts; I did not do a good review of the close out and did not catch that it was based on flaps 22 until we were enroute. I had thought we were doing flaps 9 and we were almost an hour late. Because I thought we had workable numbers and we had not gotten a manual form yet was another reason to forgo the manual process and depart. Had we gotten a manual form when we asked for it; that process could have progressed while all the other aspects of solving our problem and the various options being worked on would have come together around the same time. Clearly Runway XX would be the better option and we would have used that if given several options to choose from.As the Captain I should have restricted the solutions to focus on only the effected runway where the Crew works a manual solution while the Station works the problem. We were already late so there was no hurry. I also relied on the automation being totally correct and did not verify all information on the close out.Suggest including the First Officer in what transpired out of earshot and be more diligent in my communication not only to the First Officer but to the Station Agents as well.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.