Narrative:

While reviewing the maintenance status of our aircraft I saw there were multiple instances of FCU (flight control unit) failure with multiple resets that would temporarily fix the issue only to have the FCU fail again. After consultation with my dispatcher; maintenance control; my flying partner and the FAA inspector riding with us to ZZZ1; I refused the aircraft since we were scheduled to fly to ZZZ1 where the weather was forecast to be at minimums. Maintenance arrived at the aircraft and said they had a replacement FCU and immediately started pulling circuit breakers in front of the FAA inspector riding with us to ZZZ1. At this point I left the cockpit to give the two mechanics room to work on the FCU and went into the cabin to make a PA to the passengers and let the csrs know we would be delayed for at least an hour while the FCU was replaced. We finally departed for ZZZ1 almost 1.5 hours late after maintenance had replaced the FCU and successfully run their tests. I did notice that during their test; there was a red autopilot failure ECAM present for much of the time.43 minutes into the flight at cruise in smooth air; autopilot 1 disconnected. I confirmed that neither one of us had accidently bumped the side stick and neither one of us had our hands or any objects near the stick. I reconnected AP1 and it remained engaged for about 10 more minutes when it again disconnected. I again reconnected AP1 and it remained connected for about 5 minutes when it again disconnected. This time when I tried to reconnect it I received a FCU channel 2 failure and autopilot 1 failure. I gave the aircraft to my first officer since I had also lost FMGC1 with no map display. Our display showed -FD2 and with my FD on 2fd2. The first officer's FMGC remained normal and AP2 connected successfully. The ECAM had no action items so I referred to the QRH which did have procedures for airborne system resets. Before attempting the resets I established a phone patch with maintenance control to discuss the procedure in light of the past history. Maintenance control agreed with attempting the reset on FCU2 on the 141VU panel. I confirmed the circuit breaker location and had my jump seater cycle the circuit breaker per maintenance control's instructions. The reset was unsuccessful. We then performed a reset on FMGC1 on 49VU to regain FMGC1. This was only partially successful and my FD display returned to 1fd2 but the FMGC remained in independent mode. I conferred with my flying partners on our options. Taking this aircraft on to ZZZ1 with weather at minimums was not feasible. We elected to divert and with the dispatcher's concurrence proceeded to ZZZ2; reviewing the overweight landing checklist and landing data provided by our dispatcher; where we landed about 11000 pounds overweight. Since my FMGC was only partially usable I elected to let the first officer make the landing. I have had previous experience with FMGC failures where the FMGC fails totally at the last minute creating un-needed confusion in a critical phase of flight. Since the first officer's systems were normal and he was a very experienced airbus pilot; I had no hesitation letting him perform the landing. Landing and rollout were normal. A ZZZ2 mechanic met us at the gate and printed out about 12 inches of maintenance failures from the mcdu and made sure he understood exactly what the failures were. We proceeded to the spare aircraft that was towed from the hangar right behind us as we were taxing in.when we arrived at the new gate; the csr had to manually input my file number and the first officer's to check us off. When I pulled up the release information it showed me fit but showed no next to the first officer. We had to manually input the fit information and eventually called the dispatcher to get it accomplished. As we were getting ready to push; the release showed a new release 3 which I had not signed off; and discovered the dispatcher had made a new release without informing us. I had to reconnect my ipad to download and sign the new release. About 1.5 hours later; after having to wait for a new release we taxied out. When the final weights arrived; the weight manifest did not include the jumpseater. We had to call the station with the jump seater's credential information to have him included in the weight manifest. The csr had failed to do this at the gate. After multiple calls to the station and to dispatch; after almost 30 minutes off the gate; we finally had it corrected.we proceeded to ZZZ1 where the weather had continued to get worse. We had two alternates. Eventually one of them went below minimums so it was dropped. We discussed our options should the approach into ZZZ1 not be successful and elected; rather than attempt another approach at ZZZ1; we would proceed on to the other where the weather was at CAT1 minimums. We successfully flew a CAT2 autoland into ZZZ1 with weather right at minimums. This aircraft was not autoland limited into ZZZ1 where as the original one was. We arrived at the gate in heavy snow; almost four hours late. Our FAA jumpseater told us we did a great a job handling all of the issues.to top off the night; we had to take cabs; including flight attendants from another flight waiting at the curb; to the hotel as the roads were snow blocked and the hotel van was not operating. Our cab barely made it to the hotel dodging sliding cars stuck in the snow.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 Captain reported refusing an aircraft with a history of FCU failures. The FCU was replaced by Maintenance; but failed enroute and the crew elected to divert due to low visibility at their destination.

Narrative: While reviewing the maintenance status of our aircraft I saw there were multiple instances of FCU (Flight Control Unit) failure with multiple resets that would temporarily fix the issue only to have the FCU fail again. After consultation with my dispatcher; Maintenance Control; my flying partner and the FAA inspector riding with us to ZZZ1; I refused the aircraft since we were scheduled to fly to ZZZ1 where the weather was forecast to be at minimums. Maintenance arrived at the aircraft and said they had a replacement FCU and immediately started pulling circuit breakers in front of the FAA inspector riding with us to ZZZ1. At this point I left the cockpit to give the two mechanics room to work on the FCU and went into the cabin to make a PA to the passengers and let the CSRs know we would be delayed for at least an hour while the FCU was replaced. We finally departed for ZZZ1 almost 1.5 hours late after maintenance had replaced the FCU and successfully run their tests. I did notice that during their test; there was a Red Autopilot Failure ECAM present for much of the time.43 minutes into the flight at cruise in smooth air; Autopilot 1 disconnected. I confirmed that neither one of us had accidently bumped the side stick and neither one of us had our hands or any objects near the stick. I reconnected AP1 and it remained engaged for about 10 more minutes when it again disconnected. I again reconnected AP1 and it remained connected for about 5 minutes when it again disconnected. This time when I tried to reconnect it I received a FCU channel 2 failure and Autopilot 1 failure. I gave the aircraft to my first officer since I had also lost FMGC1 with no map display. Our display showed -FD2 and with my FD on 2FD2. The first officer's FMGC remained normal and AP2 connected successfully. The ECAM had no action items so I referred to the QRH which did have procedures for airborne system resets. Before attempting the resets I established a phone patch with Maintenance Control to discuss the procedure in light of the past history. Maintenance Control agreed with attempting the reset on FCU2 on the 141VU panel. I confirmed the CB location and had my jump seater cycle the CB per Maintenance Control's instructions. The reset was unsuccessful. We then performed a reset on FMGC1 on 49VU to regain FMGC1. This was only partially successful and my FD display returned to 1FD2 but the FMGC remained in independent mode. I conferred with my flying partners on our options. Taking this aircraft on to ZZZ1 with weather at minimums was not feasible. We elected to divert and with the dispatcher's concurrence proceeded to ZZZ2; reviewing the overweight landing checklist and landing data provided by our dispatcher; where we landed about 11000 pounds overweight. Since my FMGC was only partially usable I elected to let the F/O make the landing. I have had previous experience with FMGC failures where the FMGC fails totally at the last minute creating un-needed confusion in a critical phase of flight. Since the F/O's systems were normal and he was a very experienced Airbus pilot; I had no hesitation letting him perform the landing. Landing and rollout were normal. A ZZZ2 mechanic met us at the gate and printed out about 12 inches of maintenance failures from the MCDU and made sure he understood exactly what the failures were. We proceeded to the spare aircraft that was towed from the hangar right behind us as we were taxing in.When we arrived at the new gate; the CSR had to manually input my file number and the F/O's to check us off. When I pulled up the release information it showed me fit but showed NO next to the F/O. We had to manually input the FIT information and eventually called the dispatcher to get it accomplished. As we were getting ready to push; the release showed a new Release 3 which I had not signed off; and discovered the Dispatcher had made a new release without informing us. I had to reconnect my IPAD to download and sign the new release. About 1.5 hours later; after having to wait for a new Release we taxied out. When the final weights arrived; the weight manifest did not include the jumpseater. We had to call the station with the jump seater's credential information to have him included in the weight manifest. The CSR had failed to do this at the gate. After multiple calls to the station and to dispatch; after almost 30 minutes off the gate; we finally had it corrected.We proceeded to ZZZ1 where the weather had continued to get worse. We had two alternates. Eventually one of them went below minimums so it was dropped. We discussed our options should the approach into ZZZ1 not be successful and elected; rather than attempt another approach at ZZZ1; we would proceed on to the other where the weather was at CAT1 minimums. We successfully flew a CAT2 autoland into ZZZ1 with weather right at minimums. This aircraft was not autoland limited into ZZZ1 where as the original one was. We arrived at the gate in heavy snow; almost four hours late. Our FAA jumpseater told us we did a great a job handling all of the issues.To top off the night; we had to take Cabs; including flight attendants from another flight waiting at the curb; to the hotel as the roads were snow blocked and the hotel van was not operating. Our cab barely made it to the hotel dodging sliding cars stuck in the snow.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.