Narrative:

Approximately 5 miles from the fix zzzzz on an intercept for the runway ILS localizer; engine #2 involuntarily quit producing power. The captain immediately stated that we had lost our number 2 engine. I disconnected the autopilot; leveled the aircraft at about 2;400 feet MSL; and maintained control of the aircraft. We had been cleared to descend to 2;000 feet MSL. Approach told us to descend to 2;000 feet. The captain responded that we had lost our number 2 engine and that we [want priority handling].the captain (pilot monitoring) called for the immediate action checklist. We ran the checklist and secured the engine. We noted that there did not appear to be a catastrophic event with the engine and we did not rotate the fire handle. I continued the intercept of the localizer. We quickly discussed that we should land immediately rather than accept a delay vector to troubleshoot the issue. I asked the captain if we should increase the speeds by 5 knots and perform a flaps 22 landing. He increased the speeds and prepared for a flaps 22 landing. The captain asked if I were comfortable landing the aircraft in its current condition. I stated that I felt prepared. At 1;000 feet; we were unstable in that I was carrying an additional 15 knots of airspeed. We were stable by 500 feet. We had an uneventful landing.during this time; we did not contact the flight attendant. We both felt that it would have created a further distraction on a segment of the flight that was essentially operating normally from a passenger's perspective. The captain did make an announcement once we landed and we were safely off the runway.we accepted this aircraft earlier in the day. This was the last leg of a five leg day at the end of a three day pairing for me and a four day pairing for the captain. All five legs on this day were flown in the same aircraft.on our first start of the day; we noted that the interstage turbine temperature (itt) was running about 100 degrees hotter than the other side. After the engine warm up; it normalized. I was pilot flying on this leg and made a mental note during the climb that the high pressure vibration indicator for #2 was about one third of the way into the green ribbon. We were climbing to FL330. After we leveled off at FL330; the high pressure vibration indicator normalized; but slightly higher than the other engine.the captain was pilot flying on the next leg. In the climb he noted that the high pressure vibration indicator was just below the top of the green ribbon. Once again; it showed seemingly normal indications during cruise and descent. The captain did remark that the pressure and temperature on that engine was slightly higher than the other engine.in preparing for departure; the captain included the engine parameters in his brief. He told me to keep an eye on the high pressure spool vibes as well as the pressures and temperatures. They were indicating fairly normally on [climb out].on the [next] turn; I also included the slightly higher engine indications in my departure briefs as well. On both flights; all indications were well within normal limits during all phases of flight. The engine failure slightly surprised me during the approach phase of the flight.I had excess speed on the approach. I was not stable at 1;000 feet due to 15 knots of excess airspeed. We were stable by 500 feet within the 10 knot airspeed threshold.I was very impressed with the professionalism; maturity; and experience of the captain/line check pilot. We had flown a lot of legs together in some horrible weather over the past several days. Fatigue had begun to set in on me and possibly him as well. I think he could have taken the airplane from me and landed just so he could be more comfortable. I also surmise that this could have created a further distraction in a high workload environment. He kept a cool head the whole time. Keep the standards of training high!I do not know that this event could have been prevented based on my knowledge.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB135 flight crew reported a number 2 engine loss during an intercept to final approach. Crew reported running checklist to secure engine and accomplished an uneventful landing.

Narrative: Approximately 5 miles from the fix ZZZZZ on an intercept for the runway ILS localizer; engine #2 involuntarily quit producing power. The Captain immediately stated that we had lost our number 2 engine. I disconnected the autopilot; leveled the aircraft at about 2;400 feet MSL; and maintained control of the aircraft. We had been cleared to descend to 2;000 feet MSL. Approach told us to descend to 2;000 feet. The Captain responded that we had lost our number 2 engine and that we [want priority handling].The Captain (pilot monitoring) called for the immediate action checklist. We ran the checklist and secured the engine. We noted that there did not appear to be a catastrophic event with the engine and we did not rotate the fire handle. I continued the intercept of the localizer. We quickly discussed that we should land immediately rather than accept a delay vector to troubleshoot the issue. I asked the Captain if we should increase the speeds by 5 knots and perform a flaps 22 landing. He increased the speeds and prepared for a flaps 22 landing. The Captain asked if I were comfortable landing the aircraft in its current condition. I stated that I felt prepared. At 1;000 feet; we were unstable in that I was carrying an additional 15 knots of airspeed. We were stable by 500 feet. We had an uneventful landing.During this time; we did not contact the flight attendant. We both felt that it would have created a further distraction on a segment of the flight that was essentially operating normally from a passenger's perspective. The Captain did make an announcement once we landed and we were safely off the runway.We accepted this aircraft earlier in the day. This was the last leg of a five leg day at the end of a three day pairing for me and a four day pairing for the Captain. All five legs on this day were flown in the same aircraft.On our first start of the day; we noted that the Interstage Turbine Temperature (ITT) was running about 100 degrees hotter than the other side. After the engine warm up; it normalized. I was pilot flying on this leg and made a mental note during the climb that the high pressure vibration indicator for #2 was about one third of the way into the green ribbon. We were climbing to FL330. After we leveled off at FL330; the high pressure vibration indicator normalized; but slightly higher than the other engine.The Captain was pilot flying on the next leg. In the climb he noted that the high pressure vibration indicator was just below the top of the green ribbon. Once again; it showed seemingly normal indications during cruise and descent. The Captain did remark that the pressure and temperature on that engine was slightly higher than the other engine.In preparing for departure; the Captain included the engine parameters in his brief. He told me to keep an eye on the high pressure spool vibes as well as the pressures and temperatures. They were indicating fairly normally on [climb out].On the [next] turn; I also included the slightly higher engine indications in my departure briefs as well. On both flights; all indications were well within normal limits during all phases of flight. The engine failure slightly surprised me during the approach phase of the flight.I had excess speed on the approach. I was not stable at 1;000 feet due to 15 knots of excess airspeed. We were stable by 500 feet within the 10 knot airspeed threshold.I was very impressed with the professionalism; maturity; and experience of the Captain/Line Check Pilot. We had flown a lot of legs together in some horrible weather over the past several days. Fatigue had begun to set in on me and possibly him as well. I think he could have taken the airplane from me and landed just so he could be more comfortable. I also surmise that this could have created a further distraction in a high workload environment. He kept a cool head the whole time. Keep the standards of training high!I do not know that this event could have been prevented based on my knowledge.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.