Narrative:

During cruise first officer (first officer) noticed that the number 2 engine fire push button light on the overhead panel was illuminated; we had no other indication of a fire; no ECAM; no other lights were illuminated elsewhere which we both thought to be highly unusual. The light was on steady so I called for the QRH engine fire checklist which [the first officer] had already gotten ready; then the light went out. It then started to flash randomly off and on. I tested the number 2 engine fire system and it tested normally.at that point I was thinking we had a failure within the detection system or warning system and told [the first officer] I think we should do the 3 way call with dispatch and [maintenance control]. He agreed and so I gave [the first officer] the pilot flying (PF) duties and I worked on the phone patch to dispatch. I also sent maintenance a quick note through ACARS about our situation. It took a few minutes to get the phone patch together; and during that time [the first officer] and I both agreed the engine was most likely fine; that we had some kind of detection/warning failure and that a diversion would probably be the best decision and ZZZ was only 50 to 60 miles away.the arinc phone patch was established and I informed [maintenance control] and dispatch of our issue. After a few minutes [maintenance control] came back with a response that his only guidance he could give us was to follow the QRH. He had nothing to offer other than that. I was reluctant to follow that idea as there was no ECAM; no other lights or warnings; just an errant flashing fire light. I glanced over at who was monitoring the call and I could tell he was also reluctant with that idea but we both knew it was the most conservative approach to the situation.I told [the first officer] head for ZZZ. I confirmed with [maintenance control] and dispatch about following the QRH engine fire checklist; I'm sure they could hear my reluctance to their guidance. I was about to tell [the fp] that we should consider running the checklist and shut down the number 2 engine. I happened to glance down at the center pedestal and noticed the red number 1 engine 'fire' light on the engine start and ignition panel was now on and pointed it out. It also flashed on and off a few times. Again; there were no ecams; no other lights or warnings. At that point I decided to disregard the [maintenance control] guidance; told [the first officer] let's use my emergency authority; disregard both lights and land in ZZZ. I then informed [maintenance control] about the new light; and told them I would use that authority to disregard the [maintenance control] guidance and that we would be leaving both engines running and plan a normal landing. [Maintenance control] signed off and dispatch and I finished up with the diversion info such as landing performance; NOTAMS; weather; etc. [My first officer] was very proactive and called back to the fas and informed them of the divert and to close up everything in the back while I finished up with the phone patch. I made an announcement to the passengers informing them of our maintenance issues and our need to divert. I joined back up with [the first officer] as we were descending into ZZZ. I set up the [flight computer]; glanced through the diversion guide; and [the first officer] landed. Although we didn't request emergency fire equipment; it was present during the landing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The flight crew of an Airbus A320 reported they noticed a Number 2 Eng Fire push button light illuminated on the overhead panel. No other indications of a fire.

Narrative: During cruise First Officer (FO) noticed that the Number 2 Engine Fire push button light on the overhead panel was illuminated; we had no other indication of a fire; no ECAM; No other lights were illuminated elsewhere which we both thought to be highly unusual. The light was on steady so I called for the QRH engine fire checklist which [the FO] had already gotten ready; then the light went out. It then started to flash randomly off and on. I tested the Number 2 engine fire system and it tested normally.At that point I was thinking we had a failure within the detection system or warning system and told [the FO] I think we should do the 3 way call with dispatch and [maintenance control]. He agreed and so I gave [the FO] the Pilot Flying (PF) duties and I worked on the phone patch to dispatch. I also sent Maintenance a quick note through ACARS about our situation. It took a few minutes to get the phone patch together; and during that time [the FO] and I both agreed the engine was most likely fine; that we had some kind of detection/warning failure and that a diversion would probably be the best decision and ZZZ was only 50 to 60 miles away.The ARINC phone patch was established and I informed [maintenance control] and dispatch of our issue. After a few minutes [maintenance control] came back with a response that his only guidance he could give us was to follow the QRH. He had nothing to offer other than that. I was reluctant to follow that idea as there was no ECAM; no other lights or warnings; just an errant flashing fire light. I glanced over at who was monitoring the call and I could tell he was also reluctant with that idea but we both knew it was the most conservative approach to the situation.I told [the FO] head for ZZZ. I confirmed with [maintenance control] and dispatch about following the QRH engine fire checklist; I'm sure they could hear my reluctance to their guidance. I was about to tell [the FP] that we should consider running the checklist and shut down the Number 2 engine. I happened to glance down at the center pedestal and noticed the red Number 1 engine 'fire' light on the engine start and ignition panel was now on and pointed it out. It also flashed on and off a few times. Again; there were no ECAMS; no other lights or warnings. At that point I decided to disregard the [maintenance control] guidance; told [the FO] let's use my emergency authority; disregard both lights and land in ZZZ. I then informed [maintenance control] about the new light; and told them I would use that authority to disregard the [maintenance control] guidance and that we would be leaving both engines running and plan a normal landing. [maintenance control] signed off and dispatch and I finished up with the diversion info such as landing performance; NOTAMS; weather; etc. [my FO] was very proactive and called back to the FAs and informed them of the divert and to close up everything in the back while I finished up with the phone patch. I made an announcement to the passengers informing them of our maintenance issues and our need to divert. I joined back up with [the FO] as we were descending into ZZZ. I set up the [Flight Computer]; glanced through the diversion guide; and [the FO] landed. Although we didn't request emergency fire equipment; it was present during the landing.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.