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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1421025 |
Time | |
Date | 201701 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZLA.ARTCC |
State Reference | CA |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Small Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | Descent |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Large Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Enroute |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Conflict Airborne Conflict Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
While working sector 27 the controller in charge came over and advised me that tmu (traffic management unit) called and said it looked like I may be going over map (monitor alert parameters) numbers. As it turned out I was already over the numbers by 20 percent; split roughly equally between arrival; departure; and enroute traffic. The d-side was saturated with landline calls and we really needed an overhead; but everyone else was one-holing thus nobody was available. I had several upside-down stacks; several arrivals that were tied; and ZOA13 wasn't complying with the LOA; sf bay area departures landing ont/psp need to be capped at 370; but I got one at 410 on top of an enroute. As far as the incident aircraft are concerned; I had aircraft X #1 in a string of 3 arrivals that I needed to get down so I could get under my departures in order to s-turn him and make him #3. I descended him to 31000 noting that aircraft Y was converging at 32000; but 60 miles away. I assumed aircraft X would descend at 1000 fpm and thus wouldn't be a factor. I shifted my attention to all the other issues I still had to work out and didn't notice aircraft X was floating it down until he was through 32900 and passed aircraft Y. I keyed up intending to level him at 330; but realized it was already too late. Conflict alert never went off; nor did the (now) flm or d-side notice until I did.the timely issuance of tmis (traffic management initiatives) would have helped tremendously with this session. It seems to me too often tmu simply calls to warn us were going over numbers instead of instituting flow restrictions. The routine recently has been to staff the shifts anywhere from 1-3 below guidelines with the overtime list completely exhausted. As a result we've had positions combined much more than I feel is safe. Our armor playbook notes what tmis should go into place for various diminished staffing levels; but I don't know whether it was actually being followed.I should also note that we've been on mandatory 6-day weeks for about 8 months now; and I had been working weekly over-time on a voluntary basis for over a year prior. I have noticed recently that I have a harder time focusing now than when we'd only get 1 or 2 overtimes a month. I know the fatigue mou (memorandum of understanding) allows me to take leave if I need the time to rest; but our shifts are staffed so badly that I can't use the leave without adversely affecting the system and my colleagues. Plus; I imagine they'd see taking a 'fatigue day' once every other week as abusive. I suppose I could use some clarification on the application of leave in accordance with the fatigue mou.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ZLA ARTCC Controller reported a loss of separation due to an aircraft not descending as fast as the Controller assumed it would.
Narrative: While working Sector 27 the CIC came over and advised me that TMU (Traffic Management Unit) called and said it looked like I may be going over MAP (Monitor Alert Parameters) numbers. As it turned out I was already over the numbers by 20 percent; split roughly equally between arrival; departure; and enroute traffic. The D-side was saturated with landline calls and we really needed an overhead; but everyone else was one-holing thus nobody was available. I had several upside-down stacks; several arrivals that were tied; and ZOA13 wasn't complying with the LOA; SF Bay area departures landing ONT/PSP need to be capped at 370; but I got one at 410 on top of an enroute. As far as the incident aircraft are concerned; I had Aircraft X #1 in a string of 3 arrivals that I needed to get down so I could get under my departures in order to S-turn him and make him #3. I descended him to 31000 noting that Aircraft Y was converging at 32000; but 60 miles away. I assumed Aircraft X would descend at 1000 fpm and thus wouldn't be a factor. I shifted my attention to all the other issues I still had to work out and didn't notice Aircraft X was floating it down until he was through 32900 and passed Aircraft Y. I keyed up intending to level him at 330; but realized it was already too late. Conflict alert never went off; nor did the (now) FLM or D-side notice until I did.The timely issuance of TMIs (Traffic Management Initiatives) would have helped tremendously with this session. It seems to me too often TMU simply calls to warn us were going over numbers instead of instituting flow restrictions. The routine recently has been to staff the shifts anywhere from 1-3 below guidelines with the overtime list completely exhausted. As a result we've had positions combined much more than I feel is safe. Our ARMOR playbook notes what TMIs should go into place for various diminished staffing levels; but I don't know whether it was actually being followed.I should also note that we've been on mandatory 6-day weeks for about 8 months now; and I had been working weekly over-time on a voluntary basis for over a year prior. I have noticed recently that I have a harder time focusing now than when we'd only get 1 or 2 overtimes a month. I know the fatigue MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) allows me to take leave if I need the time to rest; but our shifts are staffed so badly that I can't use the leave without adversely affecting the system and my colleagues. Plus; I imagine they'd see taking a 'fatigue day' once every other week as abusive. I suppose I could use some clarification on the application of leave in accordance with the fatigue MOU.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.