Narrative:

I was working cab coordinator and controller in charge combined. Aircraft X went around RWY2. I called hcf approach; to coordinate that aircraft X was responding to a TCAS RA; with no traffic; and was going around RWY2. We were intending to coordinate to see if they (approach) had any other traffic inbound next for arrival from either the south or the south west.the approach controller said; that they had no one from the south; and that their next arrivals they had were 3 arrivals; aircraft Z; on a high right downwind; currently at 7000 feet; aircraft Y; that was 20 miles southwest; and then followed by aircraft a. I asked; that ogg; (maui tower) keep aircraft X; in our VFR traffic pattern; 1500 feet; and cancelled IFR; to be the next arrival #1 to ogg again. The approach controller said ok. I coordinated with the local controller (local control) and said that right traffic is good for aircraft X; and that he will be #1 inside of aircraft Z.then; I noticed; aircraft Z; was continuing south bound on the right downwind for RWY2. I then noticed that aircraft Y was now going to be #2 after aircraft X; and was being vectored to tebbs fix for the ILS RWY2. I called hcf south; to coordinate and approval request (apreq); to slow down aircraft Y; aircraft Y was showing 270 knots; between; 13DME and 16 DME to slow to either 170 or maintain slowest practical reference aircraft X that was still in right traffic to RWY2 now entering the right downwind 1500 feet. Hcf approach controller said ok. Then; when aircraft X started their base turn; I called hcf south; to inform them that aircraft X; was now in their base turn; reference aircraft Y; now approaching tebbs fix; 3000; ILS RWY2; and 10 mile final. Aircraft Y then checked in on our frequency 118.7; the approach controller then answered and said; 'is that going to fit?' which was confusing to me; because I thought we have been coordinating that aircraft X was VFR traffic pattern to be #1; inside of aircraft Z and then aircraft Y was now after; and now was converging with aircraft Y and aircraft X on their right base 1500 feet and aircraft Y was 3000 feet. I answered that aircraft X; was flying their base turn towards the drag strip (65Z). They then asked; can you split them after aircraft Y? Which is even more confusing; because; aircraft X; was already on a 4 mile right base for RWY2; and then the approach controller is asking us; if the aircraft X; can split behind aircraft Y 9-10 mile final; and then aircraft a in trail of aircraft Y; which was also confusing.then; I asked the approach controller; do they want aircraft Y; to go back for resequencing runway heading maintain 4000? They asked to break aircraft X out; after aircraft Y to fly present heading and maintain 4000 feet.which is also confusing; because aircraft X; is on a base leg; which I called initially to report that aircraft X was on a base leg; about a 280-270 degree turn; towards a 4 mile right base for runway 2; flying towards the drag strip (65Z); and the current present heading would be flying towards the west maui mountain range. I reminded the approach controller; that we could not issue the present heading; due to the mountains and the right base towards the mountains.the approach controller; then told me to have aircraft X to fly heading 180. Which is also a bad call; because for aircraft X; to be on a right base leg for RWY2; then to turn to a 180 heading; still converges with the aircraft Y on the ILS at tebbs fix at 3000. Then the approach controller tells me to expedite. Now we are at a place that both the local control and myself never thought could deteriorate to.now I relay that to the local controller; the local controller is trying his very best; he mistakenly tells the wrong aircraft first; aircraft Y; and then aircraft Y takes the clearance. Luckily; the local controller catches it; and changes it. And grabs altitude between the two aircraft; aircraft X was pattern altitude 1500; VFR. And had aircrafty fly runway heading and maintain 3000 feet; then had aircraft Y maintain 4000.I then get a couple of coordination calls from the hcf supervisors watch desk; to coordinate the go-around mandatory occurrence reporting (mor) for aircraft X initially; and then also; another sup calls later; to coordinate immediately about the arrival tie to RWY2 between aircraft Y and aircraft X. I was still confused about the previous coordination and how we even arrived here in the first place.I also between coordinating with the approach controller and listening to the read back of the aircraft; I had mistakenly thought; that either aircraft X or aircraft Y had either had a miss read back and/or had a possible pilot deviation. However; neither was the case. But between; coordinating with the approach controller; catching up; and relaying this rapidly changing information to the local controller; and also listening to the read back of the aircraft and not hearing the read back; trying to maintain situational awareness.the operations manager then called me; and asked if we would be filing both mors at maui for both incidents. I was still trying to catch up with what the hell happened and why did everything break down so rapidly because I thought maui tower was on the same page with approach and vice-versa; however; that was not the case.the coordination broke down; and I thought; the approach controller knew; that we apreq that aircraft X was going to be the next arrival; or at least the #1; to runway 02; and then; their next 3 arrivals. If approach didn't like our apreq for aircraft X to stay in our VFR traffic pattern to land RWY2 to be #1; then why did they approve it? Also; if aircraft Y; was going to be #2; why didn't the approach controller; keep aircraft Y; to widen out to camps fix to be #2; and/or slow down like how we coordinated previously?and; if none of those was the approach controllers' plan; we (maui tower) would have been more than happy to have the first go around; (aircraft X) to simply fly runway heading and maintain 4000 feet initially to be sequenced after their next 3 arrivals. Also; if approach needed to change it; we could have simply handed off aircraft X; when they were on the right downwind for RWY2; and could have been after the arrivals that approach was working.either way; the coordination broke down and it ended being ugly and in my opinion it was [bad] coordination. We could have totally avoided this situation from the first place.we asked initially if this right traffic pattern would work with their next arrival; and we had other opportunities to double check to see if the original plan is still working and/or if we have to make any changes to ensure separation and safety to the NAS. The way the approach controller approved both times I called to check in; they made it sound like they would give us room for the jet to make a VFR right traffic pattern back to RWY2.also; I had expectation bias; because I trusted the approach controller would not have ran aircraft Y to become a tie with our aircraft X in the traffic pattern. Tower still has to provide VFR/IFR; and same runway separation between both aircraft X and aircraft Y; same large aircraft.approach control mislead us to believing that they would make room for us. If this was not approach control's expectation then why did they approve both our aircraft X to be #1; inside of aircraft Z; then followed by aircraft Y; then aircraft a.then; if approach wanted to change the sequence; that is fine; so now aircraft Y is going to be in front of aircraft Z; then; where does aircraft X fit? #1? After aircraft Y; after aircraft a? After aircraft Z? None of those options were expressed or communicated to us; so we presumed that aircraft X was #1; inside of their next 3 arrivals.if approach controller did not tell aircraft Y to widen; and/or slow; then why did the approach control send us the conflicting; / converging similar type aircraft to the same runway as a tie? After we coordinated earlier?we (maui tower) should have originally just sent aircraft X back to hcf approach for resequencing; since they were already working 3 other aircraft I guess. And/or; we could have had aircraft X; on the right downwind; to extend their downwind and do a manual hand off with hcf for re-sequencing since they changed the sequence that they told me about originally anyway.either way; I believe; both myself; the local controller and hcf south arrival approach; all had expectation bias with the coordination at the time. With the coordination; both the local control and myself; thought that they would make room for us working aircraft X back to runway 2. Maybe I need to be clearer on my coordination. Maybe hcf should consider aircraft performance; for a large jet to make right traffic; VFR traffic pattern; 1500 feet; is not going to be as close compared to a C172.did approach have a different plan? That is fine; if so; why didn't the approach controller talk to us about changing the plan to ensure a safe traffic arrival flow to RWY2? LOA misunderstanding? Misconceptions? Misinterpretations?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: OGG Tower Controller reported confusion during a go-around and Approach Control attempting to sequence traffic back into the arrival flow.

Narrative: I was working Cab Coordinator and Controller in Charge combined. Aircraft X went around RWY2. I called HCF Approach; to coordinate that Aircraft X was responding to a TCAS RA; with no traffic; and was going around RWY2. We were intending to coordinate to see if they (Approach) had any other traffic inbound next for arrival from either the South or the South West.The Approach Controller said; that they had no one from the South; and that their next arrivals they had were 3 arrivals; Aircraft Z; on a high Right Downwind; currently at 7000 feet; Aircraft Y; that was 20 miles SW; and then followed by Aircraft A. I asked; that OGG; (Maui Tower) keep Aircraft X; in our VFR Traffic Pattern; 1500 feet; and cancelled IFR; to be the next arrival #1 to OGG again. The approach Controller said OK. I coordinated with the Local Controller (LC) and said that right traffic is good for Aircraft X; and that he will be #1 inside of Aircraft Z.Then; I noticed; Aircraft Z; was continuing South Bound on the right downwind for RWY2. I then noticed that Aircraft Y was now going to be #2 after Aircraft X; and was being vectored to TEBBS fix for the ILS RWY2. I called HCF South; to coordinate and Approval Request (APREQ); to slow down Aircraft Y; Aircraft Y was showing 270 knots; between; 13DME and 16 DME to slow to either 170 or maintain slowest practical reference Aircraft X that was still in right traffic to RWY2 now entering the Right Downwind 1500 feet. HCF Approach Controller said OK. Then; when Aircraft X started their base turn; I called HCF South; to inform them that Aircraft X; was now in their base turn; reference Aircraft Y; now approaching TEBBS fix; 3000; ILS RWY2; and 10 Mile final. Aircraft Y then checked in on our frequency 118.7; the Approach Controller then answered and said; 'Is that going to FIT?' Which was confusing to me; because I thought we have been coordinating that Aircraft X was VFR traffic pattern to be #1; inside of Aircraft Z and then Aircraft Y was now after; and now was converging with Aircraft Y and Aircraft X on their right base 1500 feet and Aircraft Y was 3000 feet. I answered that Aircraft X; was flying their base turn towards the drag strip (65Z). They then asked; can you split them after Aircraft Y? Which is even more confusing; because; Aircraft X; was already on a 4 mile Right Base for RWY2; and then the Approach Controller is asking us; if the Aircraft X; can split behind Aircraft Y 9-10 mile final; and then Aircraft A in trail of Aircraft Y; which was also confusing.Then; I asked the Approach controller; do they want Aircraft Y; to go back for resequencing Runway Heading maintain 4000? They asked to break Aircraft X out; after Aircraft Y to fly Present heading and Maintain 4000 feet.Which is also confusing; because Aircraft X; is on a base leg; which I called initially to report that Aircraft X was on a Base leg; about a 280-270 degree turn; towards a 4 mile Right Base for Runway 2; flying towards the drag strip (65Z); and the current present heading would be flying towards the West Maui Mountain Range. I reminded the Approach controller; that we could not issue the Present Heading; due to the Mountains and the Right Base towards the Mountains.The Approach Controller; then told me to have Aircraft X to fly Heading 180. Which is also a bad call; because for Aircraft X; to be on a Right Base leg for RWY2; then to turn to a 180 heading; still converges with the Aircraft Y on the ILS at TEBBS fix at 3000. Then the approach controller tells me to EXPEDITE. Now we are at a place that both the LC and myself never thought could deteriorate to.Now I relay that to the Local Controller; the Local Controller is trying his very best; he mistakenly tells the wrong aircraft first; Aircraft Y; and then Aircraft Y takes the clearance. Luckily; the Local Controller catches it; and changes it. And grabs altitude between the two aircraft; Aircraft X was pattern altitude 1500; VFR. And had AircraftY fly Runway Heading and maintain 3000 feet; then had Aircraft Y maintain 4000.I then get a couple of coordination calls from the HCF Supervisors Watch Desk; to coordinate the Go-Around Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) for Aircraft X initially; and then also; another sup calls later; to coordinate immediately about the arrival TIE to RWY2 between Aircraft Y and Aircraft X. I was still confused about the previous coordination and how we even arrived here in the first place.I also between coordinating with the Approach Controller and listening to the read back of the aircraft; I had mistakenly thought; that either Aircraft X or Aircraft Y had either had a miss read back and/or had a possible pilot deviation. However; neither was the case. But between; coordinating with the Approach Controller; catching up; and relaying this rapidly changing information to the Local Controller; and also listening to the read back of the aircraft and not hearing the read back; trying to maintain situational awareness.The Operations Manager then called me; and asked if we would be filing both MORs at Maui for both incidents. I was still trying to catch up with what the hell happened and why did everything break down so rapidly because I thought Maui Tower was on the same page with Approach and vice-versa; however; that was not the case.The coordination broke down; and I thought; the Approach Controller knew; that we APREQ that Aircraft X was going to be the next arrival; or at least the #1; to Runway 02; and then; their next 3 arrivals. If Approach didn't like our APREQ for Aircraft X to stay in our VFR traffic pattern to land RWY2 to be #1; then why did they approve it? Also; if Aircraft Y; was going to be #2; why didn't the approach controller; keep Aircraft Y; to widen out to CAMPS fix to be #2; and/or slow down like how we coordinated previously?And; if none of those was the Approach Controllers' plan; we (Maui Tower) would have been more than happy to have the first go around; (Aircraft X) to simply fly Runway Heading and maintain 4000 feet initially to be sequenced after their next 3 arrivals. Also; if Approach needed to change it; we could have simply handed off Aircraft X; when they were on the Right Downwind for RWY2; and could have been after the arrivals that Approach was working.Either way; the coordination broke down and it ended being ugly and in my opinion it was [bad] coordination. We could have totally avoided this situation from the first place.We asked initially if this right traffic pattern would work with their next arrival; and we had other opportunities to double check to see if the original plan is still working and/or if we have to make any changes to ensure separation and safety to the NAS. The way the Approach Controller approved both times I called to check in; they made it sound like they would give us room for the jet to make a VFR right Traffic Pattern back to RWY2.Also; I had expectation bias; because I trusted the Approach Controller would not have ran Aircraft Y to become a tie with our Aircraft X in the traffic Pattern. Tower still has to provide VFR/IFR; and Same Runway Separation between both Aircraft X and Aircraft Y; same large aircraft.Approach Control mislead us to believing that they would make room for us. If this was not Approach Control's expectation then why did they approve both our Aircraft X to be #1; inside of Aircraft Z; then followed by Aircraft Y; then Aircraft A.Then; if Approach wanted to change the sequence; that is fine; so now Aircraft Y is going to be in front of Aircraft Z; then; where does Aircraft X fit? #1? After Aircraft Y; after Aircraft A? After Aircraft Z? None of those options were expressed or communicated to us; so we presumed that Aircraft X was #1; inside of their next 3 arrivals.If approach controller did not tell Aircraft Y to widen; and/or slow; then why did the Approach Control send us the Conflicting; / Converging similar type aircraft to the same runway as a tie? After we coordinated earlier?We (Maui Tower) should have originally just sent Aircraft X back to HCF approach for resequencing; since they were already working 3 other aircraft I guess. And/Or; we could have had Aircraft X; on the right downwind; to extend their downwind and do a manual hand off with HCF for re-sequencing since they changed the sequence that they told me about originally anyway.Either way; I believe; both myself; the Local Controller and HCF South Arrival Approach; all had expectation bias with the coordination at the time. With the coordination; both the Local Control and myself; thought that they would make room for us working Aircraft X back to Runway 2. Maybe I need to be clearer on my coordination. Maybe HCF should consider aircraft performance; for a large Jet to make Right Traffic; VFR traffic pattern; 1500 feet; is not going to be as close compared to a C172.Did Approach have a different plan? That is fine; If so; why didn't the approach controller talk to us about changing the plan to ensure a safe traffic arrival flow to RWY2? LOA misunderstanding? Misconceptions? Misinterpretations?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.