37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1419181 |
Time | |
Date | 201701 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Dispatcher |
Qualification | Dispatch Dispatcher |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown |
Narrative:
I had several flights inbound to ZZZ receiving airborne delays due to weather at the destination airport of ZZZ and [the area] in general. One of these flights was flight XXXX which I received as a pass down from another dispatcher who gave it the alternates of ZZZ1 and ZZZ2. I received an ACARS message from the flight regarding delay vectors that they were being given from ATC. The vector was taking them [away from the destination airport]. The aircrew stated they were nearing minimum fuel and I acknowledged them. A few minutes later I noticed on the display the flight had turned more northward toward ZZZ1 and was descending. I sent a message to the flight inquiring their status. I did not receive a reply. I informed the supervisor that it appeared the flight was diverting to ZZZ1 and that I had not received a reply to my message. I called the station in ZZZ1 for the airline which we were operating the flight for informing them of a possible diversion. I sent another message to the flight asking if they were diverting to which I still received no reply. I did not send an amendment changing their destination from ZZZ to ZZZ1. I called the station in ZZZ1 again about the diversion. I was informed that the station would not be able to pull the new release for this flight from their normal computer system to return back to ZZZ. However; I received an email address to send it to. I received an on time for the flight in ZZZ1 and observed the aircraft taxiing on the airport in ZZZ1. I was in contact with the station and also sending ACARS messages to the flight about getting the aircraft parked. Several of my messages to the flight were not replied to. I obtained the phone number of the captain of this flight and called that number. The station in ZZZ1 was trying to reach the flight on the operations frequency but was having difficulty communicating with them. I was able to speak with the captain; and he stated they were also having difficulty communicating with the station operations on the radio but were finally able to make good contact about parking the aircraft. The captain had informed me that a passenger on the flight had a final destination of ZZZ1 and would like to deplane. I told the captain to coordinate with station operations about that passenger and that if other passengers wanted to deplane to coordinate those passengers as well with station operations. The airplane was refueled; and the crew received their new release to operate the flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ with an alternate airport of ZZZ2.the airplane blocked out at ZZZ1. Shortly after; I observed that the airplane was parked on a taxiway near the runway with several other aircraft. I sent a message to the plane asking if they had received a flow time to ZZZ. They replied with their flow time which would have been approximately one hour from the time they blocked out. I informed the supervisor and duty manager of that and concurred we would wait for that time. Shortly after; I received a call from the captain stating the passenger that wanted to exit the airplane because their destination was ZZZ1 was not able to. The captain continued saying that the personnel that met the aircraft would not allow passengers to deplane on the remote parking pad. I immediately informed the duty manager of this. The duty manager decided that the airplane needed to be re-parked and the passengers needed to be offered the opportunity to exit the airplane to reset the DOT 3 hour rule time. The wheels up time from ATC should have been 2.5 hours from when the plane landed in ZZZ1. I informed the captain that we needed to re-park the airplane.a coordinated effort between my supervisor; the duty manager; and me began with the station to park the aircraft. During this process; the duty manager and my supervisor decided without me to contact the tower at ZZZ1 and remove the flight strip; therefore forcing the plane to return to parking. Several messages were sent to the aircraft stating they must block back in. Efforts continued to obtain parking for the aircraft including calls to the main operations center for the airline which we were operating the flight for. I also placed calls to another airline in ZZZ1 informing them of our DOT 3 hour time situation. That airline generously offered a gate for our aircraft to park; however we would still need an agent and ground crew personnel from the airline for which we were operating the flight. Multiple more calls were made to try to obtain the necessary personnel. It was becoming clear that we would not be able to obtain the personnel needed within the 3 hours from the time the aircraft originally landed in ZZZ1. I suggested that the flight plan be re-filed with air traffic control so the flight could depart for ZZZ. After my supervisor and duty manager concurred; I refiled the flight plan. I also contacted the tower in ZZZ1 to ensure they received the flight plan and to ask to depart the airport within a few minutes due to the DOT 3 hour time which we were nearing. The tower coordinated with center to obtain a quick time of departure and told me that we could possibly receive airborne holding to ZZZ. I informed my supervisor and the duty manager of this and contacted the flight to try to depart as soon as possible.it became apparent that the flight would not be ready to depart with the 3 hour timeframe. The duty manager was also on the phone with the maintenance control manager. With a few minutes remaining I was informed the flight was to wait for air stairs to be brought back to the airplane. I asked the captain over the phone if they could see anyone near the aircraft bringing air stairs; and he said they could not. Meanwhile; the duty manager was on a call with the maintenance control manager. With a few minutes remaining before the 3 hour time; the duty manager stated that slides were to be deployed now and that it was an emergency. The duty manager told me to tell the captain to deploy the slides. I was concerned that this was not an appropriate course of action; and I reminded the duty manager that I had operational control of the flight. The duty manager replied that they were taking operational control of the flight at that time. I was on the phone with the captain and handed the phone to the duty manager. The duty manager informed the captain to deploy the evacuation slides. The captain debated with the duty manager over this course of action. The L1 slide was deployed. The duty manager left the phone at my desk; and I resumed talking with the captain. The captain asked me if passengers should evacuate via the slide. I said that passengers could be injured going down evacuation slides and that I did not want anyone to get hurt. The captain stated that he did not want passengers to go down the slide as it could result in injury. I asked the captain if they had contacted air traffic control. The captain said that [he had] and trucks were approaching the aircraft. I ended the call to allow the aircrew to coordinate with the service personnel now at the aircraft. I made a call to one of the assistant chief pilots to ensure they were aware and informed of the situation. I gave a brief synopsis of the situation and he agreed that using slides can cause injury. A short time later; I called the captain back to ask about the current status and if all passengers were okay. The captain stated all passengers had safely exited the aircraft with air stairs and were bussed to the terminal.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: EMB-175 Dispatcher reported the aircraft diverted for fuel because of destination airport weather delays. After fueling; further ground delays approached the FAR 3 hour limitation. Unable to find a gate; the Dispatch Manager ordered the Captain to evacuate the aircraft on the ramp.
Narrative: I had several flights inbound to ZZZ receiving airborne delays due to weather at the destination airport of ZZZ and [the area] in general. One of these flights was flight XXXX which I received as a pass down from another dispatcher who gave it the alternates of ZZZ1 and ZZZ2. I received an ACARS message from the flight regarding delay vectors that they were being given from ATC. The vector was taking them [away from the destination airport]. The aircrew stated they were nearing minimum fuel and I acknowledged them. A few minutes later I noticed on the display the flight had turned more northward toward ZZZ1 and was descending. I sent a message to the flight inquiring their status. I did not receive a reply. I informed the supervisor that it appeared the flight was diverting to ZZZ1 and that I had not received a reply to my message. I called the station in ZZZ1 for the airline which we were operating the flight for informing them of a possible diversion. I sent another message to the flight asking if they were diverting to which I still received no reply. I did not send an amendment changing their destination from ZZZ to ZZZ1. I called the station in ZZZ1 again about the diversion. I was informed that the station would not be able to pull the new release for this flight from their normal computer system to return back to ZZZ. However; I received an email address to send it to. I received an on time for the flight in ZZZ1 and observed the aircraft taxiing on the airport in ZZZ1. I was in contact with the station and also sending ACARS messages to the flight about getting the aircraft parked. Several of my messages to the flight were not replied to. I obtained the phone number of the Captain of this flight and called that number. The station in ZZZ1 was trying to reach the flight on the operations frequency but was having difficulty communicating with them. I was able to speak with the Captain; and he stated they were also having difficulty communicating with the station operations on the radio but were finally able to make good contact about parking the aircraft. The Captain had informed me that a passenger on the flight had a final destination of ZZZ1 and would like to deplane. I told the Captain to coordinate with station operations about that passenger and that if other passengers wanted to deplane to coordinate those passengers as well with station operations. The airplane was refueled; and the crew received their new release to operate the flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ with an alternate airport of ZZZ2.The airplane blocked out at ZZZ1. Shortly after; I observed that the airplane was parked on a taxiway near the runway with several other aircraft. I sent a message to the plane asking if they had received a flow time to ZZZ. They replied with their flow time which would have been approximately one hour from the time they blocked out. I informed the supervisor and Duty Manager of that and concurred we would wait for that time. Shortly after; I received a call from the Captain stating the passenger that wanted to exit the airplane because their destination was ZZZ1 was not able to. The Captain continued saying that the personnel that met the aircraft would not allow passengers to deplane on the remote parking pad. I immediately informed the Duty Manager of this. The Duty Manager decided that the airplane needed to be re-parked and the passengers needed to be offered the opportunity to exit the airplane to reset the DOT 3 Hour rule time. The wheels up time from ATC should have been 2.5 hours from when the plane landed in ZZZ1. I informed the Captain that we needed to re-park the airplane.A coordinated effort between my supervisor; the Duty Manager; and me began with the station to park the aircraft. During this process; the Duty Manager and my supervisor decided without me to contact the tower at ZZZ1 and remove the flight strip; therefore forcing the plane to return to parking. Several messages were sent to the aircraft stating they must block back in. Efforts continued to obtain parking for the aircraft including calls to the main operations center for the airline which we were operating the flight for. I also placed calls to another airline in ZZZ1 informing them of our DOT 3 Hour time situation. That airline generously offered a gate for our aircraft to park; however we would still need an agent and ground crew personnel from the airline for which we were operating the flight. Multiple more calls were made to try to obtain the necessary personnel. It was becoming clear that we would not be able to obtain the personnel needed within the 3 hours from the time the aircraft originally landed in ZZZ1. I suggested that the flight plan be re-filed with air traffic control so the flight could depart for ZZZ. After my supervisor and Duty Manager concurred; I refiled the flight plan. I also contacted the tower in ZZZ1 to ensure they received the flight plan and to ask to depart the airport within a few minutes due to the DOT 3 Hour time which we were nearing. The tower coordinated with Center to obtain a quick time of departure and told me that we could possibly receive airborne holding to ZZZ. I informed my supervisor and the Duty Manager of this and contacted the flight to try to depart as soon as possible.It became apparent that the flight would not be ready to depart with the 3 hour timeframe. The Duty Manager was also on the phone with the Maintenance Control Manager. With a few minutes remaining I was informed the flight was to wait for air stairs to be brought back to the airplane. I asked the captain over the phone if they could see anyone near the aircraft bringing air stairs; and he said they could not. Meanwhile; the Duty Manager was on a call with the Maintenance Control Manager. With a few minutes remaining before the 3 hour time; the Duty Manager stated that slides were to be deployed now and that it was an emergency. The Duty Manager told me to tell the Captain to deploy the slides. I was concerned that this was not an appropriate course of action; and I reminded the Duty Manager that I had operational control of the flight. The Duty Manager replied that they were taking operational control of the flight at that time. I was on the phone with the Captain and handed the phone to the Duty Manager. The Duty Manager informed the Captain to deploy the evacuation slides. The Captain debated with the Duty Manager over this course of action. The L1 slide was deployed. The Duty Manager left the phone at my desk; and I resumed talking with the Captain. The Captain asked me if passengers should evacuate via the slide. I said that passengers could be injured going down evacuation slides and that I did not want anyone to get hurt. The Captain stated that he did not want passengers to go down the slide as it could result in injury. I asked the Captain if they had contacted air traffic control. The Captain said that [he had] and trucks were approaching the aircraft. I ended the call to allow the aircrew to coordinate with the service personnel now at the aircraft. I made a call to one of the assistant chief pilots to ensure they were aware and informed of the situation. I gave a brief synopsis of the situation and he agreed that using slides can cause injury. A short time later; I called the Captain back to ask about the current status and if all passengers were okay. The Captain stated all passengers had safely exited the aircraft with air stairs and were bussed to the terminal.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.