Narrative:

Our base is located approximately 42 miles northwest of the pickup point; which made us fly there; pick up the patient and a third rider; and fly to ZZZ. The weather sensors at our location as well as at pick up point and ZZZ were reporting VFR conditions. The radar showed areas of small pockets of convective activities 40-50 miles south and west of our base but the taf reported that those cells would not be a factor until [after our flight]; so I decided we could conduct the mission safely and accepted it. We departed from our base and started flying southeast towards pick up point. We noticed there was an unusual amount of haze in the air; to the point where our visibility was diminished to about 4 to 5 miles to the southeast and north. There were a few clouds at about 2000 ft in altitude; although they were reported at 2800 ft by nearby aerodromes. As we were flying; the medical crew members looked back towards the northwest; where the flight was scheduled to take us and noticed that with the setting sun the visibility was diminished even further. We estimated the visibility was down to about 2.5 to 3 miles to the northwest. The crew members mentioned that we probably need to assess the weather further and not to make patient contact because it looked like we were not going to be able to make it from pick up point to ZZZ. I decided to divert the flight to the nearest airport (our home airport where we could shelter the aircraft in the event of storms or maintenance). We informed our dispatch that we were diverting and landing at the airport instead of the hospital. Upon landing we assessed the weather further and noticed that the storm cells to the south and west have developed further and they appear to be posing a threat for our flight to ZZZ by the time we departed after picking up the patient. I called our dispatch and notified them that we were going to have to abort the flight request due to the weather rapidly deteriorating. Our dispatch acknowledges and told me to hang tight at the airport and that she was going to contact our supervisor to see if the medical crew members can take the patient by ground instead. I notified dispatch that the weather in ZZZ was not conducive for the flight but we could make it to our base before the weather turned bad without a problem. She proceeded to tell me that supervisor; mr. X wanted us to not take off and return to our base because 'if the weather is bad enough to abort; then we couldn't takeoff and make it back to base'. I explain to dispatch that the weather in ZZZ was turning bad but we could make it to our base with no issues. By this point she put me on hold and connected me via three-way with mr. Y (on-call supervisor) who was collocated with mr. X our medical director. Mr. Y was simply relaying what mr. X was telling him. Mindful that we are at our home airport and both mr. X and mr. Y are inside the building a few hundred feet away. As I am on the phone on a three-way call; I see both mr. X and mr. Y exit the building and decided to go talk to them face-to-face. Mr. X was visibly upset at the situation. I attempted to explain my rationale behind making the decision to abort to the airport and he could not 'understand why is the weather bad enough to not take the call but it was good to fly back to our base'. I explained to him that the weather in ZZZ was turning bad and I could make it to our base with the current weather conditions. He went on to questioning my judgment call to abort the flight due to weather in the first place and furthermore questioned my ability to be able to fly back to base and continued to say 'he didn't feel comfortable having his medical crew members fly back with me'. This is the same person who had dispatch call another base in our program to see if 'another pilot could complete the transfer' (shopping for another for weather). I told him I understood where he stands and told him that I would leave the aircraft at the airport and catch a taxi back to our base.by making us hold on the ground because he thought the weather was bad when I was explaining to him that it was not; he took operational control of the aircraft. This type of pressure is directly in contradiction with [company] policy of making conservative calls. I also feel my ability to manage risk; make the most conservative call and act as the PIC in the aircraft were questioned by a person who does not necessarily understand weather and how it can affect any given flight. There have been other instances where pilots and medical crew members feel pressured to fly by this same person and it is to the point where I don't feel like I want to come to work and deal with situations like this. At this point in time I am feeling that mr. X put direct pressure on the crew members to make this particular flight even though I tried to explain the reasoning behind the weather call. This type of direct and indirect pressure to fly is the type of behavior that can lead to a major accident because crew members feel that they must go on a flight just because we do not want to upset an individual who wants to micromanage every little detail within this program. Medical managers need to understand the difficult decisions aircrew members make; whether it is on the ground or in the air; due to weather or any safety issues or concern is what the crew members are trained to do and are the main reason why we get hired. To question air crew members on why they make certain decisions while in the air is something we should never have to explain if the call is legitimate. This type of pressure to fly; whether is direct or indirect is the type of behavior that can lead to a major accident and needs to be remedied [as soon as possible].

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Ambulance pilot reported being chastised by a supervisor for canceling a patient flight enroute due to weather. He felt this pressure was directly in contradiction with the company policy of making conservative calls.

Narrative: Our base is located approximately 42 miles NW of the pickup point; which made us fly there; pick up the patient and a third rider; and fly to ZZZ. The weather sensors at our location as well as at pick up point and ZZZ were reporting VFR conditions. The radar showed areas of small pockets of convective activities 40-50 miles south and west of our base but the TAF reported that those cells would not be a factor until [after our flight]; so I decided we could conduct the mission safely and accepted it. We departed from our base and started flying southeast towards pick up point. We noticed there was an unusual amount of haze in the air; to the point where our visibility was diminished to about 4 to 5 miles to the SE and north. There were a few clouds at about 2000 ft in altitude; although they were reported at 2800 ft by nearby aerodromes. As we were flying; the medical crew members looked back towards the northwest; where the flight was scheduled to take us and noticed that with the setting sun the visibility was diminished even further. We estimated the visibility was down to about 2.5 to 3 miles to the NW. The crew members mentioned that we probably need to assess the weather further and not to make patient contact because it looked like we were not going to be able to make it from pick up point to ZZZ. I decided to divert the flight to the nearest airport (our home airport where we could shelter the aircraft in the event of storms or maintenance). We informed our dispatch that we were diverting and landing at the airport instead of the hospital. Upon landing we assessed the weather further and noticed that the storm cells to the south and west have developed further and they appear to be posing a threat for our flight to ZZZ by the time we departed after picking up the patient. I called our dispatch and notified them that we were going to have to abort the flight request due to the weather rapidly deteriorating. Our dispatch acknowledges and told me to hang tight at the airport and that she was going to contact our Supervisor to see if the medical crew members can take the patient by ground instead. I notified dispatch that the weather in ZZZ was not conducive for the flight but we could make it to our base before the weather turned bad without a problem. She proceeded to tell me that Supervisor; Mr. X wanted us to not take off and return to our base because 'if the weather is bad enough to abort; then we couldn't takeoff and make it back to base'. I explain to dispatch that the weather in ZZZ was turning bad but we could make it to our base with no issues. By this point she put me on hold and connected me via three-way with Mr. Y (on-call Supervisor) who was collocated with Mr. X our medical director. Mr. Y was simply relaying what Mr. X was telling him. Mindful that we are at our home airport and both Mr. X and Mr. Y are inside the building a few hundred feet away. As I am on the phone on a three-way call; I see both Mr. X and Mr. Y exit the building and decided to go talk to them face-to-face. Mr. X was visibly upset at the situation. I attempted to explain my rationale behind making the decision to abort to the airport and he could not 'understand why is the weather bad enough to not take the call but it was good to fly back to our base'. I explained to him that the weather in ZZZ was turning bad and I could make it to our base with the current weather conditions. He went on to questioning my judgment call to abort the flight due to weather in the first place and furthermore questioned my ability to be able to fly back to base and continued to say 'he didn't feel comfortable having his medical crew members fly back with me'. This is the same person who had dispatch call another base in our program to see if 'another pilot could complete the transfer' (shopping for another for weather). I told him I understood where he stands and told him that I would leave the aircraft at the airport and catch a taxi back to our base.By making us hold on the ground because he thought the weather was bad when I was explaining to him that it was not; he took operational control of the aircraft. This type of pressure is directly in contradiction with [company] policy of making conservative calls. I also feel my ability to manage risk; make the most conservative call and act as the PIC in the aircraft were questioned by a person who does not necessarily understand weather and how it can affect any given flight. There have been other instances where pilots and medical crew members feel pressured to fly by this same person and it is to the point where I don't feel like I want to come to work and deal with situations like this. At this point in time I am feeling that Mr. X put direct pressure on the crew members to make this particular flight even though I tried to explain the reasoning behind the weather call. This type of direct and indirect pressure to fly is the type of behavior that can lead to a major accident because crew members feel that they must go on a flight just because we do not want to upset an individual who wants to micromanage every little detail within this program. Medical managers need to understand the difficult decisions aircrew members make; whether it is on the ground or in the air; due to weather or any safety issues or concern is what the crew members are trained to do and are the main reason why we get hired. To question air crew members on why they make certain decisions while in the air is something we should never have to explain if the call is legitimate. This type of pressure to fly; whether is direct or indirect is the type of behavior that can lead to a major accident and needs to be remedied [as soon as possible].

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.