37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1432666 |
Time | |
Date | 201703 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | DEN.Airport |
State Reference | CO |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Widebody Transport |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Descent |
Route In Use | Visual Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Descent |
Route In Use | Visual Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Approach |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Approach |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 6 Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Conflict Airborne Conflict Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Track / Heading All Types |
Narrative:
I was training on FR2 and we were working runway 16L. There was a separate controller that was working runway 16R and another that was working runway 17R. We were just taking the briefing and the relieved controller told us aircraft X was on a heading to join the localizer (localizer) and on a visual clearance but traffic had not been passed for the parallel final on runway 16R. The first transmission my trainee made was to call traffic. When aircraft X got near the localizer he said he was responding to a TCAS/RA and going around. He started a slow climb and ended up shooting through the 16L localizer and ended up almost directly on top of aircraft Y who was established on the 16R localizer. They were only a few hundred feet separated vertically. We allowed aircraft X to recover and then gave him instructions. My assumption is that when aircraft X received the RA the pilot grabbed the yoke and pulled back which disengaged the autopilot so the aircraft was no longer going to intercept the localizer for 16L. In this case the pilot's response to the RA actually made it less safe because he overshot his localizer and ended up so close to other traffic.aircraft X was only about 10 miles from touchdown and a little less than 3000 feet AGL when he got the RA. I understand that they are trying to be as safe as possible but when aircraft are that close to the airport the RA response was less safe than if he had joined the localizer. On 16L/right aircraft get consistent ras from parallel traffic. I think that we either need to land runways that are further apart at den when we land south to avoid this constant safety risk. If we do not do that then the airlines need to allow the pilots to go into advisory mode higher and further from the field. If we have an RA 20 miles out and at 10;000 feet then we have options but when they are so close to the field and almost down to our minimum vectoring altitude we are left to do nothing but watch and call traffic.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: D01 TRACON controllers reported that an aircraft on final that was using visual separation on an adjoining aircraft went around due to a Resolution Alert. This made the scenario worse because the aircraft was heavy and flew over another aircraft.
Narrative: I was training on FR2 and we were working runway 16L. There was a separate controller that was working runway 16R and another that was working runway 17R. We were just taking the briefing and the relieved controller told us Aircraft X was on a heading to join the Localizer (LOC) and on a visual clearance but traffic had not been passed for the parallel final on runway 16R. The first transmission my trainee made was to call traffic. When Aircraft X got near the LOC he said he was responding to a TCAS/RA and going around. He started a slow climb and ended up shooting through the 16L LOC and ended up almost directly on top of Aircraft Y who was established on the 16R LOC. They were only a few hundred feet separated vertically. We allowed Aircraft X to recover and then gave him instructions. My assumption is that when Aircraft X received the RA the pilot grabbed the yoke and pulled back which disengaged the autopilot so the aircraft was no longer going to intercept the LOC for 16L. In this case the pilot's response to the RA actually made it less safe because he overshot his LOC and ended up so close to other traffic.Aircraft X was only about 10 miles from touchdown and a little less than 3000 feet AGL when he got the RA. I understand that they are trying to be as safe as possible but when aircraft are that close to the airport the RA response was less safe than if he had joined the LOC. On 16L/R aircraft get consistent RAs from parallel traffic. I think that we either need to land runways that are further apart at DEN when we land south to avoid this constant safety risk. If we do not do that then the airlines need to allow the pilots to go into advisory mode higher and further from the field. If we have an RA 20 miles out and at 10;000 feet then we have options but when they are so close to the field and almost down to our Minimum Vectoring Altitude we are left to do nothing but watch and call traffic.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.