Narrative:

Upon arrival to bwi the ATIS indicated strong wind gusts and cross winds. We joined the visual approach to runway 33L behind a company aircraft. After receiving landing clearance we heard the aircraft in front of us call go-around for windshear. We decided to continue our approach. Shortly after that; we received a windshear warning and performed the windshear recovery maneuver. Once we were stable we requested a runway change to runway 28. We were vectored to follow company to 28. At this time our fuel on board was 5.7. At our [departure airport] the captain requested an additional 900 pounds of fuel due to the high winds in bwi. We decided that in the event of a second-go around; we were going to proceed to another airport. I then gathered the weather in [several suitable alternates]. We were then cleared for the visual 28. The company aircraft ahead of us landed successfully. At approximately 600 AGL we once again encountered windshear and executed a go-around. We leveled off at 2000 ft and made the decision to divert [to an alternate] since the weather conditions at the other airports was similar to bwi. We requested immediate vectors. Our fuel was 5.0. We planned a burn of 2.5 to [the alternate]. We knew that [several other alternates] were additional options in the event our burn calculations were incorrect. We sent dispatch a message to inform them of our divert plan. The message we received back was 'why? What's up in bwi'; not any information on weather or fuel burn or other options were given. We spoke with the passengers and flight attendants and monitored our minimum fuel situation. We informed potomac departure that we were minimum fuel and were given direct to [alternate]. We landed successfully. Still dispatch only planned on us arriving back to bwi landing with 6.5 in the same weather conditions. We added more fuel to ensure option for arrival in bwi.the captain and dispatcher are jointly responsible for the safety of a flight. In this situation dispatch had minimal situational awareness of not only the weather in bwi; but also; after we executed a second go-around and informed them of the divert; we were planned to land with only 5.7 (the captain added 900 pounds). It is imperative that dispatch maintain situational awareness and communicate more effectively to ensure a safe outcome of a flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 First Officer reported diverting to an alternate after experiencing windshear on two consecutive approaches to BWI.

Narrative: Upon arrival to BWI the ATIS indicated strong wind gusts and cross winds. We joined the visual approach to Runway 33L behind a Company aircraft. After receiving landing clearance we heard the aircraft in front of us call go-around for windshear. We decided to continue our Approach. Shortly after that; we received a windshear warning and performed the windshear recovery maneuver. Once we were stable we requested a runway change to Runway 28. We were vectored to follow Company to 28. At this time our fuel on board was 5.7. At our [departure airport] the Captain requested an additional 900 pounds of fuel due to the high winds in BWI. We decided that in the event of a second-go around; we were going to proceed to another airport. I then gathered the weather in [several suitable alternates]. We were then cleared for the visual 28. The Company aircraft ahead of us landed successfully. At approximately 600 AGL we once again encountered windshear and executed a go-around. We leveled off at 2000 ft and made the decision to divert [to an alternate] since the weather conditions at the other airports was similar to BWI. We requested immediate vectors. Our fuel was 5.0. We planned a burn of 2.5 to [the alternate]. We knew that [several other alternates] were additional options in the event our burn calculations were incorrect. We sent Dispatch a message to inform them of our divert plan. The message we received back was 'why? What's up in BWI'; not any information on weather or fuel burn or other options were given. We spoke with the passengers and flight attendants and monitored our minimum fuel situation. We informed Potomac Departure that we were minimum fuel and were given direct to [alternate]. We landed successfully. Still Dispatch only planned on us arriving back to BWI landing with 6.5 in the same weather conditions. We added more fuel to ensure option for arrival in BWI.The Captain and Dispatcher are jointly responsible for the safety of a flight. In this situation Dispatch had minimal situational awareness of not only the weather in BWI; but also; after we executed a second go-around and informed them of the divert; we were planned to land with only 5.7 (the Captain added 900 pounds). It is imperative that Dispatch maintain situational awareness and communicate more effectively to ensure a safe outcome of a flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.