Narrative:

Descending into sfo on the evening of 4/X/90 at approximately xa:10L, we were cleared to 6000' and told to turn to a heading of 240 degree to intercept the 095 degree right off sfo. The FMS had previously been programmed with the quiet bridge visibility approach to runway 28R as the ATIS had indicated that aircraft were landing to the west. The FMS was updated to include the 095 degree right intercept and armed in both the LNAV and VNAV modes. While still on a 240 degree heading and level at 6000' the controller began asking whether or not we had the field in sight. We did not report the airport 'in sight' until a second request was made because we wanted to be certain we had the correct airport identify. It was obvious that the controller's workload was reaching a saturation level as communications were virtually nonstop. At this time the controller cleared us for a visibility approach to runway 28R and directed us to maintain 250 KTS. I turned the aircraft toward the airport (approximately a 270 degree heading) and noted our next waypoint crossing altitude was 4000'. Additionally, I observed the vertical deviation bug or diamond on my hse showed us to be very high above the VNAV path. I then reset the target altitude on the MCP to 4000' and commenced a descent. Passing through approximately 5800' the controller stated, 'air carrier X for your information you should be at 6000' until inside 18 DME on the quiet bridge approach!' he cleared us to 4000' and gave us a turn back toward a 220 degree heading and slowed us to 170 KTS. Shortly thereafter, we were cleared for a tipp toe visibility to runway 28L. We made an otherwise uneventful landing on runway 28L. At the time we commenced our descent our cockpit instruments read that a descent to 4000' would be proper. This confusing situation was caused by several factors. First, the controller was clearly overloaded. Communications were rapid fire and he was obviously anxious for pilots to report the field in sight in order to shift his burden somewhat. Second, the word 'visibility' is inappropriate in the name of IFR/VFR approach. Both pilots heard 'visibility approach' not 'quiet bridge visibility approach!'. Pilots are trained to key on the phrase 'cleared for visibility approach' and can be misled if such wording is contained in an approach which is not a pure visibility. Third, controller terminology should be standardized to include altitude restrictions in the clearance. For example, the expressway visibility approach to runway 31 in lga has a restriction that requires aircraft to pass over 'dials' at 2500'. I have recent experience on this approach and attest to the fact that controllers giving this clearance always state 'cross dials at or above 2500', cleared expressway visibility to runway 31'. Had similar language been used here, there would have been no question that the controller was clearing us for a 'quiet bridge visibility approach' and not a pure visibility approach. Fourth, our instruments showed us to be at a point inside the 6000' restriction. Both pilots verified this looking at two different instruments. The final point I wish to make concerns glass cockpit technology in the visibility approach environment. The glass cockpit in the current state does not allow enough flexibility for runway approach changes in close and in fact creates a potentially dangerous situation. Our procedures prohibit major FMS modifications below 10000'. Additionally we are not currently trained for such close in changes and suddenly reverting to older technology while maintaining appropriate situational awareness is difficult.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR DID NOT FLY ASSIGNED APCH AND WAS RESEQUENCED TO FOLLOW ANOTHER ACFT DURING A BUSY PERIOD.

Narrative: DSNDING INTO SFO ON THE EVENING OF 4/X/90 AT APPROX XA:10L, WE WERE CLRED TO 6000' AND TOLD TO TURN TO A HDG OF 240 DEG TO INTERCEPT THE 095 DEG R OFF SFO. THE FMS HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN PROGRAMMED WITH THE QUIET BRIDGE VIS APCH TO RWY 28R AS THE ATIS HAD INDICATED THAT ACFT WERE LNDG TO THE W. THE FMS WAS UPDATED TO INCLUDE THE 095 DEG R INTERCEPT AND ARMED IN BOTH THE LNAV AND VNAV MODES. WHILE STILL ON A 240 DEG HDG AND LEVEL AT 6000' THE CTLR BEGAN ASKING WHETHER OR NOT WE HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT. WE DID NOT RPT THE ARPT 'IN SIGHT' UNTIL A SECOND REQUEST WAS MADE BECAUSE WE WANTED TO BE CERTAIN WE HAD THE CORRECT ARPT IDENT. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE CTLR'S WORKLOAD WAS REACHING A SATURATION LEVEL AS COMS WERE VIRTUALLY NONSTOP. AT THIS TIME THE CTLR CLRED US FOR A VIS APCH TO RWY 28R AND DIRECTED US TO MAINTAIN 250 KTS. I TURNED THE ACFT TOWARD THE ARPT (APPROX A 270 DEG HDG) AND NOTED OUR NEXT WAYPOINT XING ALT WAS 4000'. ADDITIONALLY, I OBSERVED THE VERT DEVIATION BUG OR DIAMOND ON MY HSE SHOWED US TO BE VERY HIGH ABOVE THE VNAV PATH. I THEN RESET THE TARGET ALT ON THE MCP TO 4000' AND COMMENCED A DSNT. PASSING THROUGH APPROX 5800' THE CTLR STATED, 'ACR X FOR YOUR INFO YOU SHOULD BE AT 6000' UNTIL INSIDE 18 DME ON THE QUIET BRIDGE APCH!' HE CLRED US TO 4000' AND GAVE US A TURN BACK TOWARD A 220 DEG HDG AND SLOWED US TO 170 KTS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WE WERE CLRED FOR A TIPP TOE VIS TO RWY 28L. WE MADE AN OTHERWISE UNEVENTFUL LNDG ON RWY 28L. AT THE TIME WE COMMENCED OUR DSNT OUR COCKPIT INSTRUMENTS READ THAT A DSNT TO 4000' WOULD BE PROPER. THIS CONFUSING SITUATION WAS CAUSED BY SEVERAL FACTORS. FIRST, THE CTLR WAS CLRLY OVERLOADED. COMS WERE RAPID FIRE AND HE WAS OBVIOUSLY ANXIOUS FOR PLTS TO RPT THE FIELD IN SIGHT IN ORDER TO SHIFT HIS BURDEN SOMEWHAT. SECOND, THE WORD 'VIS' IS INAPPROPRIATE IN THE NAME OF IFR/VFR APCH. BOTH PLTS HEARD 'VIS APCH' NOT 'QUIET BRIDGE VIS APCH!'. PLTS ARE TRAINED TO KEY ON THE PHRASE 'CLRED FOR VIS APCH' AND CAN BE MISLED IF SUCH WORDING IS CONTAINED IN AN APCH WHICH IS NOT A PURE VIS. THIRD, CTLR TERMINOLOGY SHOULD BE STANDARDIZED TO INCLUDE ALT RESTRICTIONS IN THE CLRNC. FOR EXAMPLE, THE EXPRESSWAY VIS APCH TO RWY 31 IN LGA HAS A RESTRICTION THAT REQUIRES ACFT TO PASS OVER 'DIALS' AT 2500'. I HAVE RECENT EXPERIENCE ON THIS APCH AND ATTEST TO THE FACT THAT CTLRS GIVING THIS CLRNC ALWAYS STATE 'CROSS DIALS AT OR ABOVE 2500', CLRED EXPRESSWAY VIS TO RWY 31'. HAD SIMILAR LANGUAGE BEEN USED HERE, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO QUESTION THAT THE CTLR WAS CLRING US FOR A 'QUIET BRIDGE VIS APCH' AND NOT A PURE VIS APCH. FOURTH, OUR INSTRUMENTS SHOWED US TO BE AT A POINT INSIDE THE 6000' RESTRICTION. BOTH PLTS VERIFIED THIS LOOKING AT TWO DIFFERENT INSTRUMENTS. THE FINAL POINT I WISH TO MAKE CONCERNS GLASS COCKPIT TECHNOLOGY IN THE VIS APCH ENVIRONMENT. THE GLASS COCKPIT IN THE CURRENT STATE DOES NOT ALLOW ENOUGH FLEXIBILITY FOR RWY APCH CHANGES IN CLOSE AND IN FACT CREATES A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITUATION. OUR PROCS PROHIBIT MAJOR FMS MODIFICATIONS BELOW 10000'. ADDITIONALLY WE ARE NOT CURRENTLY TRAINED FOR SUCH CLOSE IN CHANGES AND SUDDENLY REVERTING TO OLDER TECHNOLOGY WHILE MAINTAINING APPROPRIATE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IS DIFFICULT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.