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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1430977 |
Time | |
Date | 201703 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | GFK.Airport |
State Reference | ND |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Final Approach |
Route In Use | Vectors |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Large Transport |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Final Approach |
Route In Use | Visual Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Local |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 6 Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Aircraft X just completed a practice approach and was transferred to approach control. Shortly after approach control notified me that aircraft X has [advised of emergency condition] with an engine failure and that they had already transferred communications to me. Aircraft X checked on and restated emergency status directly west of the airport and requested to land runway 9L an intersecting runway of the advertised 35L. Winds were light and out of the north. Aircraft X received a landing clearance for runway 9L and then informed me that he would require a circle to lose some altitude. In total he flew 3 circles west of the airport.during that time he described the issue in further detail including the strong smell of burning oil. Prior to aircraft X landing; [an emergency vehicle] called local control directly to respond to the emergency (this doesn't follow our LOA with the airport authority). Due to the short amount of time the emergency vehicle had to get to the runway I retained him on my frequency. Aircraft X landed without incident on runway 9L however they shut down the troubled engine and required a tow. Within 30 seconds after the arrival of aircraft X; aircraft Y called inbound for runway 35L. Due to the unknown conditions/ contamination of the intersection I didn't feel comfortable with a jet landing that runway without an inspection. [The emergency vehicle] was positioned at the runway but the driver kept having issues understanding ground control and was having difficulties getting on the correct frequency. During this time aircraft Y continued inbound and acknowledged the situation. I informed the pilot to expect further clearance prior to a 2 mile final. After numerous attempts to get [the vehicle] to inspect the runway all without responses I issued aircraft Y their missed approach instructions and transferred them back to radar. The runway was eventually inspected and reopened and aircraft Y landed without incident. During and after the event a lot of questions arose at this tower about our standard operating procedure (SOP). Letter of agreements are so extensive that it is tough to know what SOP rules apply to each situation especially in nonstandard operations. In this case out LOA with the airport authority specifically spells out when runway 9L is unusable after an emergency on runway 35L however it doesn't address if 35L is usable after an emergency aircraft lands runway 9L. The SOP transfers the runway to ground control automatically after emergency aircraft crosses the landing threshold of that runway; however in this situation I don't know if it automatically does the same with the intersecting runway or not. I recommend that the airport authority drivers and the control tower have meetings on a fairly regular basis to ensure everyone is on the same page for emergency situations. I also recommend that the airport rescue and fire fighting trucks radios default to ground control frequency so in the case of a rapid response they contact the correct control position. Additionally the airport authority needs to insure their drivers are capable and proficient in operating their radios on the airfield. The confusion created from [the emergency vehicle] in this case was far worse than any of the aircraft on frequency. The SOP and LOA should be reviewed and become inclusive of all runways not just our primary set. As this case demonstrated a single engine aircraft with an engine failure may not make it to the main runway and we should have an understanding of what's expected in this situation. I feel that better coordination between the radar facility and the tower could have helped this situation. When I picked up the shout line I didn't expect an aircraft engine out by the announcement they gave which was 'local-departure information'. In this situation using the words 'emergency' could have aided the tower team in knowing that an emergency aircraft is inbound very quickly. Additionallyafter the arrival of that aircraft it would have been helpful if they confirmed that the runway was usable for aircraft Y prior to transfer of communications.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: GFK Tower Controller working an arriving emergency aircraft was not clear on the proper runway closure procedures as they were not addressed in their local procedures.
Narrative: Aircraft X just completed a practice approach and was transferred to approach control. Shortly after approach control notified me that Aircraft X has [advised of emergency condition] with an engine failure and that they had already transferred communications to me. Aircraft X Checked on and restated emergency status directly west of the airport and requested to land runway 9L an intersecting runway of the advertised 35L. Winds were light and out of the north. Aircraft X received a landing clearance for runway 9L and then informed me that he would require a circle to lose some altitude. In total he flew 3 circles west of the airport.During that time he described the issue in further detail including the strong smell of burning oil. Prior to Aircraft X landing; [an emergency vehicle] called Local Control directly to respond to the emergency (this doesn't follow our LOA with the airport authority). Due to the short amount of time the emergency vehicle had to get to the runway I retained him on my frequency. Aircraft X landed without incident on runway 9L however they shut down the troubled engine and required a tow. Within 30 seconds after the arrival of Aircraft X; Aircraft Y called inbound for runway 35L. Due to the unknown conditions/ contamination of the intersection I didn't feel comfortable with a jet landing that runway without an inspection. [The emergency vehicle] was positioned at the runway but the driver kept having issues understanding Ground Control and was having difficulties getting on the correct frequency. During this time Aircraft Y continued inbound and acknowledged the situation. I informed the pilot to expect further clearance prior to a 2 mile final. After numerous attempts to get [the vehicle] to inspect the runway all without responses I issued Aircraft Y their missed approach instructions and transferred them back to radar. The runway was eventually inspected and reopened and Aircraft Y landed without incident. During and after the event a lot of questions arose at this tower about our Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). Letter of Agreements are so extensive that it is tough to know what SOP rules apply to each situation especially in nonstandard operations. In this case out LOA with the airport authority specifically spells out when runway 9L is unusable after an emergency on runway 35L however it doesn't address if 35L is usable after an emergency aircraft lands runway 9L. The SOP transfers the runway to Ground Control automatically after emergency aircraft crosses the landing threshold of that runway; however In this situation I don't know if it automatically does the same with the intersecting runway or not. I recommend that the airport authority drivers and the control tower have meetings on a fairly regular basis to ensure everyone is on the same page for emergency situations. I also recommend that the Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting trucks radios default to Ground Control frequency so in the case of a rapid response they contact the correct control position. Additionally the airport authority needs to insure their drivers are capable and proficient in operating their radios on the airfield. The confusion created from [the emergency vehicle] in this case was far worse than any of the aircraft on frequency. The SOP and LOA should be reviewed and become inclusive of all runways not just our primary set. As this case demonstrated a single engine aircraft with an engine failure may not make it to the main runway and we should have an understanding of what's expected in this situation. I feel that better coordination between the radar facility and the tower could have helped this situation. When I picked up the shout line I didn't expect an aircraft engine out by the announcement they gave which was 'Local-Departure information'. In this situation using the words 'emergency' could have aided the tower team in knowing that an emergency aircraft is inbound very quickly. Additionallyafter the arrival of that aircraft it would have been helpful if they confirmed that the runway was usable for Aircraft Y prior to transfer of communications.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.