Narrative:

We had eight mels on our release; seven involved cockpit actions. Each engine had something MEL'd. When we called the dispatcher; his answer was yes there was a lot broken and did I want to talk to the duty officer (do). I talked to local maintenance and was told they could not clear or troubleshoot any of the mels. There was a spare on the ramp and it appears that the system did not consider using it. The spare issue was brought up by us after show time; we considered it; but no one else did.the do said since the loading had started; it was my call as to whether or not I would accept the aircraft and that it would delay the freight; possibly to the point of the freight not making the sort if I chose not to take the aircraft. I was also told the aircraft was scheduled to be fixed upon its return to ZZZ1 (I later learned the aircraft flew to [another airport] on the turn and then back to ZZZ1). It took us another 15 minutes to consider all our issues and elected to add ZZZ2 as an alternate as its weather was very good with long runways; clear skies and light winds. We then methodically went through all of the precautions needed to ensure we were safe and legal. The best thing going for me was my first officer. He had previously flown the md at a previous company and his knowledge and experience level helped me ensure safety. We coordinated with our dispatcher about our alternate.upon reading the airworthiness release documents (ard); it became apparent that some of the mels where carried on the aircraft since [multiple foreign airports]. The aircraft had landed at [two] maintenance bases before being sent to us in ZZZ. It appeared no one considered using a spare and having it fixed prior to our flight. There was no indication of any attempt to troubleshoot or repair any of these issues prior to its arrival in ZZZ. I then discovered the aircraft sat so long the engines had to be run by maintenance on the ground due to the long turn time.it does not appear that the dispatchers can inquire about spare aircraft when carrying so many mels involving engines; bleed systems; reverses; fire detection; AC packs; fadecs and anti-ice systems. The fact that I asked about a spare seemed like a new concept to him.learning that the aircraft turned from ZZZ1 after being reassured it would be fixed upon its arrival at ZZZ1 is very disconcerting. And now I am being shown the company intends to send it out on another pairing as well. In short; the trust model is being strained.this is textbook normalization of deviance. The company cannot say 'safe; legal; reliable' and then continue to provide reduced capability aircraft while requiring maximum efforts by the crew to account for all of the generated issues. These aircraft are carrying too many mels. The crews want to do our jobs and fly the freight; but the other departments need to step up and do their part. Saying they don't have the time or manpower no longer holds any credibility.there are only two way this gets fixed. One is a complete FAA audit of the MEL process. The other is an accident involving maintenance failures with associated mels. Carrying so many complex mels past maintenance bases must stop. Of course there is a third way; and that would be if the company reviewed its processes and reformed their practices to provide a better product to the crew force.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD-11 Captain reported the company was not taking advantage of maintenace opportunities to clear the many MEL items on the subject aircraft.

Narrative: We had eight MELs on our release; seven involved cockpit actions. Each engine had something MEL'd. When we called the dispatcher; his answer was yes there was a lot broken and did I want to talk to the Duty Officer (DO). I talked to local maintenance and was told they could not clear or troubleshoot any of the MELs. There was a spare on the ramp and it appears that the system did not consider using it. The spare issue was brought up by us after show time; we considered it; but no one else did.The DO said since the loading had started; it was my call as to whether or not I would accept the aircraft and that it would delay the freight; possibly to the point of the freight not making the sort if I chose not to take the aircraft. I was also told the aircraft was scheduled to be fixed upon its return to ZZZ1 (I later learned the aircraft flew to [another airport] on the turn and then back to ZZZ1). It took us another 15 minutes to consider all our issues and elected to add ZZZ2 as an alternate as its weather was very good with long runways; clear skies and light winds. We then methodically went through all of the precautions needed to ensure we were safe and legal. The best thing going for me was my First Officer. He had previously flown the MD at a previous company and his knowledge and experience level helped me ensure safety. We coordinated with our dispatcher about our alternate.Upon reading the Airworthiness Release Documents (ARD); it became apparent that some of the MELs where carried on the aircraft since [multiple foreign airports]. The aircraft had landed at [two] maintenance bases before being sent to us in ZZZ. It appeared no one considered using a spare and having it fixed prior to our flight. There was no indication of any attempt to troubleshoot or repair any of these issues prior to its arrival in ZZZ. I then discovered the aircraft sat so long the engines had to be run by Maintenance on the ground due to the long turn time.It does not appear that the dispatchers can inquire about spare aircraft when carrying so many MELs involving engines; bleed systems; reverses; fire detection; AC packs; FADECs and Anti-ice systems. The fact that I asked about a spare seemed like a new concept to him.Learning that the aircraft turned from ZZZ1 after being reassured it would be fixed upon its arrival at ZZZ1 is very disconcerting. And now I am being shown the company intends to send it out on another pairing as well. In short; the trust model is being strained.This is textbook normalization of deviance. The company cannot say 'safe; legal; reliable' and then continue to provide reduced capability aircraft while requiring maximum efforts by the crew to account for all of the generated issues. These aircraft are carrying too many MELs. The crews want to do our jobs and fly the freight; but the other departments need to step up and do their part. Saying they don't have the time or manpower no longer holds any credibility.There are only two way this gets fixed. One is a complete FAA audit of the MEL process. The other is an accident involving Maintenance failures with associated MELs. Carrying so many complex MELs past Maintenance bases must stop. Of course there is a third way; and that would be if the company reviewed its processes and reformed their practices to provide a better product to the crew force.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.