Narrative:

At approximately XA40; I arrived at aircraft X. Upon arrival; I contacted first officer (first officer) who was in contact with a aviation maintenance technician (amt). The amt stated aircraft X had returned to the gate with several open defects. The amt further stated all open defects had been either repaired; or deferred; and that he and his colleagues were currently in the process of documenting their actions and transmitting a new maintenance release document (mrd). The amt then departed the aircraft to complete the aforementioned documentation.as [the] first officer and I initiated our preflight preparations; we discovered through the release verification process that; despite the aforementioned verbally communicated open defects; the last mrd [sent] via ACARS; was still valid. At this point; approximately XA55; mrd was approximately 2 1/2 hours old. As a cross-check; I requested a reprint of the most current mrd via ACARS/reports/miscellaneous/M4. This request produced a reprint of mrd XC21.I contacted maintenance; advised them of our discovery and concerns; and requested an amt re-dispatched to our aircraft. Approximately five minutes later; two amts arrived. First officer and I communicated our concerns to them. The lead amt suggested that perhaps a recent aircraft/flight number change could have created the incorrect appearance of the aforementioned apparently valid mrd. I stated that; based on my understanding of the maintenance release system; a valid mrd is only associated with a specific aircraft and has no association with a flight number.the lead amt advised he would return to his computer terminal to resolve the mrd discrepancy. I asked that; based on the seriousness of the mrd discrepancy; he return to our aircraft to provide verbal clarification of how the mrd discrepancy occurred and how it was ultimately resolved. Shortly after the lead amt departed; at approximately XB33. Mrd XB33 was transmitted to our aircraft. Upon completing the release verification process; mrd XB33 was verified as valid. Approximately ten minutes later; approximately XB44; the lead amt returned to our aircraft. He stated he was unable to explain how the mrd discrepancy had occurred. He further advised he would complete a report regarding the incident and suggested I do the same.the aforementioned incident resulted in a pushback at XB49; a delay of nineteen (19) minutes from our scheduled departure time of XB30.clearly; the above documented mrd discrepancy presented a serious risk of maintenance/pilot deviation. If [the] first officer and I had not been in physical contact with maintenance prior to departure and had not cross-checked the results of our release verification process with their statements; we could have departed with an improperly documented and/or defective aircraft and an invalid mrd.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 Captain reported they had a late pushback due to discrepancies with the Maintenance Release Document.

Narrative: At approximately XA40; I arrived at Aircraft X. Upon arrival; I contacted First Officer (FO) who was in contact with a Aviation Maintenance Technician (AMT). The AMT stated Aircraft X had returned to the gate with several open defects. The AMT further stated all open defects had been either repaired; or deferred; and that he and his colleagues were currently in the process of documenting their actions and transmitting a new Maintenance Release Document (MRD). The AMT then departed the aircraft to complete the aforementioned documentation.As [the] FO and I initiated our preflight preparations; we discovered through the Release Verification process that; despite the aforementioned verbally communicated open defects; the last MRD [sent] via ACARS; was still valid. At this point; approximately XA55; MRD was approximately 2 1/2 hours old. As a cross-check; I requested a reprint of the most current MRD via ACARS/REPORTS/MISC/M4. This request produced a reprint of MRD XC21.I contacted Maintenance; advised them of our discovery and concerns; and requested an AMT re-dispatched to our aircraft. Approximately five minutes later; two AMTs arrived. FO and I communicated our concerns to them. The Lead AMT suggested that perhaps a recent aircraft/flight number change could have created the incorrect appearance of the aforementioned apparently valid MRD. I stated that; based on my understanding of the Maintenance Release system; a valid MRD is only associated with a specific aircraft and has no association with a flight number.The Lead AMT advised he would return to his computer terminal to resolve the MRD discrepancy. I asked that; based on the seriousness of the MRD discrepancy; he return to our aircraft to provide verbal clarification of how the MRD discrepancy occurred and how it was ultimately resolved. Shortly after the Lead AMT departed; at approximately XB33. MRD XB33 was transmitted to our aircraft. Upon completing the Release Verification process; MRD XB33 was verified as valid. Approximately ten minutes later; approximately XB44; the Lead AMT returned to our aircraft. He stated he was unable to explain how the MRD discrepancy had occurred. He further advised he would complete a report regarding the incident and suggested I do the same.The aforementioned incident resulted in a pushback at XB49; a delay of nineteen (19) minutes from our scheduled departure time of XB30.Clearly; the above documented MRD discrepancy presented a serious risk of maintenance/pilot deviation. If [the] FO and I had not been in physical contact with Maintenance prior to departure and had not cross-checked the results of our Release Verification process with their statements; we could have departed with an improperly documented and/or defective aircraft and an invalid MRD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.